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SUMMARY
This thesis focuses on the welfare costs of exposure to risk linked to openness to
international trade. This is a prominent issue in international debate, whereas it
is largely ignored by trade literature, both theoretical and empirical. Trade theory
is mainly focused on the first moment of the above relationship, which is actually
insufficient for welfare purposes when people are risk averse. Empirical evidence
is mixed, scattered in separate fields of analysis, and does not reach a common
stance. As a result, current literature fails to make a full assessment of the net
welfare impact of an opening-up process.
This work contributes to the above debate by proposing:
• A comprehensive review of the literature on the “destabilising effects” of
openness to international trade;
• An empirical test on the significance and relevance of “precautionary saving”
behaviour under risk, estimated from cross-country data;
• A conceptualisation of vulnerability to poverty induced by trade openness;
• A comprehensive analysis of vulnerability to poverty induced by trade liber-
alisation in Vietnam under Doi Moi,1 by exploiting the available household
living standard surveys for the period 1992-2008;
• An extended version of Ligon and Schechter’s (2003) measure of Vulnerabil-
ity as low Expected Utility;
• An empirical application of the adjusted VEU measure to “trade-induced
vulnerability” using VHLSS panel data (2002-06)
The work is divided into four essays as follows:
1. Review of the literature and conceptualisation (and misconceptions) of “trade-
induced vulnerability to poverty” (Essay 1);
2. A cross-country empirical test in the long-run behaviour of consumption
under risk (Essay 2);
3. A cross-sectional empirical test of trade-induced vulnerability in Vietnam
under Doi Moi (period 1992-2008) (Essay 3);
4. A panel empirical test of trade-induced vulnerability in Vietnam in the pe-
riod 2002-06 (Essay 4).
1“Doi Moi” (renovation) was a comprehensive process of reforms undertaken from the
early 1990s by Vietnam characterised by a combination of liberalisation, stabilisation and
structural reforms.
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Introduction
This thesis focuses on the welfare costs of exposure to risk linked to
openness to international trade. This is a prominent issue in international
debate, whereas it is largely ignored by trade literature, both theoretical and
empirical. Trade theory is mainly focused on the first moment of the above
relationship which is actually insufficient for welfare purposes when people
are risk averse. Empirical evidence is mixed, scattered in separate fields of
analysis, and does not reach a common stance. As a result, current literature
fails to make a full assessment of the net welfare impact of the opening-up
process.
In principle, trade can alter risk exposure in two ways: by changing the
riskiness of existing activities, for instance, by altering the weight of foreign
compared with domestic shocks faced by the economy, or by changing the
emphasis among the different activities households engage in such as, for
example, switching from subsistence food crops to cash crops (McCulloch et
al., 2001).
According to the theory of precautionary saving (Kimball, 1990; Ca-
ballero, 1990; Deaton, 1992; Caroll 2001a; Caroll & Kimball, 2008), risk-
averse people react to risk by modifying their behaviour, and more specif-
ically, by undertaking additional saving and reducing current consumption.
This implies a smooth path of consumption that is lower than if the same av-
erage income were available with certainty which implies permanent negative
effects on welfare. This is particularly true for people characterised by a poor
ability to take advantage of the positive opportunities linked to trade reforms
and weak mitigating strategies. In the midst of trade reform, they carry out
extra/unproductive saving and follow conservative choices shying away from
profitable but risky investments (Winters et al., 2004). This is the innermost
source of vulnerability induced by trade. It is neither directly observable nor
linked to the actual manifestation of shocks. Moreover, it also implies that
mean consumption reflects the negative impact of risks. Thus, mean con-
sumption cannot be used as a riskless counterfactual as is implicitly done by
current vulnerability measures. As a result, current vulnerability measures
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tend to underestimate the overall impact of risk on consumption, leading to
biased (downward) estimates of the overall effect of risk on welfare.
This work contributes to the above debate by proposing:
• A comprehensive review of the literature on the “destabilising effects”
of openness to international trade;
• An empirical test on the significance and relevance of “precautionary
saving” behaviour under risk, estimated from cross-country data;
• A conceptualisation of vulnerability to poverty induced by trade open-
ness;
• A comprehensive analysis of vulnerability to poverty induced by trade
liberalisation in Vietnam under Doi Moi,2 by exploiting the available
household living standard surveys for the period 1992-2008;
• An extended version of Ligon and Schechter’s (2003) measure of Vul-
nerability as low Expected Utility;
• An empirical application of the adjusted VEU measure to “trade-induced
vulnerability” using VHLSS panel data (2002-06)
The added value of this work is twofold:
• it detects the relevance of precautionary saving under risk at both cross-
country and household levels;
• it proposes a novel empirical approach to looking at trade-induced vul-
nerability by separating the ex-ante effects of risk from the ex-post
effects of shocks.
The presentation of the overall work is divided into four essays as follows:
1. Review of the literature and conceptualisation (and misconceptions) of
“trade-induced vulnerability” (Essay 1);
2. A cross-country empirical test in the long-run behaviour of consump-
tion under risk (Essay 2);
3. A cross-sectional empirical test of trade-induced vulnerability in Viet-
nam under Doi Moi (period 1992-2008) (Essay 3);
2Doi Moi (renovation) was a comprehensive process of reforms undertaken from the
early 1990s by Vietnam characterised by a combination of liberalisation, stabilisation and
structural reforms.
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4. A panel empirical test of trade-induced vulnerability in Vietnam in the
period 2002-06 (Essay 4).
The first challenge to undertake was to bridge trade openness and vul-
nerability to poverty which are traditionally seen as separate topics by the
specialised literature. While the debate over trade openness and its measure-
ment has been extensively investigated since Krueger’s (1978) seminal work,
vulnerability assessment is still at the “let a hundred flowers bloom” stage,
as stated by Hoddinott and Quisumbing (2003). On the trade side, this
work relies on the operational definition of “openness in practice”, regard-
less of whether or not this depends mainly on deliberate policies (for a clear
distinction between the two concepts, see McCulloch et al., 2001). Further-
more, it does not distinguish, at this stage, between the various sources of
economic fluctuation linked to trade openness (price fluctuations, exchange
rate volatility, policy mismanagement, etc.). The added value of this piece of
work is to complement the literature that emphasises the risk side of trade
reform and its impact on households’ optimal portfolios, especially for the
poor (Winters, 2002; Winters et al., 2004) with the literature on vulner-
ability to poverty able to measure the net welfare cost under risk. Since
the most popular vulnerability measures based on expected values of the
common Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of decomposable poverty mea-
sures (the so-called Vulnerability as Expected Poverty - VEP measures) are
based on a weak theoretical background (Chaudhuri, 2001, 2003; Chaud-
huri & al., 2002; Christiaensen & Boisvert, 2000; Christiaensen Subbarao,
2001; Gunther Harttgen, 2009; Pritchett et al., 2000), Ligon and Schechter’s
(2003) Vulnerability as low Expected Utility (VEU) measure has been taken
as the main empirical reference of vulnerability induced by trade openness.
It is micro founded, empirically based and presents some clear advantages
over other groups of micro-founded vulnerability measures, e.g., the class of
Vulnerability measures looking at the Threat of Poverty (VTP) (Calvo and
Dercon, 2013; Povel, 2015, Chaudhuri & al., 2002; Kamanou & Morduch,
2004; Pritchett & al., 2000; Dutta et al., 2011; Gunther & Maier, 2008).
A key distinction to bear in mind in this work is between risk and shock.
Current measures of vulnerability to poverty show a structural inability to
provide separate assessments of the ex-ante impacts on welfare of both risk
and risk-mitigating strategies from the ex-post impacts of shocks and their
related coping strategies. Thus, they fail to properly address vulnerability.
For instance, a household adopting ex-ante a complete self-insurance mech-
anism at the cost of lower mean consumption would be registered as being
unaffected by risk, producing a structural underestimation of the risk compo-
nent of vulnerability with a parallel overestimation of its poverty component,
12
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leading to biased outcomes (Elbers and Gunning, 2003). These authors also
show that much of the effect on household expected consumption reflects
ex-ante risk. This is particularly important in trade analysis where the risk
component, as above noted, is virtually absent in the current debate on the
net welfare impacts of trade reforms, theoretical and applied.3
The issue of properly addressing the impact of ex-ante risk on vulnera-
bility has been generally performed by deriving simulation-based estimates
of vulnerability grounded on structural dynamic models of household con-
sumption and saving, modelled as the outcome of intertemporal optimisation
under uncertainty (see, among others, Elbers and Gunning, 2003; Elbers et
al., 2007; Elbers et al., 2009; Carter and Ikegami, 2009). Since we lack
general agreement on what the right dynamic model is for any given eco-
nomic environment in which vulnerable households actually live, the current
work follows the strand of the literature that argues that it is more fruitful
to derive empirically-based analyses of vulnerability, focusing on Euler-type
restrictions on the evolution of the household consumption over time. Specif-
ically, since households do their best to smooth consumption over dates and
states of the world, this literature claims that the Euler restrictions can be
exploited to estimate “ex-ante” measures of vulnerability even in the absence
of a fully specified dynamic model (Ligon, 2011). Consumption smoothing
behaviour is also consistent with the standard hypothesis of the stationarity
of consumption over time and states that characterises current applied vul-
nerability measures, even when the distribution of individual income is not
stationary. Looking primarily at consumption behaviour also looks reason-
able for the following reasons: i) it is consistent with the standard empirical
literature that looks at consumption as a more reliable indicator of individual
welfare than income; ii) it is consistent with the specific situation of poorer
households, which traditionally have few assets and are credit constrained
with important knock-on effects on their ability to smooth consumption (Mc-
Culloch et al., 2001) and, iii) it acknowledges that consumption choices actu-
ally engender a further set of behavioural changes that are likely to produce
effects on household welfare such as: smoothing asset/income; self-insurance;
risk-sharing arrangements; diversification, multiple occupations, migration,
etc. (Morduch, 1994; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Townsend, 1994; 1995,
Carter and Barret, 2006; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). However, this
3The only reference to vulnerability in trade policy is related to the ex-post status
of developing countries in terms of remoteness (in the case of Small Island Development
States, SIDS), and lack of diversification of exports (for the eligibility to the GSP+ schema
of the European Union). Additional details can be found in Winters & Martins (2004);
Briguglio, 1995; Briguglio et al., 2009; Briguglio & Galea (2003); Guillamont, 2009 and
2010).
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choice stands on the implicit assumption that consumption behaviour is the
key behavioural variable in explaining household choices under risk.
This work contains a conceptual part and a set of empirical applications:
since panel data are ideal for testing the theory of consumption but scarce at
the micro level, a first cross-country empirical exercise was carried out to test
the relevance and significance of the “extra-saving” hypothesis in response
to macro-fluctuations in income. Then, two empirical assessments of trade-
induced vulnerability were carried out at the household level. The latter
are focused on Vietnam and take advantage of the available household living
standard surveys covering the period 1992-2008.
The choice of Vietnam as the primary case study for the household level
empirical analysis is not casual. The reason is threefold: i) since the early
1990s, Vietnam undertook a vast process of reforms, namely the Doi Moi
(renovation), a combination of liberalisation, stabilisation and structural re-
forms, that determined a sudden opening up to international market of a
previous planned economy; ii) empirical analyses consistently highlight the
increased importance of international trade on Vietnamese economy as well
as the positive empirical correlation between trade liberalisation and poverty
reduction; iii) we can benefit from a collection of six household living standard
surveys for the full period 1992-2008. The challenge was to complement the
existing empirical evidence on the relationship between trade openness and
poverty in Vietnam under Doi Moi with a parallel empirical analysis of the
relationship between trade openness and vulnerability to poverty. Following
on from Winters (2002) who provides an overall picture of the transmission
channels between trade and poverty, this work assesses vulnerability induced
by trade by relying on a workable empirical identification strategy which
focuses on the presence of behavioural heterogeneity in consumption across
households clustered by industries characterised by different degrees of trade
exposure. The assumption is that the presence of heterogeneity in vulnerabil-
ity scores across clusters of households classified by trade exposure strongly
suggests heterogeneity in their risk exposure and/or mitigating strategy with
significant policy implications.
As already noted, the thesis is divided into four essays.
The first essay presents a comprehensive review of the literature on the
destabilising effects of trade openness, drawing together studies in different
fields. It also provides a conceptualisation (and discusses the most common
misconceptions) of vulnerability induced by trade openness and the main
lines of direction for research on the link between trade openness and vul-
nerability to poverty. It highlights, on the one hand, the extent of the very
informative work currently available on the topic and, on the other hand, the
urgent need for more focused work on the implications of trade openness in
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terms of vulnerability. This piece of work first introduces the separate con-
cepts of economic fluctuations, risk and uncertainty and their actual impli-
cations for welfare in developing countries, and then investigates the possible
channels of transmission between trade openness and economic instability.
The second essay is a comprehensive empirical test of the significance and
relevance of consumption smoothing under permanent risk. It presents con-
servative (i.e., lower bound) estimates of the relation between permanent risk
and consumption smoothing based on a long (pre-crisis) cross-country panel
setting (1950-2008). It proposes both LSDV and system GMM estimates of
an ARDL model of consumption behaviour under risk based on the max-
imisation of the expected value of a time-separable CARA utility function
over an infinite horizon (see Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Caballero (1990
and 1991), Weil (1990), Guiso et al., (1992) among others). As suggested
by Carroll and Samwick (1997), Reis (2009) and Krebs et al. (2010), the
permanent component of ex-ante income risk was filtered out as a measure
of permanent risk. The reason is twofold: i) to let the transitory component
of income risk absorb the measurement errors, leading to unbiased estimates
of ex-ante risk; ii) to acknowledge that the more persistent the effect of the
stochastic component of income is, the larger its impacts via the standard
precautionary savings channel are assumed to be since permanent effects can-
not easily be insured by smoothing consumption (for a thorough analysis of
the issue of persistence, see Reis, 2009). While it focuses only on aggregate
risks and rests on the implicit assumption that incomes are perfectly pooled
across individuals (i.e., a representative agent hypothesis), it goes beyond
averages and controls for country heterogeneity also providing estimates by
income deciles. The main innovation to the existing literature in this first
empirical exercise lies in proposing a way to look empirically at the cost of
volatility on welfare that is alternative to using compensation parameters of
household preference for stability (see, for instance, Lucas, 1987, 2003 and
Reis, 2009). More specifically, this essay focuses on the impact of risk on cur-
rent and future consumption possibilities (and welfare) which implies relative
changes in portfolio allocation between risky capital and safe assets (Loayza
et al., 2007; Reis, 2009; Cherif and Hasanov, 2012).
The third essay presents - to the best of my knowledge - the first compre-
hensive analysis of vulnerability to poverty induced by trade liberalisation
in Vietnam under Doi Moi for the entire period 1992-2008, by exploiting
all the available household living standard surveys. First of all, it presents
an empirical assessment of Vulnerability to Poverty (VEP) induced by trade
openness. Thus, acknowledging the structural limitations of VEP in further
decomposing its risk-induced component, it also presents “upper bound” esti-
mates on the relative importance of the various determinants of consumption
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behaviour under risk, by distinguishing the relative influence of ex-ante and
ex-post factors. Finally, by clustering households by trade-related indus-
tries, it also presents some informative analyses across trade clusters of the
heterogeneity in their stochastic component of income innovation (i.e., the
component of income variation unexplained by observables). The striking
feature of this first empirical exercise lies in highlighting the non-decreasing
importance of the share of the vulnerability component of consumption be-
haviour linked to the stochastic determinants and/or ex-post shocks - an
issue traditionally overlooked by the empirical literature in the field. More-
over, these estimates show that risk exposure varies systematically with the
trade exposure of surveyed households.
The fourth essay proposes an extended version of Ligon and Schechter’s
(2003) VEU measure of vulnerability that is able to control for trade-related
heterogeneity in households’ exposure to shocks. Moreover, it also over-
comes the common weakness of currently available measures of vulnerability,
i.e., the inability to decompose the ex-ante impact of risk and its correlated
risk-mitigating strategies from the ex-post ones. To provide an empirical ap-
plication of this extended VEU measure, the essay focuses on VHLSS panel
data (2002-06) and follows three methodological steps: first, following Ligon’s
(2006) approach, the VEU measure was further decomposed by filtering out a
trade-related risk component from the aggregate component of risk premium
able to capture any systematic variation in the expected level of log con-
sumption across households classified by trade clusters. More specifically, it
is argued that, because of heterogeneity in trade exposure between tradable
and non-tradable industries, global risks do not affect households homoge-
neously and the residuals show up a systematic correlation across households
clustered in industries characterised by the same degree of trade exposure.
Second, as suggested by several authors (Elbers and Gunning 2003, Elbers
et al. 2007, Elbers et al. 2009, Carter and Ikegami, 2009), with regard to
the assumption that households correctly perceive the distribution of risk
they face even when they actually do not experience any shock, the idiosyn-
cratic component of the VEU measure is further decomposed by filtering out
an idiosyncratic ex-ante component of risk. This lets us separate the cost
of risk due to the ex-ante change in consumption behaviour from the other
components of the risk premium and so give a distinct value to the costs of
mitigation strategies compared with ex-post coping ones. Third, once again,
the persistent component of ex-ante risk is further filtered out. This makes
the extended version of VEU fully consistent with the theoretical and empir-
ical prediction that a rational consumer safeguards against future bad shocks
by reducing current consumption and over-accumulating saving in safe (un-
productive) assets (Caballero 1990, Deaton 1992, Caroll 2001a). To test the
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significance of the separate impacts of the ex-ante permanent risk on both
non-random consumption and on the risk premium, the correlates between
permanent risk and the various components of trade-induced vulnerability
are also presented. Finally, to control for the presence of heterogeneity in
vulnerability scores by trade-related sectors, the VEU outcomes and the var-
ious components of the risk premia are calculated for cohorts of households
defined by the degree of trade exposure of the industry from which they earn
their main incomes.
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Chapter 1
Essay 1 - Review of the
literature, conceptualisation
(and misconceptions) of
trade-induced vulnerability to
poverty
This essay introduces the reader to the welfare costs of exposure to shocks
and uncertainty linked to trade openness - a prominent issue in international
debate. It presents, first, a comprehensive review of the literature on the
“destabilizing effects” of trade openness, drawing together studies in different
fields. It thus provides a conceptualisation of trade-induced vulnerability and
the promising lines of reasoning for future research on the link between trade
and vulnerability.
Keywords: vulnerability, trade openness, volatility, crisis transmission,
developing countries.
JEL: F10; F40; I32; E17, D60, O10
1.1 Introduction
According to theory, international trade improves resource allocation,
lowers prices for consumers and leads to a more efficient production. An
open trade regime also encourages the integration of the economy into the
18
1.1 Introduction
global system and imports of modern technology, which results in productiv-
ity improvements. Accordingly, international organizations advocate policy
reforms centred on trade liberalization to foster growth and welfare.
However, a key issue remains unanswered: does trade openness magnify
exposure to foreign shocks raising uncertainty and, eventually, producing
long term effects on partner countries welfare? This topic is currently hotly
debated by practitioners, whereas it is largely ignored by trade literature.
Trade theory does not provide a full understanding of the links between trade
openness, shocks and uncertainty. Empirical evidence is mixed, scattered in
separate fields of analysis and does not reach a common stance. A number
of attempts have been carried out recently to investigate more carefully this
issue both at the aggregate (Montalbano & al., 2006, 2008; Guillaumont,
2009, 2010; Naude & al., 2009a),1 and at the households level (Winters,
2002; Winters & al., 2004). However, these pioneer works lack consistency
in terms of conceptualisation and methods.
This work aims at contributing to the above debate by providing a com-
prehensive conceptualisation of “trade-induced vulnerability” and some di-
rections for future research on this topic at different levels of investigations
(macro, micro and meso).
A first challenge is to bridge two relevant issues, traditionally seen as
separate topics: trade openness and vulnerability. While the debate around
trade openness and its measurement has been extensively investigated since
Krueger (1978) seminal work, vulnerability assessment is still at the “let
a hundred flowers bloom” stage, as stated by Hoddinott and Quisumbing
(2003) and there are several misconceptions related to its analysis. The
main focus of this work is the vulnerability analysis of the effects of trade
openness on partner countries. Specifically, this essay addresses the issue
of whether or not, and eventually under which conditions, trade openness
leads to increasing exposure to external shocks and/or raising uncertainty
about the future on certain actors and/or specific social groups. The debate
around trade openness remains indeed an important part of the story but it
does not represent the main contribution of this piece of work. This essay
1It is worth mentioning that the issue of aggregate vulnerability discussed here must
be kept separated from the issue of Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) and Fragile
States. SIDS are States characterized by a natural and/or endogenous inability to face
external shocks (for additional details on SIDS see Montalbano & Triulzi, 2009; UNU-
WIDER, 2008; Briguglio 1995; Atkins & Mazzi, 1999; Easterly & Kraay, 2000; Briguglio
& Galea, 2003; Winters & Martins, 2004; Witter & al., 2002; Briguglio & al., 2009). Fragile
States are countries where government does not deliver core functions to the majority of
its people, including the poor. A number of post-conflict states fall into this category
(UNU-WIDER 2008).
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builds on McCulloch & al.’s (2001) operational view that the relative open-
ness of countries depends largely on the extent to which international trade
determines local prices, regardless of whether or not this depends mainly on
deliberate policies.2
This essay is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the existing litera-
ture on the likely destabilizing effects of trade openness. Section 3 reviews
the current theoretical and applied literature on vulnerability, presenting an
overall conceptualisation of the phenomenon as well as some of the most
common misconceptions. Section 4 proposes a first conceptualisation of the
trade and vulnerability link and some directions for future research. Section
5 concludes.
1.2 Is Trade Openness “destabilising” for de-
veloping countries?
Most empirical work establishes a consistent and significant positive corre-
lation between trade liberalization, growth and poverty reduction (Edwards,
1993; Frankel & Romer, 1999; Sachs & Warner, 1995; Dollar & Kraay, 2002,
2004; Cline, 2004; Winters, 2004). The drawbacks to trade openness are
acknowledged basically in terms of short and medium run adjustment costs.
The pervasive effects of trade openness on poverty and inequality, even in
the long run, are acknowledged as well (McCulloch & al., 2001; Lundberg
& Squire, 2003; Winters & al., 2004; Goldberg & Pavcnik 2004). An is-
sue largely ignored by the above literature concerns the analysis of possible
destabilizing effects of trade openness. The hypothesis of a direct link be-
tween developing countries’ instability and trade openness has several roots:
i) the apparent asymmetry between the process of increasing specialisation
and the presence of random, undiversifiable shocks in the export markets
of open economies (Razin & Rose, 1992; Koren & Tenreyro, 2007); ii) the
tendency of commodity prices which are at the core of the specialisation pro-
cess in developing countries to be more volatile than those of manufacture
goods (Malik & Temple, 2009); iii) the possible inconsistency between the
shocks prevailing in open markets and traditional coping mechanisms and lo-
cal market structures (Dercon, 2001); iv) the occurrence of boombust cycles
of investment induced by trade openness in countries characterized by inad-
equate infrastructures and shortages of skilled labour (Razin & al. 2003); v)
the role of trade liberalization in altering households’ optimal portfolios, cou-
2For a comprehensive list of standard measures of trade openness, see McCulloch & al.
(2001).
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pled with greater variability in new portfolio options (Winters & al., 2004);
and vi) higher risk of policy mismanagement in response to an entirely new
set of incentives induced by trade openness in contexts where political insti-
tutions are weak (Gavin & Hausmann, 1996; Rodrik, 1999, Acemoglu & al.,
2003, Fata´s & Mihov, 2003, 2005).
Given the heterogeneity of the situations above, it is worth making ex-
plicit here: first, what is meant with “economic instability”, second, why
should we care; third, what are its link with trade openness.
a. Economic instability and its long term impact on developing countries
Economic instability refers, generally speaking, to a situation of excessive
fluctuations of economic variables: a phenomenon which is indeed increasing
over time for a high fraction of low and middle income countries (Agenor
& al., 2000; Kose & al., 2003; Wolf 2005; Loayza & al., 2007). Fluctua-
tion is usually measured by the volatility of economic variables, proxied by
the standard deviation of the first differences of observed time series (Aize-
man & Pinto, 2005, Wolf, 2005).3 It reflects, empirically, the amount of
uncertainty and risk of the economic variable, where risk is normally proxied
by the predictable component of variability and uncertainty by its “unpre-
dictable component”. A workable difference between risks and uncertainty
has been highlighted by Knights (1921) classic work: while risk permits one
to assign probabilities to the different outcomes, uncertainty normally refers
to situations where several outcomes are associated with an event, but the
assignment of probabilities to these outcomes may not be possible (the so
called ”knightian uncertainty”). In this respect, empirical volatility can be
considered more as an allied to risk in that it provides a concrete measure
of the possible variation or movement of economic variables (Aizenman &
Pinto, 2005). On the other hand, it has been highlighted that the volatility
of economic variables is seldom predictable and, hence, total observed volatil-
ity may overestimate risk (Dehn, 2000; Aizenman & Pinto, 2005).4 Several
applied methods have been thus put in place by the literature to extract the
3This means to assume implicitly that series have a constant trend (equal to the mean).
Following the RBC literature, using business cycle filters, trend can be allowed to follow
a richer, time and country dependent process, by applying the so-called “output gap”
measure (Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2005).
4Dehn (2000), disentangling commodity prices ex post shocks and total volatility,
demonstrates that failure to account for ”predictable” changes leads to considerable over-
statements of actual uncertainty. This result holds for nine definitions of uncertainty from
the “simple unconditional standard deviation” to “Garchs conditional standard deviation
of one step ahead forecast error dummying out all shocks”.
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“unpredictable component” (i.e. uncertainty) from “pure risk” and sample
variability (e.g., Hnatkovska & Loayza, 2005; Wolf, 2005; Demir, 2009).
It is from Lucas’ (1987) seminal work onwards that economists have dealt
with the macro analysis of the “cost of fluctuations”. According to Lucas’
calculations, these costs account little in terms of welfare. This contributed
to divert much of the previous attention on the issue as well as in favouring
growth centred policies with respect to economic stabilization ones. However,
Lucas (1987)’ results are not compatible with a number of stylized facts, e.g.,
the so called “equity premium puzzle” (Mehra & Prescott, 1985).5 Moreover,
as Aizenman & Marion (1999) highlight, while risks do not necessarily do,6
“knightian uncertainty” produces pervasive long term effects, since agents
are more reluctant to embark on new activities. Finally, from the work of
Ramey & Ramey (1995) onwards,7 empirical cross-country studies have con-
sistently found a negative relation between volatility, long-run growth and
welfare, especially in developing economies (Aizenman & Marion, 1999; Fa-
tas, 2000; Pallage & Robe, 2003; Kose & al. 2003: Wolf, 2005; Hnatkovska
& Loayza, 2005; Demir, 2009). As Loayza & al., 2007 highlight, two are the
main reasons we should care about volatility in developing countries: i) the
substantial welfare loss of deviating from a smooth path of consumption, in
case of consumption volatility; ii) the indirect welfare loss in terms of future
consumption, in case of a negative impact of volatility on growth. Loayza
& al., (2007) underline as well that developing countries not only face more
volatility than industrial countries but suffer larger volatility effects, because
of the intrinsic instability of the developing process (mainly linked to the
weakness of their financial systems and the main characteristics of their spe-
cialisation process of production); the concrete risk of policy mismanagement
(e.g., as in the case of pro-cyclical and/or erratic fiscal and monetary poli-
cies), and the presence of weaker mitigating and coping mechanisms.
b. Economic instability and trade openness: a survey of the literature
5The “Equity Premium Puzzle”, highlighted by Mehra and Prescott (1985) comes from
the observation of higher return on equity stocks compared to government bonds. This
highlight the presence of a sort of “risk premium” on equity stocks versus government
bonds, i.e. individuals manifest clear risk aversion which is not compatible with standard
economic models.
6Even when it happens and downward shocks (crises and/or “sudden stops”) occur,
one is still dealing with short term episodes than could (but could not as well) produce
pervasive and long term effects.
7At the aggregate level, volatility has been for a long time confined in standard cycle
theory, mainly concerned in the decomposition of economic growth into cyclical and trend
components. Thus, it has been long considered as a second-order issue in developing
studies - but of primary interest in industrial countries concerned with smoothing the
fluctuations of their business cycles.
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The phenomena of “trade-induced” instability have been traditionally
seen as terms-of-trade shocks (Rodrick, 1998). However, open economies
show, overall, greater output volatility and, in some cases, greater consump-
tion volatility too (Hnatkovska & Loayza, 2005; Loayza & al., 2007). Win-
ters (2002) provides a first analysis of the conditions under which foreign
shocks can have specific impacts on households in developing countries, via
the main transmission channels of trade openness: when foreign shocks are
greater than domestic ones (e.g. when world markets are more variable than
local ones); when trade liberalization affects governments’ ability to operate
price stabilization policies; when trade reforms change the emphasis among
the different activities engaged by households (e.g. in the case of farmers,
switching from subsistence to cash crops). He concludes that international
trade has a priori ambiguous implications for macro stability.
To investigate more in depth this issue, it is useful to gather current
applied literature on the “destabilizing effects” of trade openness into two
main strands: empirical analyses that emphasize the role of trade openness
as a key determinant of aggregate volatility (Easterly & al., 1993; Mendoza,
1995; Gavin & Hausmann, 1996; Prasad & Gable, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Kose,
2002; Kose & Yi, 2001, 2006; Wolf, 2004; Kose & al., 2005); and empirical
analyses that look at trade openness as a complementary, real aspect in
currency crises (Milesi-Ferretti & Razin, 1998, 2000). In this latter case,
trade openness has been seen both as a means to trigger “sudden stops”
(Cavallo & Frankel, 2008), or as a vehicle to spread out crises, especially
in regional contexts (Glick & Rose, 1999; Easterly & Kraay, 2000; Forbes,
2002).
In both cases, empirical results are mixed. While some studies find that
an increase in the degree of trade openness leads to higher volatility on a
wider set of outcome variables (aggregate income, consumption, employment,
salaries and prices), especially in developing countries (Karras & Song, 1996;
Easterly & al., 2001; Kose & al., 2003; Di Giovanni & Levchenko, 2009; Rad-
datz, 2006; Loayza & Raddatz, 2007; Krishna & Levchenko, 2009; Haddad &
al., 2010), others find no significant relationship between an increased degree
of trade interdependence and domestic macroeconomic volatility (Calderon
& al., 2005; Kose & Yi, 2006; Cavallo, 2007) or just a temporary relationship
(Santos-Paulino, 2010). A separate but related issue is the role of inter-
national trade as a key determinant of business cycle transmission across
countries (Anderson & al., 1999; Canova & Dellas, 1993; Clark & van Win-
coop, 2001; Otto & al., 2001; Calderon & al., 2005; Calderon & al., 2007;
Baxter & Kouparitsas, 2005; Imbs, 2004; Kose & Yi, 2001, 2006). This is
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consistent, theoretically, with the international “Real Business Cycle” (RBC)
approach as it embodies demand and supply side spill-over channels (Stadler,
1994). However, Kose & Yi (2001, 2006), who try to match RBC and the co-
movements in their empirical findings, are not able to explain its magnitude,
and suggest the existence of a “tradeco-movement puzzle”.8
In the second strand of the literature, the role of trade openness in fos-
tering macroeconomic crises is also hotly debated. The basic argument for
a positive role of trade openness in reducing exposure to foreign shocks is
that a high trade/GDP ratio helps to adjust to a cut-off in international
financing. Rose (2005) provides empirical explanations for the above case,
arguing that countries with higher trade/GDP ratios are less likely to default
because investors are less likely to pull out, and that higher ratios of trade
to GDP allow countries to cope with a cut-off of capital inflow and a smaller
percentage increase in exports. Cavallo & Frankel (2008) show that trade
openness makes countries less vulnerable to both severe sudden stops and
currency crashes, and show that this relationship is even stronger when cor-
recting for the endogeneity of trade, using “gravity estimates”.9 On the other
hand, the basic argument for a pervasive role of trade openness in increasing
exposure to external shocks, is grounded in the idea that a weakening export
performance can trigger a sudden stop in capital flows. Furthermore, Eichen-
green & Rose (1999), Glick & Rose (1999) and Forbes (2002) demonstrate
empirically the role of “trade linkages” in spreading crises in regions.10 The
central point here is that currency crises spread along the lines of trade link-
ages and, since trade patterns are strongly negatively affected by distance,
- no matter who is the first victim of a speculative attack, or what factors
are behind it - there is strong evidence that currency crises tend to spread
regionally because of trade linkages. Forbes (2002), following Corsetti & al.
(2000) and Wincoop & Yi (2000), decomposes the trade linkages of crises into
three parts: i) a “competitiveness effect”, linked to changes in relative prices
8This new “economic puzzle” has been argued by Kose & Yi (2006) to highlight the
inability of standard international business cycles models to explain the empirical findings
related to the fact that pairs of countries with stronger international trade linkages tend
to have more coordinated business cycles.
9Guidotti & al. (2004) provide evidence that economies that trade more, recover more
quickly from output contractions that usually accompany “sudden stops”. Calvo & al.
(2004) and Edwards (2004) find that openness to trade is associated with fewer “sudden
stops”. Martin & Rey (2006), using a general equilibrium model, show that emerging
markets are more prone to financial crises unless openness in their financial accounting is
counteracted by similar degrees of openness in trade.
10The rationale for this evidence is that, in the presence of nominal rigidities, currency
devaluation gives the country a temporary boost in terms of competitiveness, leaving its
trade competitors likely to be the next to be attacked.
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that could hamper international competitiveness; ii) an “income effect”, i.e.
reduction in the demand for imports induced by the income reduction fol-
lowing a crisis; iii) a “cheap import effect”, which, by contrast, is a positive
supply shock connected to a reduction in import prices by trading partners
forced to devaluate.11 She highlights also the key role of countries different
responses to the initial crisis in determining the prevalence of each effect:
e.g., the competitiveness effect is larger in the face of a currency devaluation,
while the income effect is mainly linked to a rise in interest rates.
The first impression generated by the above survey is to conclude that ap-
plied literature on trade and instability is unstable too. My point here is that
the analyses above are not sufficient to have a final say on the issue and that
a more rigorous “trade-induced vulnerability to poverty” analysis is needed.
The surveyed empirical works use, in fact, numerous different methods and
empirical instruments, and studies are separated across widely different fields
of investigation which often do not communicate.12 In addition, most of these
investigations are backward looking and mainly targeted at issues not directly
linked to vulnerability. Moreover, they are overwhelmingly focused on “out-
put volatility” while there is little investigation on “consumption volatility”
and on the relationships between the two.
Before drawing the key directions of research on trade and vulnerability in
section 4, it is useful to provide a clear cut conceptualisation of vulnerability
and its measurement as well as to highlight the most common misconceptions.
11Analysing data on trade flows for a sample of countries that experienced a crisis in
the 1990s, Forbes (2002) suggests that competitiveness and income effects are negative,
significant and quantitatively relevant, while the positive cheap import effect remains weak.
12Regarding the trade and volatility link, e.g., extensive use of panel data is made to
measure the external exposure of a worldwide sample of countries by the sensitivity of
first and second moments of economic growth (average rate and standard deviation) to
openness and financial shocks (Kose & al., 2003; Hnatkovska & Loayza, 2005; Wolf, 2005;
Calderon & al., 2005). Semi-structural VAR (Vector AutoRegressive Models) are applied
to panel data in order to isolate and standardize shocks; estimate their impact on GDP and
examine whether and to what extent this impact depends on domestic conditions (Loayza
& Raddatz, 2007; Santos-Paolino 2010). Malik & Temple (2006), in their effort to explain
differences in output volatility across developing countries, used instead a Bayesian method
to highlight explanatory variables that are robust across a wide range of specifications.
Another interesting exercise to measure variability is proposed in Valenzuela (2006), which
attempts to assess whether, in a context of volatile commodity markets, it is possible to
discern the effects of trade liberalization on poverty using an innovative application of a
stochastic framework in combination with the Global CGE model and a micro-household
simulation. An extensive use of Probit models is applied to measure the probability of a
sudden stop (Cavallo & Frankel, 2008; Calvo & al., 2003, Frankel & Rose, 1996, Frankel
& Wei , 2004, Glick & Rose 1999).
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1.3 Vulnerability: Conceptualisation, measure-
ment and common misconceptions
As Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003) underline, vulnerability means differ-
ent things to different people. It is a complex phenomenon, not easily deter-
mined by one measurable dimension. It can be rightly compared to a picture
in a newspaper. Looked at from a distance, it may seem clear and relatively
sharp. However, viewed close up, it appears blurred and grainy and loses its
sharpness. Likewise, there is a wide consensus on what vulnerability means
in general terms; but, when we attempt to analyse it in detail, the concept
tends to blur and become subsumed in the haze of the multifarious situations
of vulnerability, giving only context-specific interpretations. As a result, a
proliferation of methodologies, terminology and approaches to vulnerability
analysis have been applied within a broad range of topics (e.g. food secu-
rity, natural disasters, conflict prevention, economic fragility, etc.). Scholars,
research centres, multilateral and bilateral organizations and agencies have
developed their own definitions and methods to analyse vulnerability.13 It is
notable that not all these definitions include the same key elements and they
also use slightly different terminology. Hence, practitioners from different
disciplines use different meanings and concepts of vulnerability, which tend
to be theoretically strong and empirically weak, or vice versa (Alwang & al.,
2001).
a. The concept of vulnerability
An attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of vulnerability has
been carried out by the World Bank, in its “Social Risk Management” (SRM)
approach (Holzmann, 2001; Holzmann & Jorgensen, 2001; Heitzmann &
al., 2001).14 The SRM approach is partly an extension of the literature
on poverty dynamics, where the traditional distinction between chronic and
transient poverty is enhanced by a forward-looking approach. According to
this approach (see Heitzmann & al., 2001), the three basic components of
vulnerability analysis are the following:
13For an extensive analysis of the methods and tools in international organization, see
Montalbano & Triulzi (2002).
14The aim of the Social Risk Management approach is to embed social protection pro-
grams into an integrated approach to poverty reduction. To this extent, the SRM frame-
work is considered as a safety net in times of crisis and hardship, but more importantly a
springboard to assist the poor to escape poverty and vulnerability prior to the occurrence
of a shock (World Bank, 2000).
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• a thorough analysis of risks (i.e. the exogenous side): risks have dif-
ferent nature. Moreover, they can be characterised by a known or
unknown probability distribution, by different magnitude (size and
spread), history, frequency, correlation, duration, timing and severity.
Finally, they may be idiosyncratic (i.e. specific to the household and
its members, e.g. illness or job loss), or covariate (i.e. experienced
simultaneously, regionally or nationally, e.g. inflation, recession, and
terms-of-trade volatility);
• an assessment of the degree of resilience and/or responsiveness (i.e. the
endogenous side): Households can respond to or manage risks in several
ways, using formal and informal risk managing, mitigating and coping
tools. Risk management involves ex-ante and ex-post actions. Risk
mitigation includes formal and informal responses to expected losses
such as self-insurance (e.g. precautionary savings), building social net-
works, and formal insurance based on expansion of the risk pool. Risk
coping activities are ex post responses and involve activities to deal
with actual losses such as selling assets, removing children from school,
migration of selected family members, taking temporary employment.
The availability of coping mechanisms has to be coupled with the de-
gree of “adaptability” or “resilience” of different households.
• a benchmark: it means a socially accepted minimum norm for each
outcome under which households is said to be vulnerable to future
loss.15
Another prominent approach to vulnerability is the “Sustainable Liveli-
hood Vulnerability” (SLV) adopted by many international development agen-
cies, such as UNDP, and with slight differences in terminologies and methods
also by DFID, IDS, Oxfam, CARE, to produce project appraisals and re-
views (see Carney &. al., 1999). The SLV approach is linked to Sens seminal
“capabilities approach” which stresses what people can do or be, based on
their entitlements. Accordingly, SLV assesses vulnerability as the likelihood
that people’s livelihoods deteriorate over time, and analyses the dynamics
and characteristics of the population’s reaction strategies in various political
and socio-economic contexts (Barrientos, 2007; UNDP, 1999 & 2000; Singh
& Gilman, 1999). It incorporates an evaluation of sensitivity to negative
shocks (“livelihood sensitivity”) as well as the endogenous ability to respond
and recover (“livelihood resilience”).16
15Standard analyses generally use a poverty line to assess vulnerability to poverty.
16Efforts have been made to combine the “sustainable livelihood” approach and “en-
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b. The measurement of vulnerability
Different approaches to vulnerability lead to different methods of esti-
mation. While SLV adopts a more holistic approach and looks at the ca-
pacity of social communities to recover from disasters, monetary analyses
of vulnerability typically express welfare in terms of consumption and focus
on consumption variability as proxy for economic instability, acknowledging
that consumption of an optimizing household changes only in response to
unexpected changes in income (Dynan, 1993).
While the earliest efforts attempt to measure vulnerability simply as the
negative impact on household’s consumption from exposure to a set of ob-
served risks - the so called VER (vulnerability exposure to risk) approach
(Glewwe & Hall, 1998; Amin & al., 1999, Dercon & Krishnan, 2000) later
efforts measure vulnerability as loss in “expected welfare”, variously defined,
in an uncertain environment (Chaudhuri, 2001, 2003; Ligon & Schechter,
2003; Calvo & Dercon, 2007a).
A first taxonomy of the main methods applied in vulnerability analy-
sis has been provided by Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003). A slight up-
date to this identifies three main typologies of vulnerability measures: VEP-
Vulnerability as Expected Poverty (Christiaensen & Boisvert, 2000; Chris-
tiaensen & Subbarao, 2005; Chaudhuri, 2001, 2003; Chaudhuri & al., 2002;
Pritchett & al., 2000; Gunther & Harttgen, 2009); VEU - Vulnerability as
Low Expected Utility (Ligon & Schechter 2003, 2004); VTP - Vulnerability
as Threat of Future Poverty (Calvo & Dercon, 2003, 2005, 2007a,b). Each of
these vulnerability method presents its own virtues and weaknesses (details
about these methods and their pros and cons are reported in the Appendix).
VEP method is the most commonly applied. The reason is twofold: it is
more easily interpretable than utility-based measures since it provides re-
sults in terms of expected values of the common FGT class of decomposable
poverty measure (Foster & al., 1984); it permits one to assess vulnerability
using a single round of cross-sectional data, which is a strong assumption
vironmental vulnerability”, where vulnerability is the exposure of individuals or social
groups to a reduction in livelihood linked to environmental change (Dinar & al., 1998,
Ahmed & Lipton, 1999). Following this approach, methodologies to provide insights into
the expected negative impacts of climate change have been developed. However, we should
remember the distinction between “socio-economic vulnerability” and “ecological fragility
or environmental vulnerability” (Guillamont, 2009). While socio-economic vulnerabil-
ity can be induced also by natural factors (see, e.g., the undeniably negative impact of
earthquakes, typhoons and floods on the sustainability of economic growth), we need to
acknowledge that an entire set of issues, such as biodiversity, pollution and global warming,
remain exclusively outside this subject and form a separate and specific area of analysis,
i.e. “ecological fragility”.
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but particularly convenient in the absence of panel data, as it is the case for
most developing countries. However, it holds, among others, on two addi-
tional strong assumptions: i) the variance of log consumption of otherwise
equal households is not the same for all households and captures the im-
pact of covariate and idiosyncratic shocks17 ii) this variance can be explained
with observable household and community characteristics. One of the main
weakness of the VEP method lies in its somewhat perverse policy implication
that is the fact that increasing variance one would reduce the vulnerability of
those with mean consumption below the poverty line. VEU is more rigorous
in terms of theoretical background but less suitable to be easily transformed
into policy prescriptions. It measures vulnerability as the difference between
the expected utility of consumption and a minimum acceptable level of util-
ity derived from a certainty-equivalent level of consumption. It helps to
disentangle “vulnerability to poverty” from “vulnerability to risk” (i.e., high
volatility in consumption). However, it remains sensitive to the choice of the
form of the utility function and changes in welfare above the poverty line.
Lastly, VTP actually benefits of a rich “axiomatic approach” but pays for
it through a limited empirical applicability and the need of lengthy house-
holds panels. VTP sees vulnerability as a combination of poverty (measured
as failure to reach a minimum outcome) and risk (measured as dispersion
over different states of the world), emphasising the sensitivity to risk of the
vulnerability measure. It also avoids vulnerability to depend from outcome
changes above the poverty line (the so called focus axiom).
Ligon & Schechter (2004), using a set of Monte Carlo experiments to
explore the performance of different estimators and vulnerability measures,
find that each of the three approaches perform best in different environ-
ments. More specifically, when the environment is stationary and consump-
tion expenditures are measured without error, VEP is the best estimator.
If the vulnerability measure is risk-sensitive18 and consumption is measured
with error, then VEU and VTP estimators generally perform best. Finally,
if the distribution of consumption is non-stationary, a modification of the
Chaudhuri (2001) estimator applied to panel data in differences proposed by
Pritchett & al. (2000) performs best.
17As Kamanou & Morduch (2002) and Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003) point out, a
strong homogeneity assumption must be made in order to interpret results of vulnerability,
namely that all households observed in the cross-section receive draws from the same
distribution of consumption changes. In practice, while one can refine this measure by
disaggregating by region, by income group, etc., the assumption of homogeneity still has
to be made.
18According to Ligon & Schechter (2004) a vulnerability measure is “risk sensitive” if it
increases when risk increases.
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In conclusion, we still lack a single, generally agreed, method to mea-
sure vulnerability as well as a common approach to look at uncertainty as a
source of distress. Moreover, the above methods focus all on households, no
matter what the typology (from handmade macroeconomic policy to natural
disasters, e.g. rainfall, etc.) and nature (covariate and idiosyncratic) of the
observable shocks. Furthermore, they all make reference to a poverty line (in
terms of consumption, income or utils) as a benchmark, narrowing, generally
speaking, the assessment of vulnerability into vulnerability to poverty.
c. The most common misconceptions about vulnerability
Notwithstanding the amount of analytical and empirical work on vulner-
ability, its analysis is still affected by several misconceptions.
I) Vulnerability vs poverty
First, most analyses liken vulnerability to poverty. Although closely re-
lated - they can be seen as two sides of the same coin - these two concepts
are different. The first obvious remark is that observed poverty status of a
household is the ex-post realisation of a state, whereas vulnerability is its
ex-ante probability (Chaudhuri & al., 2002). However, it is worth underly-
ing they both focus on poverty dynamics with a different lens. While, in
fact, standard poverty assessments deal with the evidence of the temporary
nature of poverty (Baulch & Hoddinott, 2000)19 trying to separate transient
and chronic poverty and providing information on “how often” a household
is poor; vulnerability analyses that deal with it distinguish between those
who have low expected mean consumption (i.e. low endowment) and those
who have high volatility of consumption (i.e. high uninsured income fluc-
tuations), provides additional information on the sources of poverty. Thus,
vulnerability analysis, by disentangling those who are considered as vulner-
able because of an estimated expected mean consumption below a minimum
accepted benchmark from those who have an estimated expected mean above
the benchmark but a high estimated variance in consumption provides an an-
swer also to the key question of “why the poor are poor” (Chaudhuri & Datt,
2001, Gunther & Harttgen, 2009). It follows that the characteristics of the
vulnerable differ significantly from those of the poor. Hence, targeting only
the latter will exclude a significant group of households that are at risk of a
19Comparing 13 panel studies of developing countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia
and Russia, Baulch & Hoddinot (2000) show there is a surprisingly large percentage of
temporarily poor households (from a low of 20% to a high of 66%) in relation to the
percentage of chronically poor (10% on average, but never more than 25%) for each region.
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decline in living standards as well. In other words, the distinction between
poverty and vulnerability remains key for economic policy.
A separate but related issue concerns the degree of vulnerability of the
poor. The widespread idea is that the poor will be among the most vulnerable
people (World Bank, 2000; Calvo & Dercon, 2007a). Empirical analyses
show however that shocks occur everywhere along the income distribution
and affect poor and non-poor alike (Tesliuc and Lindert, 2004).20 Moreover,
the poor can show a higher degree of resilience even if they rely on coping
strategies that could damage their growth prospects (Jalan & Ravaillon, 1999,
Zimmerman & Carter, 2003; Carter & Barrett, 2006; Carter & al., 2007). It
follows thus another key difference between resilience and responsiveness it
is worth bearing in mind.
II) Resilience vs responsiveness
Another common misconception in vulnerability analysis concerns pre-
cisely the distinction between “resilience” or “adaptability” and “responsive-
ness” or “coping capacity”. Notwithstanding their obvious interconnection,
they are different concepts and cannot be considered as a single one. The
term “resilience” refers to “the capacity of a system, community or soci-
ety potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in
order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and struc-
ture” (UN/ISDR, 2004). “Responsiveness”, on the other hand, measures the
availability of policy tools and institutions to cope with, mitigate or avoid
the negative effects of external shocks. In the first case, we are dealing with
a structural phenomenon given by the complex of individual actions under-
taken collectively mainly by private agents, to cope with, mitigate or avoid
the negative effects of external shocks. These actions will depend strongly on
assets, and levels of education and health and open the way to new conceptual
developments - for instance, in the recent debate on adaptation to climate
change. In the second case, we are dealing with policies and institutions ca-
pable of strengthening or reducing a country’s ability to cope and/or recover
from negative shocks. This distinction has been enhanced at the macro level,
by separating the issue of “structural vulnerability” which results from en-
dogenous factors that are independent of a country’s current political will,
from the issue of “policy vulnerability” which is linked to a country’s polit-
ical choices or, even more clearly, from the issue of “state fragility” which
relates to countries characterized by very low policy-capability scores (Naude
& al., 2009a,b; Guillamont, 2009, 2010). A similar distinction is been in the
20The largest relative differences in the incidence of shocks seem to occur across location
characteristics, such as the region or area of residence.
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“sustainable livelihood” approach, between “coping strategies”, defined as
short-term responses to specific shocks, and “adaptive strategies”, or those
that entail longer-term changes in behaviour as a result of shocks or stress.
Note that, a greater capacity to cope usually builds resilience, and vice-versa.
III) Vulnerability vs ex post welfare loss
Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that experiencing an ex-post wel-
fare loss is neither necessary nor sufficient for the classification of vulnerable.
Vulnerability is an ex-ante condition that only potentially may lead to nega-
tive outcomes. Therefore, vulnerability cannot be directly observed, but only
predicted (Chaudhuri & al., 2001). Vulnerability measures cannot rely only
on observable data (e.g, vulnerability does not depend on, say, what con-
sumption expenditures are actually realized, but rather on what they might
be, Ligon & Schechter, 2004). The estimation problem in vulnerability anal-
ysis generally involves two steps: first, making consumption predictions; sec-
ond, summarizing their welfare consequences (Ligon & Schechter, 2004). The
first step normally implies the use of past realizations of consumption expen-
ditures to estimate the probability of possible future consumption outcomes.
This may be relatively easy if the environment is assumed to be stationary
(probabilities remain the same across time). However, environments are not
stationary in reality, and the probabilities associated with different consump-
tion realizations vary over time (Ligon & Schechter, 2004).
As a matter of fact, vulnerability needs both a factual analysis (i.e. a
forward looking measure from the observed facts) and a counterfactual (i.e.
another measure for a different world). For instance, the counterfactual for
vulnerability measures based on consumption expenditure is the unobserv-
able level of consumption that would have prevailed in the absence of shocks
and/or uncertainty (Alwang & al., 2001). This is the most problematic issue
in vulnerability analysis. As many empirical studies show, to figure out a
counterfactual is intrinsically challenging because individuals cannot easily
or accurately quantify the extent/cost of welfare losses from shocks (Tesliuc
& Lindert, 2004). Hence, one should rely on indirect estimation methods. A
number of methods have been applied so far, from simple augmented spec-
ifications of a typical consumption regression with shock dummies (Datt &
Hoogeveen, 2000), to an extensive application of the Oaxaca decomposition
(Oaxaca, 1973)21 or the use of non-parametric density estimations (Di Nardo
21The Oaxaca (1973) decomposition provides separate consumption estimations for a
sample of households with and without shocks, and a way of partitioning the gap into
a part attributable to differences in measured characteristics and a part attributable to
the “treatment”. This approach helps to explain the average differences between the two
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& al., 1996).22
Finally, as illustrated previously, without any benchmark, the term vul-
nerability is too imprecise to be practically useful. A mere situation of risk
exposure or a simple subjective feeling of vulnerability are not sufficient for
policy targeting. Hence, vulnerability should be defined in terms of the
potential to fall below a socially accepted minimums and its measurement
should include a cut-off or benchmark (Alwang & al., 2001). At the household
level, monetary vulnerability measures assess vulnerability strictu sensu, as
the risk of falling below a poverty line. Similarly, the sustainable livelihood
literature defines vulnerability with respect to a minimum livelihood level.
With a macro level view Naude et al. (2009) adopt a broader definition of
vulnerability as the risk that a “system” will be adversely affected by a shock
(encompassing a broad range of welfare measures, benchmarks and shocks).
1.4 Trade-induced vulnerability to poverty:
directions for future research
Keeping in mind concepts, misconceptions and methods of vulnerability
analyses is of great help to foster current debate on the destabilizing effects
of trade openness. This permit, in particular, to draw the main elements of
a thorough analysis of “trade-induced vulnerability to poverty” as well as to
derive a sound research agenda on the topic.
A number of considerations support the hypothesis of a trade and vulner-
ability link: Dercon (2001) underlines the role of openness as a vehicle for an
entirely new set of shocks and incentives able to put traditional mechanisms
under pressure and hamper people’s standard management strategies; Win-
ters (2002) and Winters & al. (2004) suggest that trade openness could alter
households’ optimal portfolios, so that their current portfolios become sub-
optimal, especially for the poor, because of their poor ability to bear new
risks, and weak capabilities to insure themselves against adverse impacts;
Ligon (2006) and Calvo & Dercon (2007a) infer that households’ welfare can
be negatively affected by uncertainty over future change induced by, among
groups, but is not very helpful for understanding the distributional consequences of shocks.
22Di Nardo & al. (1996) provide an extension of the Oaxaca decomposition by estimating
the distribution of consumption that would have prevailed if all households were spared
the negative impact of shocks, giving more weight to those households who are more likely
to be under-represented. This distribution is compared with the actual distribution of
consumption, and for each bin of the distribution the impact of the shock is determined
as the difference between the current and the counterfactual density. For more details, see
Tesliuc & Lindert (2004).
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other things, reductions in barriers to trade.
A comprehensive investigation of this link requires not only the analysis,
theoretically and empirically, of the main transmission channels by which
trade openness could eventually turn into negative impacts in terms of wel-
fare, but also an assessment of the degree of both resilience and responsiveness
of partner countries. It requires as well the agreement of a socially accepted
minimum standard or benchmark over which vulnerability is not an issue.
The issue of the benchmark is key in a “trade-induced vulnerability” analy-
sis. Approaches that condemn any shock that causes even one individual to
suffer a reduction in income are not useful because, given the heterogeneity of
households and the strongly redistributive nature of trade shocks, they will
condemn virtually any policy intervention (Winters, 2002). Conversely, nar-
rowing “trade-induced vulnerability” to essentially “vulnerability to poverty
because of trade openness”, as follows directly from current vulnerability
analyses, not only embodies all the limits of standard poverty analyses, but
does not take into account a broad range of welfare measures, benchmarks
and shocks which turn indeed to be relevant in an open scenario.
To achieve a better understanding of the trade and vulnerability link
and a sound method to measure it, I will suggest some refinements to the
current literature on the “destabilizing effects” of trade openness and three
promising directions for future research which are related to three levels of
investigation: macro, micro and meso.
Concerning the refinement of current literature, it is possible to sum up
three main weaknesses of applied literature on the “destabilising effects” of
trade openness. First, the need to move from ex post assessments, based
on aggregate volatility or crisis transmission, to ex-ante measures of the
likelihood and magnitude of experiencing a reduction in well-being induced
by trade openness. Second, the need to choose a suitable benchmark to
distinguish actual vulnerability from normal variability. Third, the need
of a counterfactual, since vulnerability is an ex-ante condition and it is not
observable. At the micro level, since the data derived from household surveys
are severely limited, there is also the need of a better accounting for the actual
impacts of external shocks and specific evidence on “man-made” shocks, such
as those that derive from the management of economic policies in a globalised
world (Dercon, 2001).
Regarding the directions of future research, from a macro point of view
the key challenge is to incorporate a forward looking lens to the standard
macro literature on cross-country effects of trade openness; from a micro
point of view the aim is to assess the welfare impact of covariate and id-
iosyncratic shocks induced by trade openness at household level; at the meso
level, the objective is to derive useful insights and a more comprehensive
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picture of the vulnerability to trade phenomena by investigating the chan-
nels of transmission of external shocks at the subnational level. The first
aspect of vulnerability highlights the pervasive and differentiated impact of
covariate shocks that are of main interest for international economic policy.
The second might help national policymakers to set priorities and calibrate
domestic coping mechanisms and safety nets. The third sheds lights on the
pervasive role of geography, regional, industry and competition polices.
a) Aggregate vulnerability from international trade
Substantive cross-country evidence claims that trade openness foster in-
come growth and poverty alleviation among trading partners. As Bhagwati
and Srinivasan (2002) clearly state “trade does seem to create, even sustain,
higher growth”, while Dollar and Kraay (2002; 2004) argue trade openness
benefits the poor, given the positive association between overall growth and
poor income growth. These results are consistent with trade theory: trade
liberalisation, by eliminating price distortions, improves resource allocation,
the import of modern technology and, hence, productivity improvements.
The need for a macro approach to vulnerability is grounded in the recog-
nition that, in the current wave of global trade integration, external covariate
macro shocks - the result of a perverse combination of international turmoil
and economic policy mismanagement - are becoming increasingly and quan-
titatively important (World Bank, 2000; Eichengreen & Bordo, 2002).23 As
a result, efforts to measure vulnerability on the level of countries are increas-
ing too (Gallopin, 2006; Montalbano & al., 2006, 2008; Guillaumont, 2009;
Naude & al., 2009a, 2009b).
Following a broad definition of vulnerability as the likelihood that an
economic system would undergo an outcome below a certain benchmark be-
cause of a “perturbation” (Naude & al., 2009b), and recalling Hnatkovska
& Loayza’s (2005) decomposition method to derive “extreme volatility” of
consumption (i.e., large fluctuations above a specified band) as a proxy for
“perturbation”, Federici & Montalbano (2012) provide a first empirical cross-
country test for vulnerability from trade openness. They investigate the long
term relationship, in a large sample of countries, between the portion of
“extreme volatility” of consumption linked to trade openness and the devia-
tion of consumption growth from its expected path (derived, using business
cycle filters, as a time and country dependent trend). The novelty of this
23Although some of these crises received considerable attention in the media (Mexico
1995, Southeast Asia 1997, Brazil and Russia 1998, and Argentina 2001), as World Bank
(2000) points out, they represent merely the tip of the iceberg that is a much vaster and
more complex phenomenon.
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empirical exercise lies in its ability to add a forward looking lens to existing
literature on the effects of volatility on consumption growth, a feasible notion
of benchmark and a counterfactual, all essential elements of a vulnerability
framework.
However, simple negative associations between trade openness, macroe-
conomic volatility and consumption growth are not a sufficient condition
to derive robust conclusions on the vulnerability of partner countries. At
the same time, we should acknowledge that growth may be higher or lower
without uncertainty, but welfare will always be higher without (Reis, 2009).
Hence, current empirical literature actually underestimates the cost of fluc-
tuations. Additional efforts towards a more comprehensive aggregate vul-
nerability analysis are needed. This means, first of all, to reach consensus
on a workable definition of ”aggregate vulnerability”with the aim to limit
the playing field of the analysis and avoid the most common misconceptions.
Secondly, to provide a more comprehensive assessment, theoretically and em-
pirically, of the permanent effects on welfare of risk, and its macro links with
trade openness and global imbalances (Bordo, 2005; Caballero & Krishna-
murthy, 2009; Claessens & al., 2010). The next essay represents a first step
in this direction since it provides a comprehensive empirical test of the signif-
icance and relevance of consumption behaviour under permanent risk. It is
theoretically grounded in a precautionary saving framework and empirically
grounded in a wide (147 countries) and long cross-country panel setting for
the pre-crisis period (1950-2008);
b) Household vulnerability from trade
A macro approach to vulnerability encompasses the limitations of stan-
dard cross-section analyses. Moreover, it focuses on aggregate variables and
thus deals only with covariant macro shocks at country level (i.e. shocks
affecting the variables on average), without taking account of the differences
in observable household characteristics and income distributions. As already
underlined, vulnerability assessments may differ across social groups within
countries, while the relative income positions of households are likely to have
important effects on their ability to access adequate tools and coping mecha-
nisms, as underlined by a number of vulnerability analyses. Hence, aggregate
vulnerability needs to be complemented by household investigations.
International trade affects the risks faced by households in two ways:
by changing the riskiness of existing activities, for instance, by altering the
weight of foreign relative to domestic shocks faced by the economy, and by
changing the emphasis among the different activities they engage in, for
instance, switching from subsistence food crop to cash crops (McCulloch &
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al. 2001). However, if the above risks are taken knowingly it is not clear if
they are welfare worsening, even if the variance increases (Winters, 2002).
Empirical evidence shows that poorer households may be less able than
richer ones to protect themselves against the adverse effects of man-made
external shocks or to take advantage of the positive opportunities created by
policy reforms (Tesliuc & Lindert, 2004). This may explain the unwillingness
of some households to pursue high average returns linked to the different
activities opened up by trade reforms (see Morduch, 1994). Thus, they suffer
the costs of trade reforms without reaping any compensating benefits in
the form of higher average earnings. If this is the case, trade openness has
pervasive effect on households’ optimal portfolios with likely negative effects
in the long run (Winters, 2002; Winters & al., 2004; Calvo & Dercon, 2007a).
This issue, though very relevant, has been largely overlooked by trade em-
pirical literature. It implies the capacity to measure the cost and the proba-
bility of changes in households’ behaviour induced by risk exposure linked to
trade openness that generates uncertainty. This needs a factual and a coun-
terfactual analysis alike. Counterfactual analysis should be able to measure
the expected level of consumption expenditure in the absence of uncertainty,
net of the mean effects generated by trade. From the point of view of the
factual analysis, it means acknowledging that keeping “consumption smooth-
ing” as a primary behavioural objective in the midst of trade reforms actually
engenders a set of behavioural changes that can produce diversified effects on
households’ welfare: from “smoothing income” i.e. sacrifice expected profits
for greater self-protection (Morduch, 1994) to the sale of assets (Rosenzweig
& Wolpin, 1993) and/or risk-sharing (Townsend, 1994, 1995), to changes
in many non-marketed investments, including human capital outcomes and
life-cycle patterns of consumption expenditure and time allocation (Becker,
1965).24 As Elbers & Gunning (2003) demonstrate, behavioural changes in
response to ex-ante uncertainty/risk, even under consumption smoothing hy-
24Other strands of the literature underline the existence of constrained circumstances
that may lead individuals to depart from consumption smoothing as well. The “dynamic
asset-based approach to poverty” (Zimmerman & Carter, 2003; Carter & Barrett, 2006;
Carter & al., 2007) highlights that poorer agents respond to shocks by smoothing produc-
tive assets, hence destabilizing consumption and thus possibly dipping to a poverty trap.
Caroll (2001) observes the precautionary savings motive can generate a behaviour that is
virtually indistinguishable from that generated by a liquidity constraints, by essentially
inducing self-imposed reluctance to borrow. Lee & Sawada (2010) demonstrate that the
introduction of a liquidity constraint in presence of precautionary savings might nega-
tively affect the behaviour of the poor, by preventing them to raise the optimal amount
of savings. This because the possibility of future binding constraints in a standard life
cycle model with uncertainty, makes the households accumulate precautionary wealth in
the attempt to insure themselves.
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pothesis, may have substantial welfare costs. Moreover, the potential impact
of risk exposure may be much greater than normally estimated by standard
vulnerability measures which treat the mean expected consumption as the
riskless counterfactual.
A useful attempt to provide an overall assessment of trade reforms on
household welfare, was conducted by Niimi & al. (2007). Adopting Glewwe
& al.’s (2002), Justino & Litchfield’s (2004) and Winters’ (2002) conceptual
framework, Niimi & al. (2007) analyse the impact of the Doi Moi reform
process in Vietnam through three channels: prices, employment and wages,
and fiscal policies. They provide robust empirical evidence that trade reforms
have actually contributed to reducing poverty in Vietnam.25 However, they
lack a forward looking approach. It means to investigate whether the process
of opening up the Vietnamese economy has also had an identifiable impact
on people’s behaviour, and long term effects on their welfare, by increasing
ex-ante their degree of uncertainty towards the future and/or their exposure
to risk.
To this end, both the third and the fourth essays represents a step forward.
They complement the existing poverty assessments of Vietnam opening up
process by presenting workable ways of exploiting the available households’
living standard surveys and present both VEP and (extended) VEU assess-
ments from trade openness.
Vulnerability from trade: a meso approach
A meso approach of vulnerability from trade is required to compound
the outcomes of cross-country vulnerability analyses with those at household
level in “within country” approaches. The need to enrich vulnerability anal-
ysis with a “meso” perspective emanates from the consciousness that neither
cross country nor household vulnerability assessments, although character-
ized by relevant virtues, can guarantee an holistic welfare analysis of the risks
induced by trade liberalization. The “meso approach” of vulnerability is a
totally new - and promising approach that attracts a growing interest among
practitioners. Up to now, it is possible to identify basically two main strands
of the literature devoted to the meso approach: the “vulnerability of subna-
tional regions approach”, which underlines the role of regional-level shocks as
a source of covariate risk to households’ income and stresses fragility in var-
ious domains, such as economic fragility, fragility of ecosystems and fragility
related to governance and local institutions; and the “industry level volatility
approach”, which starts from the assumptions that the analysis of volatility
25They apply a multinomial logit (MNL) model to analyse the probability of being in a
particular state, out of several unordered alternatives.
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across industries and a closer look at the production sector are key to an
deep investigation of the impact of shocks on poverty.
Frontrunners of the first strand of the literature, also called “vulnerability
of place” (i.e. the vulnerability of people to fall into or remain in poverty ow-
ing to being at a particular place) are Naude et al., (2009b). They built a Lo-
cal Vulnerability Index (LVI) across 354 magisterial districts in South Africa
concluding that remoteness, dominance of primary (agricultural) production
in a local economy, and low population densities are the dominant features of
the most vulnerable sub-national districts. Also Gunther & Harttgen (2009),
starting from the traditional VEP method and using a multilevel analysis
(Goldstein, 1999), present a method to differentiate the relative importance
of covariate shocks at “community level” (i.e. geographically clustered) with
idiosyncratic shocks at household level.
Proponents of the “industry level approach” are Imbs (2004), di Giovanni
& Levchenko (2009) and Krishna & Levchenko (2009). Imbs (2004) proposes
a possible solution to the macro trade co-movement puzzle (see Kose & Yi,
2001, 2006), highlighting the role of intra-industry trade on business cycle
synchronization. Di Giovanni & Levchenko (2009), using a broad, industry-
level panel dataset of manufacturing production and trade (59 countries and
28 manufacturing sectors over a period of 30 years), highlight that more open
the industries tend to be, ceteris paribus, the more volatile since they are more
exposed to world supply and demand shocks. Krishna & Levchenko (2009)
provide theoretical explanations of Koren & Tenreyro’s (2007a) hypothesis
that developing countries are more volatile because their production special-
isations are in more volatile sectors. They find that less developed countries
with low levels of human capital or with lower institutional ability, tend to
specialise in less complex goods (i.e. that require fewer inputs for the pro-
duction of one unit of the good), which are characterised by higher levels of
output volatility. This last is a somewhat surprising feature. According to
Leontief technology if all inputs are necessary, more inputs imply more risks.
Their argument is that the volatility of a good that uses only a few inputs
will be more affected by the shocks to each individual input, while produc-
tion in a sector that uses numerous inputs will be less affected, on average,
by shocks to any particular input (see also Koren & Tenreyro, 2007b). As
it is apparent, we are still far from a comprehensive analysis of “meso vul-
nerability”. However, also in this case, very useful, although still scattered,
contributions are in place and provide a valuable starting point.
Notwithstanding a through analysis of “meso vulnerability” is outside the
scope of this research work, the empirical evidence presented in both Essays
3 and 4 that trade-related risks are not fully shared across trade-related
industries consistently highlights the relevance of this issue and the need of
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further investigations in this direction.
1.5 Conclusions
Whether - and eventually to what extent - trade openness imply long
term welfare discounting for some countries or households by raising their
uncertainty about the future and/or their risk exposure to external shocks is
still uncertain. Hence, it warrants more careful investigation.
The literature review presented here highlights the amount and extent of
the very informative work currently available on this topic and also the urgent
need for more focused work on the implications of trade openness in terms of
vulnerability. The added value of the present work is to get a comprehensive
conceptualisation of vulnerability, its methods and misconceptions, and to
highlight three directions for future research in “trade-induced vulnerabil-
ity” within three levels of analysis: macro, micro and meso. Improving our
capacity to assess the vulnerability hazard of different trade reform options,
at different levels of analysis, has evident policy implications. Evaluation of
the impact of covariate shocks induced by trade openness is of major interest
to international economic policy; assessment of trade-related idiosyncratic
shocks will help national policymakers to set priorities and calibrate domes-
tic coping mechanisms and safety nets; the “meso” analysis sheds lights on
the economic geography and socio-political determinants of “trade-induced
vulnerability” as well as on the role of industrial and competition polices.
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Appendix 1A - Short summary of the most
common vulnerability measures
This appendix provides a short summary on the main available methods
to measure monetary vulnerability as well as of their pros and cons.
VEP-Vulnerability as Expected Poverty (Christiaensen & Boisvert, 2000;
Christiaensen & Subbarao, 2005; Chaudhuri, 2001, 2003; Chaudhuri & al.,
2002; Pritchett & al., 2000).
This is the most controversial but commonly applied method. It assesses
vulnerability simply as the expected value of the standard FGT class of
decomposable poverty measures (Foster & al., 1984) as follows:
Vα,ht = F (z)
∫ z
0
(
max
{
0,
z − ch,t+1
z
})α
f(ch,t+1)
F (z)
dch,t+1 (1A-1)
where ch is household’s consumption; z is the standard poverty line; F (.)
and f(.) indicate, respectively, the cumulative distribution and the density
function of consumption at time t + 126. Eq.1A-1 measures the probability
of households to fall below the poverty line, i.e. F (z), multiplied by a condi-
tional probability-weighted function of the shortfall below this poverty line
(Christiaensen & Boisvert, 2000). The parameter α sets the degree of sen-
sitivity of the vulnerability measure to the distance from the poverty line.27
When α = 0 VEP measure reduces to the probability that the household will
experience poverty, i.e V = F (z)28. The distribution F is taken as given and
reflects both the households’ exposure to shocks (idiosyncratic or covariant)
and its ability to cope with them.
26Eq. 1A-1 is obtained by multiplying the expected value of the poverty index by
F (z)/F (z). For more information on the derivation procedure of Eq.1A-1, see Christi-
aensen & Boisvert, 2000.
27To provide a measure of vulnerability more consistent with the measure of the severity
of poverty, Kamanou & Morduch (2002) express vulnerability as expected changes in
poverty rather than expected poverty per se. Specifically, they define vulnerability in
a population as the difference between the expected value of a poverty measure in the
future and its current value (i.e. only the first moment matters), attaching weights to the
deviations between the welfare measure and its benchmark.
28The majority of works (Christiaensen and Boisvert, 2000; Pritchett et al., 2000;
Chaudhuri and Datt, 2001; Chaudhuri et al., 2002) rely on this choice indeed, but there
are also some VEP applications which look at the depth of the poverty (α = 1) and at the
spread of its distribution (α = 2) (see, for example, Ravallion, 1988).
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Empirically, on the assumption that consumption is log-normally dis-
tributed, setting the consumption poverty threshold, z and a threshold prob-
ability value above which a household is considered vulnerable, it is possible
to estimate vulnerability to expected poverty as the probability at time t of
a household with characteristics Xh to fall below the poverty line in the near
future using the estimated expected mean (ĉh) and variance (σ̂
2
h) of its log
consumption, as follows:
Vα,ht = Pr(lncht < lnz|Xht) = Φ( lnz − lnĉht√
σ̂2ht
) (1A-2)
where Φ is the cumulative density of the standard normal distribution.
The main assumption of the VEP approach is that environment is sta-
tionary and the variance of the residuals in cross-sectional consumption re-
gressions (i.e. the unexplained part of household consumption) is not simply
a measurement error and is not equal across households. It rather captures
the impact of both idiosyncratic and covariate shocks on consumption, that
can be explained by a set of observable household characteristics. It follows
from this assumption the main advantage of the VEP method: it can be used
to assess vulnerability with a single round of cross-sectional data.
The drawbacks of the VEP method are essentially the lack of a solid
theoretical background and the fact it relies on a set of strong assumptions,
namely: cross-sectional variability proxies also inter-temporal variance in
consumption (hence, it misses the impact of household-invariant but time-
variant shocks); time series are stationary; the distribution of shocks to con-
sumption is independent normal; households have increasing absolute risk
aversion, (which contrasts to the empirical evidence on the risk preferences
of the poor).29 Furthermore, it displays a somewhat perverse feature relating
to the measure of the welfare consequences of risks, since it implies a reduc-
tion of vulnerability by increasing the variability of consumption around the
poverty line, which is in sharp contrast to the poor being risk averse (Hod-
dinott & Quisumbing, 2003).30 Finally, the standard version of the approach
is not able to differentiate between the impact of idiosyncratic shocks and
29VEP method does not deal with households’ risk preferences, but this assumption
follows directly from the VEP method as noticed by Ligon & Schechter (2004).
30To make this point Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003) present the following example:
consider two possible scenarios. In the first, a risk averse household is certain that ex-
pected consumption in period t+1 is just below the poverty line so that the probability of
poverty (i.e. vulnerability) is 1. In the second, while mean expected consumption remains
unchanged, there is a slight variability of consumption such that there is probability 0.5
that the household will have consumption just above the mean (and above the poverty
line) and probability 0.5 that the household will have consumption slightly lower than
the mean (and the poverty line). Moving from the first scenario to the second, makes
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the impact of covariate shocks. Acknowledging the latter caveat, Sarris &
Karfakis (2006) and Gunther & Harttgen (2009) present different methods to
disentangle VEP measure assessing separately the impact of covariate shocks
at the community level and the idiosyncratic ones at household level. More
specifically, Gunther & Harttgen (2009) acknowledge the hierarchical struc-
ture of community and household variables by applying a multilevel analysis.
Hence, they decompose the unexplained variance in households’ consumption
into a lower-level (i.e. household) and a higher-level (i.e. community) compo-
nent. Gunther & Harttgen (2009) provide also a sound method to decompose
vulnerability estimates into sources of vulnerability. They disentangle the set
of vulnerable households into two sub-groups, namely: households with the
estimated expected mean consumption below the poverty line (the poverty
induced vulnerable) and households with estimated expected mean consump-
tion above the poverty line but characterized by high estimated variance in
consumption (the risk induced vulnerable).
VEU - Vulnerability as Low Expected Utility (Ligon & Schechter 2003,
2004).
The VEU model tries to counteract the weak theoretical background of
the VEP class of measures by proposing a measure of vulnerability based on
expected utility. The vulnerability of household h is thus measured as the
difference between the utility derived from some level of certainty-equivalent
consumption, zce (above which the household would not be considered vul-
nerable; something analogous to a poverty line), and the expected utility of
consumption (EUh(ch)), as follows:
Vh = Uh(zce)− EUh(ch) (1A-3)
where Uh is a weakly concave, strictly increasing function.
The VEU method too enables decomposition of vulnerability into two
distinct components: vulnerability to poverty, that is, low expected con-
sumption, and vulnerability to risk, that is, high volatility of consumption,
as follows:
Vh = [Uh(zce)− Uh(E(ch))] + [Uh(E(ch))− EUh(ch)] (1A-4)
where the first bracketed term (i.e. the difference in utility at zce com-
pared to the utility of households’ expected consumption) is a measure of
the household worse off (being risk averse, it would prefer the certain consumption to the
expected consumption). However, the second scenario will reduce vulnerability, from 1
to 0.5. The perverse result is that, using this measure, a policymaker seeking to reduce
vulnerability should introduce new sources of risks.
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vulnerability to poverty and involves no random variables, while the second
term, according to the ordinal measures of risk proposed by Rothschild &
Stiglitz (1970), measures vulnerability to risk.31. Moreover, with this method,
different from VEP, the risk component can be further decomposed into co-
variate and idiosyncratic components. Let E(ch|xt) be the expected value of
consumption conditional on a vector of covariant variables xt, then we can
rewrite the VEU measure as follows:
Vh = [Uh(zce)− Uh(Ech)] + [Uh(E(ch))− E(ch|xt)] + [E(ch|xt)− EUh(ch)]
(1A-5)
where the first bracketed component is again vulnerability to poverty,
but the second and third components break down vulnerability to risk into
two sub-components: vulnerability to covariate risks and vulnerability to
idiosyncratic risks. To avoid confusion between the measurement error and
idiosyncratic risk, Ligon & Schechter (2003) further decompose their measure
of idiosyncratic risk into risk that can be attributed to a set of distinct,
observed, time varying characteristics.
The VEU measure of vulnerability raises three main and interrelated con-
cerns too: firstly, the obvious circumstance that the choice of the particular
functional form of the utility function directly affects the magnitude of the
phenomenon32; secondly, the difficulty to transform VEU measures of vul-
nerability, in units of utility, into actual economic policy targets (Hoddinott
& Quisumbing, 2003); thirdly, it is sensitive overall to ex-ante changes in
welfare, even those above the poverty line that have no direct incidence on
future poverty (Calvo & Dercon, 2007a).
VTP - Vulnerability as the Threat of Poverty (Calvo and Dercon, 2013;
Povel, 2015, Chaudhuri et al., 2002; Kamanou & Morduch, 2004; Pritchett,
Suryahadi, & Sumarto, 2000; Dutta et al., 2011; Gunther & Maier, 2008).
The VTP class of vulnerability measures tries to avoid some of weak-
nesses of both VEP and VEU methods. The main advantage of this group of
measures is that vulnerability is associated to the extent that poverty can-
not be safely ruled out as any of the possible future scenarios (Calvo, 2008).
31It is the ”natural” counterpart, denominated in utils, of the ” risk premium” the
household would be willing to forego in order to eliminate the risk. It can be measured,
starting from a (weakly) concave utility function, as the difference between the utility
of consuming the expected consumption with certainty and the expected utility from
consuming ch.
32Ligon and Schechter (2003) rely on the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) form
of the utility function.
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Starting from the assumption that people suffer and are wary of the future if
their knowledge of what it holds is uncertain, Calvo & Dercon (2007a) assess
vulnerability as the ex-ante probability weighted average[s] of state-specific
indices of deprivation and propose a set of axioms33 to picture the desirable
properties of a vulnerability measure able to endogenously combine poverty
and risk measures.
If all the axioms are satisfied, the following vulnerability measure applies:
Vα = 1− E[xα] (1A-6)
with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.0 ≤ 1 represents the rate of coverage of basic needs,
which is derived, for each state of the world, as xi ≡ y˜i/z where y˜i(yi, z); yi
is the consumption level (after all consumption smoothing efforts have been
deployed); z is the standard poverty line; and α represents risk sensitivity (as
α increases to 1, household approaches risk-neutrality). It follows then, that
people are vulnerable to the extent that poverty cannot be safely ruled out as
a possible future scenario (Calvo, 2008) This means that general uncertainty
not related to poverty in any state of the world does not enter in this measure
of vulnerability. In this respect, the VTP measure overcomes VEP, which,
according to this view, risks to overestimate vulnerability and VEU, since
the vulnerability measure cannot be affected by outcome changes above the
poverty line (i.e., the focus axiom).
Two main caveats apply to use of the VTP measure. Firstly, it follows
from the definition above that for those facing no uncertainty with known
xi = x∗ < 1, for all i, Vα > 0; that is, they must be considered vulnerable
with certainty. In other words, being poor is the dominant threat in terms of
vulnerability. However, there is no agreement on this reasoning in the litera-
ture. Moreover, there is also a risk of a spurious correlation between poverty
and vulnerability since those households that suffer an income or wealth loss
are likely to be at the lower end of the income distribution (Tesliuc & Lindert,
2004). Secondly, the empirical strategy of VTP implies the use of lengthy
33The set of axioms is the following: the focus axiom (i.e. the vulnerability measure
cannot be affected by outcome changes above the poverty line); symmetry over states (i.e.
the only relevant difference between two states of the world i and j is the difference in their
outcomes and probabilities); continuity and differentiability (of the vulnerability function);
scale invariance (i.e. vulnerability measure should not depend on the unit of the measure
of outcomes); normalization (i.e. to impose boundaries for reasons of comparability);
probability-dependent effect of outcomes (i.e. vulnerability is sensitive to the likelihood
of that particular state of the world); probability transfer (i.e. if yi is greater than or at
least equal to yj , then vulnerability cannot increase as a result of a probability transfer
from state j to state i); risk sensitivity (i.e. greater risk increases vulnerability); constant
relative risk sensitivity (i.e. risk sensitivity remains constant if all state specific outcomes
increase proportionally). Calvo and Dercon (2007).
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panel data to retrieve predictions of the rate of coverage of basic needs and
the distribution of random idiosyncratic shocks looming for households in
the future in various states of the world (Calvo, 2008). This strategy is not
exempt from critique. It is not only subject to mis-specifications and mea-
surement errors, but assumes a time invariant discrete uniform distribution
of shocks, which is indeed an assumption as strong as proxing inter-temporal
variance with cross-sectional variability, as made by the VEP method. As a
result, this generous effort of building an axiomatic approach to vulnerability
lacks robust empirical analyses capable of providing a clear added value to
standard VEP outcomes. It should be borne in mind, generally speaking,
the existence of a trade off between more accurate vulnerability estimates
and the vast amounts of data required on all possible states of the world.
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Chapter 2
Essay 2 - Aggregate risk and
consumption behaviour: the
empirical evidence in the long
run
This essay sheds light on the impact of aggregate (permanent) risk on
consumption behaviour. Unlike previous works, the present analysis: i) is
theoretically grounded in a precautionary saving framework; ii) is empirically
grounded in a wide (147 countries) and long cross-country panel setting for
the pre-crisis period (1950-2008); iii) controls for country heterogeneity and
also includes the poorest countries in the world. By presenting conservative
(i.e., lower bound) estimates, our main conclusion is to highlight a significant
association, on average and ceteris paribus, between aggregate permanent
risk, “extra saving” and consumption. Although consumption fluctuations
are seen as the optimal response to risk, this implies a lower smooth path
of consumption than the risk-free counterfactual, with permanent negative
effects on welfare. This relationship holds in the long run, increases over
time and is widespread across the entire income distribution. However, our
results empirically confirm Lucas’s (1987) intuition regarding the low value
of stabilisation policies.
Keywords: consumption, volatility, risk, precautionary saving, welfare,
developing countries.
JEL: E21, F40, C82, O10, O57
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2.1 Background, aims and caveats
This work contributes to the empirical debate on the impact of macro-
economic fluctuations on welfare by empirically assessing the impact of ag-
gregate (permanent) risk on consumption behaviour. The global crisis of
2008-09 has raised additional concerns about the welfare effect of macroe-
conomic shocks on public and private saving (Mody et al., 2012; Aizenman
and Noy, 2013), especially in developing contexts (Prasad, 2013). While the
empirical debate from Ramey and Ramey (1995) onwards has largely focused
on the causal impact of macro volatility on long run growth (highlighting a
negative relationship for developing countries), we believe that the empirical
assessment of the impact of macro-economic fluctuations on welfare needs
additional, more careful investigation (Loayza et al., 2007; Reis, 2009).
Since panel data are ideal for testing the theory of consumption but scarce
at the micro level, we present conservative (i.e., lower bound) estimates of
the relevance and significance of household “extra-saving” under the precau-
tionary saving hypothesis (Caroll, 2001a; Kimball, 1990; Caballero, 1990,
Deaton, 1992) based on a long and wide cross-country panel setting (147
countries) for the pre-crisis period (1950-2008). To go beyond averages and
control for country heterogeneity, we provide estimates by income deciles as
well.
Our main conclusion is that, on average and ceteris paribus, a lower con-
sumption smoothing path is significantly associated with permanent risk,
producing aggregate “extra saving” and hampering consumption prospects.
This relationship holds in the long run and is widespread across the income
distribution. However, albeit by reference to conservative estimates, we can-
not refute Lucas’s (1987) intuition regarding the low value of stabilisation
policies.
As in other similar studies, the aim is not, at this stage, to distinguish
between the various sources of macroeconomic fluctuations (productivity or
monetary shocks; pure business cycles; long run uncertainty; policy mis-
management, etc.)1, nor to address the issue of the portfolio choices beneath
consumption behaviour,2 but rather to highlight empirically the presence of a
1Parker and Preston (2005) underline four proximate causes of fluctuations in aggregate
consumption growth: new information, real interest rate, consumption preference, and
risk.
2In this respect, our results should be assumed to be conditional to asset prices. While
direct estimates of precautionary wealth may be advisable to let data speak in a much
less filtered way (Carroll, 2001b; Carroll and Samwick, 1997), data on wealth cannot be
estimated reliably and in a comparable way across countries. Furthermore, it is not yet
clear how to translate estimates on wealth into a set of behavioural parameters (Carroll
and Kimball, 2008)
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robust relationship between aggregate permanent risk, consumption smooth-
ing and “extra-saving” by looking at its magnitude; short-run versus long
run dynamics and robustness to countries’ heterogeneity. It is also worth
noting that our focus is not, at this stage, to determine clear-cut attribution
but to present lower bound estimates on the likely change in consumption
behaviour in countries characterised by significant aggregate fluctuation as
well as to assess possible traces of “extra-saving” in poor countries. Since
income and consumption fluctuations are growing over time (and cannot be
considered only as a negative spill-over of the global crisis) this is a relevant
issue for policymaking.
The empirical strategy is grounded on the theory of precautionary sav-
ing and looks at the impacts of permanent risk on consumption behaviour.
According to the precautionary saving literature, consumption adjustments
(e.g., reducing current consumption and encouraging additional/extra sav-
ing) are seen as optimal responses to meaningful uncertainty in future income
(Caroll, 2001a; Kimball, 1990; Caballero, 1990, Deaton, 1992). The litera-
ture on precautionary saving is mainly focused on individuals in a closed
economy setting. Surprisingly little attention has been devoted to its ag-
gregate counterpart in a global framework (significant exceptions are Ghosh
and Ostry, 1995 and 1997; Krussell and Smith, 1998; Carroll, 2000 and, more
recently, Mody et al., 2012; Cherif and Hasanov, 2012; Baiardi et al., 2013).
Our contribution is an effort to bridge this gap and give additional insights
into the impact of aggregate risk on countries’ welfare.
A number of caveats must be taken when performing this empirical task.
The main drawback is represented by the implicit assumption that there is
a representative agent (i.e., no individual differences). While convenient - it
permits the adoption of an invariant felicity function and reduces the problem
of measurement error - it implies that incomes are perfectly pooled across
individuals (i.e., full domestic risk sharing) and, hence, limits the analysis
to aggregate risk only.3 In this respect, our empirical results can be seen as
a conservative estimate of the phenomenon under analysis since the direc-
3The usual concern is that the representative consumer model reduces the relevance
of precautionary saving (Carroll, 2000). The representative agent story can be even more
misleading in the presence of borrowing restrictions that could alter uniformity across in-
dividuals. However, as Krussel and Smith (1998), Heaton and Lucas (1996) and Constan-
tinides and Duffie (1996) argue, household heterogeneity arises mostly from idiosyncratic
transitory shocks which are easy to insure with only a modest amount of saving (Gourin-
chas, 2000). Conversely, in a world full of uncertainty, the precautionary demand for saving
is likely to be strengthened if access to credit is limited when it is most required (Deaton,
1992; Lee and Sawada, 2010). Moreover, several recent studies controlling for incomplete
risk sharing and heterogeneous agents find only modest effects on welfare estimates with
respect to Lucas’s benchmark (Lucas, 2003; Krussel et al., 2012; Krebs, 2003)
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tion of distortion of our aggregate estimates is likely to reduce the impact of
volatility rather than emphasise it (the average variability of the individual is
greater than the variability of individuals whose behaviour is being averaged).
The same consideration applies for another theoretical prediction: the pres-
ence of full international risk sharing (i.e., perfect consumption smoothing
across countries and states of nature) in the hypothesis of complete markets
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996).4
Lastly, consumption smoothing is not the only behavioural mechanism to
respond to risk and uncertainty. For instance, prudent households under risk
may well decide to reduce their health care and school expenditure, contribut-
ing in this way to a permanent reduction in income and welfare. However,
consumption behaviour is undeniably one of the most relevant household
choices under risk. Since saving-ratios tend to be pro-cyclical (rising in boom
times and falling in times of crisis), consumption should be assumed, in a
macroeconomic perspective, to be protected against business-cycle fluctua-
tions (Deaton, 1992). Violation of this assumption reveals that people react
to risk by modifying their consumption behaviour, specifically by reducing
current consumption and encouraging additional/extra saving. This implies
a lower smooth path of consumption than a risk-free counterfactual with
permanent negative effects on welfare. This could arise for various reasons.
Risk exposure could generate behaviour that is virtually indistinguishable
from that generated by a liquidity constraint by inducing self-imposed reluc-
tance to borrow (Caroll, 2001a). Alternatively, liquidity constraints could
make people accumulate precautionary wealth in an attempt to insure them-
selves (Lee & Sawada, 2010).5 Consumption smoothing also engenders a
set of behavioural changes apt to produce likely effects on household welfare
such as smoothing asset/income; self-insurance, risk-sharing arrangements,
diversification, migration, etc. (Morduch, 1994; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993;
Townsend, 1994, 1995; Zimmerman and Carter 2003).
The work is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly summarises the lit-
erature; Section 3 presents the empirical model; Section 4 shows the cross-
country estimates and Section 5 concludes.
4In this framework, the only type of risk reflected by consumption is due to aggregate
uncertainty over world output (i.e., systemic risk). However, also in this case, the em-
pirical literature has systematically rejected the null hypothesis of complete risk sharing,
acknowledging a much larger degree of risk sharing within countries than cross-countries
(Crucini and Hess, 2000; Kose et al., 2003, 2007, 2009 and 2011; Asdrubali and Kim, 2008;
Broner and Ventura, 2011, Pierucci and Ventura, 2012).
5Madsen and McAleer (2000) provide some support for the uncertainty hypothesis,
using panel data for 22 OECD countries.
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2.2 Why should we care about macro-volatility?
A review of the literature
The phenomenon of macro volatility has been confined to standard cycle
theory for a long time and was mainly concerned with the decomposition of
economic growth into cyclical and trend components. Thus, it has long been
considered a second-order issue in studies on developing countries, but of
primary interest in industrial countries concerned with smoothing the fluctu-
ations of their business cycles. Moreover, according to the influential Lucas
(1987) study, the cost of fluctuations is supposed to be of little account in
terms of welfare. The fraction of consumption forgone for a reduction in
its variability is approximated by the reduction in the squared coefficient of
variation multiplied by half the coefficient of relative risk-aversion. Hence,
the value of so-called “economic stabilisation” policies is supposed to be low.
However, Lucas (1988) observed that, in the long term, fluctuations in rates
of growth are likely to be more substantial in less developed countries, sug-
gesting a link between a country’s level of economic development and its
volatility. Recent empirical evidence questions Lucas’s (1987) results. While
Lucas conveniently assumed consumption shocks to be serially uncorrelated,
Reis (2009) points out that Lucas’s estimates are downward-biased, since
he belittled the role of ”persistence” as a crucial determinant of the cost of
fluctuation.
This weakness is supposed to be more serious in the context of devel-
oping countries (Calderon and Fuentes, 2010). From the work of Ramey
and Ramey (1995) onwards empirical cross-country studies have consistently
found that volatility exerts a significant negative impact on long-run growth.
Moreover, they show that it severely affects developing economies’ welfare
(Fatas, 2000; Pallage and Robe, 2003; Wolf, 2005; Aizenman and Pinto,
2005; Loayza et al., 2007) and that consumption volatility increases com-
pared with income volatility (Kose et al., 2003). More recently, Malik and
Temple (2009) argue that volatility should be assumed as “endemic” in the
developing world. They show that the median standard deviation of annual
growth rates in low-income countries has been more than three times that
of OECD member countries over a period of 40 years (1960-99). The World
Bank, in its volatility handbook, also claimed that, in the developing world,
“good times do not offset the negative impact of bad times” and shocks tend
to have permanent negative effects (Aizenman and Pinto, 2005). According
to a number of scholars, such asymmetry is reinforced by internal factors such
as incomplete markets, inefficient taxation, pro-cyclical fiscal policy and es-
pecially, weak financial market institutions (Easterly et al., 2001; Denizer et
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al., 2002; Ferreira da Silva, 2002; Bekaert et al., 2005). Other factors include
political insecurity, macroeconomic instability and institutional weaknesses –
all phenomena that largely affect developing countries (Alesina et al., 1999;
Judson and Orphanides, 1999; Gavin and Hausmann, 1996; Raddatz 2006;
Serve´n, 1997; Age´nor et al., 2000; Fata´s and Mihov 2005; Acemoglu et al.,
2003; Rodrik, 1998 and 1999). Volatility, in this context, is seen as a proxy
of “uncertainty”, likely to lead firms either to under-invest or to invest in
the “wrong” projects (Caballero, 1991; Bertola and Caballero 1994; Serven,
1997; Aizenman and Marion, 1999) and households to abandon a smooth
path of consumption. This behaviour is enhanced by conditions of risk aver-
sion, incomplete markets, lumpiness and the irreversibility associated with
the investment process (Hnatkovska and Loyaza, 2005). More recently, the
literature has also investigated the plausibility of an overall negative effect of
cyclical fluctuations on long-term growth (Fatas, 2000; Blackburn and Pel-
loni, 2004 and 2005), overcoming the standard distinction between the two
issues.
Loayza & al. (2007) highlight two main reasons why we should care about
macroeconomic fluctuation: i) the substantial welfare loss of deviating from
a smooth path of consumption; ii) the indirect welfare loss in terms of fu-
ture consumption, in the case of a negative impact of volatility on growth.
They also argue that these phenomena are emphasised in developing coun-
tries which not only face more volatility than industrial countries, but suffer
larger volatility effects, because of the intrinsic instability of the process of
development (mainly linked to the weakness of their financial systems and the
main characteristics of their specialisation process of production); the con-
crete risk of policy mismanagement (e.g., as in the case of pro-cyclical and/or
erratic fiscal and monetary policies) and the presence of weaker mitigating
and coping mechanisms.
More recently, additional empirical cross-country evidence (Mody et al.,
2012 and Cherif and Hasanov, 2012) shows how heightened uncertainty has
increased precautionary saving in safe assets, leading countries into a “volatil-
ity trap”. Likewise, Carrie´re-Swallow and Ce´spedes (2013) highlight the
presence of strong heterogeneity in the impact of uncertainty on countries’
welfare with emerging markets suffering a much more severe and persistent
fall in investment than the other countries in the sample.
The empirical framework adopted in this essay aims to explore the first
direct channel of the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations highlighted by
Loayza et al. (2007). In this respect, this work differs from the strand of the
literature that looks primarily at the second (indirect) channel (Ramey and
Ramey, 1995, Fatas, 2000; Pallage and Robe, 2003; Wolf, 2005; Aizenman
and Pinto, 2005; Loayza et al., 2007). It also differs from the one that
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looks directly at the observed aggregate consumption to calculate the gains
from eliminating fluctuations in consumption using compensation parameters
of household preference for stability (Lucas, 1987, 2003; Reis, 2009). In
other words, this Essay focuses on the impact of ex-ante risk on current and
future consumption possibilities which implies relative changes in portfolio
allocation between risky capital and safe assets.Taking advantage of the long
panel data available for aggregate variables, it exploits Euler restrictions to
estimate the ex-ante impact of income risk even in the absence of a fully
specified dynamic model.
2.3 Macro-volatility and consumption smooth-
ing: the empirical model
To assess the cost of fluctuations on consumption behaviour the obvious
theoretical reference is the theory of ”precautionary saving” (Caroll, 2001;
Kimball, 1990; Caballero, 1990, Deaton, 1992). According to this strand of
the literature, if the marginal utility of consumption function is convex, the
consumer follows prudent behaviour.6 This means that an individual pays
attention not only to the mean of the future income (as implicitly assumed
by the standard permanent consumption model) but also to its variability.
Although the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the theory of precau-
tionary saving (whose basic intuition dates back to Keynes) are now well
established, less agreement exists about the strength of the precautionary
motive (Carroll and Kimball, 2008) and little attention has been devoted
to its aggregate counterpart. Furthermore, the impact of the precautionary
motive in developing contexts remains somewhat ambiguous and calls for ad-
ditional empirical investigation. Deaton (1992) - the first to provide evidence
of the cost of precautionary saving on household welfare in developing con-
texts - highlights a positive effect of risk/uncertainty on saving and growth.
Conversely, Hahn (1970), Dercon (2005), Elbers et al. (2009) and Gunning
(2010) show how the introduction of risky assets produces, under a series
6Although often confused, precaution and risk aversion are not exactly the same thing
(Carroll and Kimball, 2008). While prudence represents the “intensity” of the precau-
tionary saving motive, risk aversion determines the price one is willing to pay to eliminate
uncertainty. Practically speaking, the degree of precaution is the degree of convexity of the
marginal utility function, whereas risk aversion is controlled by the degree of concavity of
the utility function. Hence, while precaution depends on the third derivative of the utility
function, risk aversion depends on the second derivative and one can be inferred from the
other only for very special functions, e.g. if utility is exponential, then absolute prudence
coincides with absolute risk aversion (Kimball, 1990).
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of specific circumstances, negative effects of risk and uncertainty on saving
decisions.
Our cross-country comparison adds a long-term perspective (not avail-
able at the micro level) to look at the impact of permanent risks on labour
income. Furthermore, it could help in assessing whether and to what extent,
on average and ceteris paribus, aggregate precautionary saving behaviour in
developing countries is statistically different from that in more developed
contexts.
The standard approach to testing the impact of income risk on caus-
ing representative agents to deviate from consumption smoothing is to as-
sume that agents maximise the expected value of the following time-separable
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility function7 over an infinite
horizon (see Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Caballero (1990 and 1991), Weil
(1990), Guiso et al., (1992) among others)8:
maxEt
[ ∞∑
t=0
βte−ρct
]
(1)
where β is a subjective discount rate of consumption (time preference)
and ρ is the degree of absolute risk aversion. Eq. (1) is subject to a standard
budget constraint wt+1 = Rwt + yt+1− ct+1 where R = (1 + r) is the interest
factor (assumed to be constant); w is individual wealth (wt is given) and yt
is the consumer’s idiosyncratic income. For now let’s assume that the latter
exhibits a random-walk deviation from an exogenously growing measure of
permanent income: yt+1 = ŷt + ψt+1.
9 In the simplified case where Rβ = 1
and if income shocks are normally distributed, the solution of the system is
the following (see Appendix A):
7Notwithstanding the fact that the adoption of the Constant Relative Risk Aversion
(CRRA) isoelastic utility function is standard in models of precautionary saving (Carroll
et al., 1992; Carroll and Samwick, 1997 & 1998; Deaton 1992; Zeldes 1989, Skinner 1988),
with a stochastic income process it does not allow a closed form solution. To assess the cost
of fluctuations in income, therefore, the only solution left is to apply a negative exponential
utility function with Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) which allows for a closed
form solution for the consumption function. The CARA utility function is the following:
U(C) = − 1ρe−ρC where ρ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (ρ = −U
′′
U ′ > 0).
CARA application also has its drawbacks since it implies that the degree of risk aversion
is constant (i.e., independent of the level of individual resources) and it does not rule out
negative consumption, especially early in life, if assets are low and income innovations are
variable (Deaton, 1992).
8The hypothesis of infinite time horizon is standard in macroeconomics and reasonable
when the focus is on households and not on individuals.
9In appendix 2B, we further decompose this measure of permanent income to assess
separately the permanent and transitory stochastic components.
54
2.3 Macro-volatility and consumption smoothing: the empirical
model
ct = wt
R− 1
R
+ ŷt − (R− 1)
1
2
ρ
(1−R)2σ
2
ψ (2)
Eq. (2) adds to the certainty equivalent consumption a negative term
on the right hand side that is precautionary saving. It is evident from the
fact that it equals zero if there is no risk σ2ψ = 0 or no precautionary motive
ρ = 0.10 Note that, according to this model, the effect of risk on consumption
does not depend on the level of permanent income or the level of wealth.
Eq. (2) assumes that consumption tracks permanent income in the long
run (which is reasonable in an aggregate framework thanks to the turnover
of generations, Deaton, 1992). However, consumption also shows sensitivity
to transitory income in the short-run and consumers take some time to ad-
just their consumption to long-run equilibrium.11 It means technically that
consumption and total income are co-integrated.12
To control for this and provide a full account of the separate (short-
term and long-term) components of the consumption function as well as the
adjustment mechanism that links short-term and long-term consumption-
income equilibria, we apply an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) (1,1)
version of our consumption model, as follows:13
ct = β0 + β1yt + β2yt−1 + β3ct−1 + ut (3)
10Because of the use of exponential utility in this exercise, the degree of absolute risk
aversion is assumed to be equal to the degree of absolute prudence.
11Probably linked to imperfect information and the correlated small individual mistakes
in consumption choices.
12Indeed, Fisher-type tests do not exclude ”unit-root” problems even when cross-
sectional averages and linear time trends are taken explicitly into account. Following
up the Im–Pesaran–Shin (IPS) approach, the Fisher test performs a unit-root test on each
panel series separately, then combines the p-values to obtain an overall test of whether the
panel series contains a unit root. The starting point for the test is a set of Dickey–Fuller
regressions of the form: ∆Yit = φiYit−1 + Zitγi + εit where φi is panel-specific. The null
hypothesis is H0 : φi = 0 for all i versus the alternative Ha : φi < 0. Zitγi represent
panel-specific means (fixed effects) and linear time trends that describes the process by
which the series is generated. Our test uses Newey–West standard errors (i.e., based on
heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent covariance matrix estimator) to account
for serial correlation.
13The generic form of the Autoregressive Distributed Lags-ARDL (p,q) process applied
to consumption function is the following:
ct = α0 + α1yt + α2yt−1 + ...+ αpyt−p + γ1ct−1 + ...+ γqct−q + ut
Our aim is to reach a version of this ARDL process with white noise errors and the
minimum number of lags.
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From Eq.(3) we can derive the steady state equation:14
c∗ =
β0
(1− β3) +
β1 + β2
(1− β3)Y
∗ (4)
where β = β1+β2
(1−β3) is the long-term marginal propensity to consume.
If we subtract ct−1 from both sides Eq.(3) and take into account the
steady state (long-term) equilibrium by acknowledging from Eq.4 that β2 =
β(1− β3)− β1 we get:15
ct − ct−1 = β0 + β1(yt − yt−1)− (1− β3)[ct−1 − βyt−1] + ut (5)
where [ct−1 − βyt−1] is the error correction mechanism (Hendry, 1995;
Hamilton, 1994); β is the long-term parameter; β1 is the short-term param-
eter (attached to variables in differences) and (1 − β3) is the speed of the
adjustment process from short-term to long-term equilibrium (the EC term).
Eq. (5) can be estimated without constraints as follows:
∆ct = β0 + β1∆yt − (1− β3)ct−1 + β(1− β3)yt−1 + ut (6)
where ∆ is the first difference operator.
From Eq. (6) we derive the following empirical model:
∆ct = δ0 + δ1∆yt + δ2ct−1 + δ3yt−1 + ut (7)
where:
δ0 = β0 [the constant]
δ1 = β1 = c [the short-run propensity of consumption]
δ2 = −(1− β3) = [i.e. the EC term]
δ3 = β(1− β3) [where β is the long-term propensity of consumption]
By applying an Error Correction Model (ECM), this framework is able
to link both the short-term and long-term components of the consumption
function in a way that is consistent with the standard stylised facts on con-
sumption (i.e., consumption proportional to permanent income in the long
run and to current income in the short run). The consistency of this model
with permanent consumption theory is generally acknowledged by the em-
pirical condition that the sum of δ2 and δ3 approximate statistically to zero
(i.e., β = 1).
14Steady state is non-stochastic [Et(ut) = 0] and variables are supposed to be in equi-
librium at a constant level as follows:
ct = ct−1 = C∗ and yt = yt−1 = y∗
15For details, please refer to Appendix 2C
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While in equilibrium certainty equivalence holds by definition, according
to Eq. (2), under the log normality assumption16, precautionary saving is
proportional to the variance of income shocks. Hence, the precautionary
saving version of Eq. (7) is the following:
∆cit = δ0 + δ1∆yit + δ2cit−1 + δ3yit−1 + δ4σ2id + uit (8)
where δ4 = −(R− 1)
1
2
ρ
(1−R)2 . It is worth noting that ∆cit has been derived
by subtracting ct−1 from both sides of Eq.(3) and hence here it does not
represent the consumption slope. As standard in this literature in this paper
we only refer to labour income (i.e., excluding capital income). This lets
us treat income as outside the agents’ control and assess the consumption
consequences of unanticipated shocks (whereas capital income depends at
least partially on assets and portfolio choices of households).
2.4 The empirical strategy and cross-country
estimates
2.4.1 The empirical strategy
To estimate Eq.(8) we need to handle the classical dynamic panel bias
(Nickell, 1981) i.e., the presence of a positive correlation between the lagged
dependent variable and the error.17 Since our panel is balanced, we first ap-
ply the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator.18 Notwithstanding
that the residuals of the ARDL specification are not expected to show any
systematic component,19 we repeat the estimation by using the Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond system generalised method of moments (SGMM) esti-
mator (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998).20 The motivation
16Traditional models assume the log normality of consumption from the log normality of
permanent income. Battistin et al. (2009) demonstrate empirically that the distribution of
consumption expenditures across households is closer to log normal than the distribution
of income.
17By construction, unobserved panel-level fixed effects are correlated with the lagged
dependent variable
18Note that it could argued that the dynamic panel bias is actually not a major issue
for our full sample estimates since T ≥ 30 (Roodman, 2009).
19As expected, Fisher type tests now reject the presence of a “unit-root” problem.
20The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond SGMM estimator augments the Arellano and
Bond (1991) GMM estimator built on Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) by including lagged
level as well as lagged difference in a system of two equations (the original and the trans-
formed ones). The first difference transformation is applied here since our panel is strongly
balanced (Roodman, 2009).
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for using the SGMM estimator instead of the GMM one is the recognition
that lags are likely to be weak instruments in the context of the Arellano and
Bond (1991) GMM estimator if consumption is expected to be persistent.21
Moreover, since risk/volatility effects are also supposed to be persistent
(Reis, 2009) and to control for the likely correlation between permanent risk
and errors determined by replacing expected values with observed means,
we present additional SGMM estimates where risk is assumed as a predeter-
mined variable.22 Thus, we use lagged values of risk/volatility as instruments
only for the period in which they are supposed to be unrelated to the error
term (i.e., lags higher than three for the first difference equation).23 Fur-
thermore, we control for the possible spatial cross-sectional dependence of
panel data.24 Moreover, even if observed variables are in real terms and
first differencing removes any time invariant components of the model, we
21When the time series are persistent and the number of time series observations is small,
the first-differenced GMM estimator is poorly behaved. The reason is that, under these
conditions, lagged levels of the variables are only weak instruments for subsequent first-
differences (Bond et al., 2001). The system estimator exploits an assumption regarding the
initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent
series, and it has been shown to perform well in simulations. Specifically, the system GMM
estimator combines the standard set of equations in first-differences with suitably lagged
levels as instruments, with an additional set of equations in levels with suitably lagged
first-differences as instruments. Although variables in levels are necessarily correlated with
country-specific effects, it assumes that variables in first-differences are not correlated with
the country-specific effects used as instruments in the level equations. The validity of
these additional instruments can be tested by using the standard tests of over-identifying
restrictions. Practically speaking, instead of transforming the regressors to expunge the
fixed effects, it transforms the instruments to make them exogenous to fixed effects. This is
valid assuming that changes in any instrumenting variable are uncorrelated with observed
country fixed effects (i.e., countries are not too far from steady states, in the sense that
deviations from long-run means are not systematically related to fixed effects). It is worth
noting that assuming the opposite (i.e., first-differences correlated with country-specific
effects) would result in implausible long-run implications (Bond et al., 2001).
22This means we allow the error term at time t to have some feedback on the subsequent
realisations of the risk/volatility term at time t. More formally, E(volisεit) = 0 for s ≤ t
and E(volisεit) 6= 0 for s > t. vol is volatility.
23The STATA command xtabond2 has been applied to run the SGMM estimates,
whereas the more flexible STATA command xtdpd has been applied for running the addi-
tional SGMM estimates with risk/volatility as predetermined variables.
24The assumption that the disturbances of a panel model are cross-sectionally indepen-
dent is often inappropriate (so called ”pure heteroscedasticity”). Provided that the unob-
servable common factors are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, the coefficient
estimates from standard panel estimators are still consistent (but inefficient). However,
the standard error estimates of commonly applied covariance matrix estimation techniques
are biased and hence statistical inference that is based on such standard errors is invalid
(see Driscoll and Kraay, 1998; Hoechle, 2007).
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include time dummies to remove any residual time variant component that
can impact consumption behaviour other than volatility and observables.
This makes the assumption that there is no correlation across countries in
the idiosyncratic disturbances more likely.
With regard to our proxy for risk, in line with the classical literature in
the field (Guiso et al., 1992; Hubbard et al., 1994; Carroll and Samwick, 1997;
Gourinchas and Parker, 2002; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004; Storesletten et al.,
2004; Krebs et al., 2010; Reis, 2009) we filtered out the permanent component
of income innovation for each country i in the sample (for more details, see
Appendix B). The assumption is that the ability to smooth consumption
changes according to the degree of shock persistence, with likely deviations
from the consumption smoothing of permanent risk (which is assumed to be
fully persistent) being larger than that for transitory ones. This reinforces
our aim to make conservative estimates since the relevance and significance of
transitory income shocks in causing deviations from consumption smoothing
are not addressed here.
Fig. 1 provides a glance into the long-run relationship between volatility
of per capita consumption growth and per capita GDP across our sample of
147 countries in the period 1950-2008 (the full list of countries included in
the sample, divided into deciles for different decades, is provided in Tables
2D-1 and 2D-2 in Appendix 2D).
The figure highlights the well-known evidence of strong heterogeneity in
consumption volatility according to the income levels of the countries in the
sample. Specifically, richer countries show a lower degree of consumption
volatility, than poorer ones. This leads us to investigate whether differences
in countries’ income levels actually produce diversified effects both in their
short-term and long-term consumption dynamics as well as in their precau-
tionary saving behaviour. A workable way to look at this source of countries’
heterogeneity is to provide consumption estimates by income deciles.25
2.4.2 Data
We provide estimates for a panel of 147 countries in a long-term pre-
crisis period (1950-2008). Data come from the PWT 7.0 database which is
the most widely used source for cross-country comparisons (Johnson et al.,
2013). They have been extensively used in various fields of economics in-
cluding growth, development and international trade. Data in the PWT are
measured at purchasing power parity and have covered a large number of
25This means we rely on mean group estimators of the parameters, i.e., not imposing
that both short-term and long-term parameters are the same across groups. See Pesaran
and Smith, 1995.
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Figure 1: Volatility and per capita GDP in the long run
countries from all regions for more than 50 years. The ultimate objective
of the PWT is to adjust national estimates of GDP by valuing output at
common international (purchasing power parity [PPP]) prices so that the
resulting PPP-adjusted estimates of GDP are comparable across countries.
This allows researchers to make real quantity comparisons both across coun-
tries and over time. As a matter of fact, roughly two-thirds of all cross-
country empirical work is based on the PWT. Second place is held by the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) which were originally
based on the PWT, but have subsequently diverged. The IMFs World Eco-
nomic Outlook (WEO) dataset comes a distant third (Johnson et al., 2013).
Recently, the PWT methodology came under some criticism. Ponomareva
& Katayama (2010) were among the first to argue that outcomes from the
PWT could be version-dependent. They noted that in case of “classical”
measurement errors, where the growth rate is the LHS variable, measure-
ment error results only in inefficiency (it is captured by the random error
term of the regression). However, Johnson et al. (2013) highlighted that
this variability across alternative versions of the PWT stems, in fact, only
in part from random changes to underlying national income accounts data.
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It also seems to be systematically related (inversely) to the size of a country
and to the distance of the data from the benchmark data. Hence, when the
PPP-adjusted GDP appears as an independent variable (in level or growth)
in the regression estimation, measurement errors actually produce biased re-
sults. Although challenging, Johnson et al. (2013) demonstrate that this
further source of bias could be corrected econometrically. Carrying out care-
ful robustness checks, they argue that the use of a good instrumentation
strategy helps to overcome these additional sources of measurement errors
in the PWT. Moreover, they demonstrate that while studies that use annual
data are less robust, low frequency data remain more robust. All things con-
sidered, the use of SGMM technique appears to be the best strategy to adopt
also for this purpose, provided that proof of instrument validity is supplied
using the appropriate tests (see the following sub-section). Also, assuming
that low frequency data are more robust, as a further robustness check for the
validity of the estimates, the consistency of annual empirical outcomes with
those obtained by averaging data on 3-year spans will be tested as well.26
Specifically, we make use of the following variables: the per capita con-
sumption share of real gross domestic product to derive our proxy of real per
capita consumption and the PPP Converted GDP Laspeyres per worker at
2005 constant prices to derive our proxy of real labour income (Table 2D-3 in
Appendix 2D provides some descriptive statistics). All variables are in 2005
international dollars per person. According to the PWT, workers’ definition
includes all status categories of persons in employment, not only employees,
including paid family workers, employers, own-account workers, members of
producers’ cooperatives, contributing family workers and workers not clas-
sifiable by status. The choice to use GDP per worker is driven by the fact
that national labour income is likely to be misreported especially where there
are high rates of informality, unemployment and short-term work, and that
the income of self-employed workers is not directly observable. Moreover, in
most developing countries, the assumption that the self-employed earn the
same average wage as employees would be misleading since the share of em-
ployees in the total number of persons engaged (employees + self-employed)
is below 50 percent (Inklaar & Timmer, 2013). On top of that, there is a
clear lack of consistency across methods used by national accounts and labour
surveys in different countries. Of course, this choice rests on the assumption
that real wages should track labour productivity in the long run. The use
of the SGMM technique helps to control for potential sources of unobserved
26Note that lower frequency exercises would not be compatible with our empirical anal-
ysis. They would smooth excessively the data and would cause a dramatic reduction in
the number of observations.
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heterogeneity also linked to this assumption.27
2.4.3 Cross-country estimates
Table 1 shows the outcomes of the panel estimates of Eq.(8) for the full
sample. In the first three columns, it reports the certainty equivalence (CE)
version of our consumption model (the baseline model) whereas the rest of the
table presents the outcomes of the precautionary saving model (for the sake
of brevity, proxies of permanent risk computed for d = 5 and d = 10 years
backwards are reported in the main table). For each model, the table reports
in the first column the result of the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV)
specification and in the second and third columns, respectively, the outcomes
of the one step (SGMM) and two step (2SGMM) system GMM estimates.
A further empirical exercise with permanent risk as predetermined variable
is reported in the last two columns (denoted as PSGMM and P2SGMM,
respectively, where P stands for pre-determined).
As can be seen in the table, all coefficients are significant and show the
expected signs in all panel estimates. As expected, the LSDV coefficients look
downward biased than the system GMM ones, whereas the two step GMM
estimates are supposed to be more robust due to the expected persistence of
consumption and income28. The consistency of the GMM estimates cannot
be taken for granted and depends strictly on the validity of the moment
conditions used.29 To test this validity, we adopt the Hansen J Test which
27It is worth noting that the new PWT 8.1 (released in 2015) also provides for the first
time estimates for the share of labour income in GDP. These are based on a strong set of
assumptions related to comparability across time and space as well as on the decomposition
of mixed total income earned by self-employed workers. Unfortunately, this new release is
not directly comparable with the previous one (it prepares the ground for a new generation
of the PWT managed by the University of Groningen). Moreover, it does not provide
separate estimates for private, government and investment shares of consumption. While
in fact the previous release, and specifically its consumption component, was primarily
intended to measure the standard of living across countries, the new generation is meant
primarily to measure the productive capacity of an economy (for more details, see Feenstra
et al., 2015).
28While naive OLS regressions of the lagged dependent variable are supposed to be
positively correlated with the error, biasing its coefficient estimate upward, the opposite
is supposed to happen with the LSDV specification. As a matter of fact, the evidence
that LSDV coefficients should be considered downward biased with regard to alternative
specifications (including GMM) is included by Roodman (2003) in the checks to perform
when using System or Difference GMM. The fact that the two sets of coefficients could
converge using the two estimation techniques is excluded.
29Unfortunately, as Roodman (2009) clearly states, there appears to be little guidance
from the literature on how many instruments is “too many”. Adopting prudent behaviour,
we used the collapse option to reduce the proliferation of instruments and always checked
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is robust to heteroskedasticity.30 It actually rejects the null hypothesis of
over-identifying restrictions. Furthermore, the Arellano-Bond test for serial
correlation in the first-differenced errors at orders higher than one strongly
supports the hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced errors
for all our system GMM empirical exercises.31
When looking at the coefficients of the certainty equivalence model, it
is worth noting that the long-term propensity to consume out of income
is less than one for each of the reported model specifications32. It denotes
a relatively high sensitivity of consumption to current income and reveals
signs of possible violations of the consumption smoothing hypothesis. The
consistency of our empirical estimates with permanent consumption theory
actually increases when we control for permanent risks (in the main sections
of the table we report for the sake of brevity, only permanent risk computed
at the most statistically significant time horizons i.e., d = 5 and d = 10).
This consistency means that the consumption smoothing hypothesis seems to
hold net of precautionary saving. In other words, our average “representative
household” shows risk-averse behaviour and the supposed violation of con-
sumption smoothing highlighted by the certainty equivalence model becomes
perfectly rational once we take into account the role of the overall risk that
is perceived to be permanent (as highlighted by the significant coefficients
for ex-ante risk and the corresponding increase of the long-term propensity
to consume out of income). The highly significant negative relationship be-
tween permanent risk and per capita consumption, on average and ceteris
paribus, is thus the main feature of our empirical estimates. This empirical
evidence is fully consistent with the theory of precautionary saving and re-
veals the presence of extra-saving in response to aggregate risk (i.e., when
incomes are perfectly pooled across individuals). If this is the case, standard
the validity of the test for subsets of instruments via the difference-in-Hansen test.
30The most common Sargan test has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution only for a
homoskedastic error term. It tends to over-reject with heteroskedasticity.
31The presence of autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term would render
some lags invalid as instruments. Of course, full disturbance is presumed to be autocor-
related because it contains fixed effects. Hence, rejecting the null hypothesis of first-order
serial correlation in the first-differenced errors does not imply model misspecification be-
cause the first-differenced errors are serially correlated even if the idiosyncratic errors are
independent and identically distributed (and the GMM estimation procedure is specifically
designed to eliminate this source of trouble). It is only rejection of the null hypothesis of
no serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at an order greater than one which im-
plies model misspecification. In fact, if some instruments are endogenous to the error term
in differences, they become potentially invalid instruments after all (Roodman, 2009).
32Note that the long-term propensity to consume can be computed as −[δ3/δ2], where
δ3 is the coefficient of the lagged per capita income and δ2 the coefficient of the lagged per
capita consumption.
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certainty equivalence models are actually severely affected by an omitted
variable bias. This result, especially in the case of permanent risk computed
using a decade as a time horizon, is robust to the various specifications of
our empirical model, including the one step and two step system GMM and
also when we control for permanent risk to be a predetermined variable in
our empirical specification (see the PSGMM and P2SGMM outcomes in the
last two columns of both the permanent risk sections in Table 1).
For sensitivity purposes, in Table 2D-4 in Appendix 2D we present the
estimated coefficients for permanent risk computed at various time horizons:
from d = 5 to d = 15 (In Table 2D-4 for the sake of brevity, the parameters
of the CE components have been not reported since they do not show any
significant changes compared with the previous estimates). It turns out that
our estimates are robust to permanent risk computed only at some specific
fixed time horizons (e.g. d = 5 and d = 10 or not far from them) and that
the magnitude (in the case of d = 6 also the sign) of the relationship is not
stable across the different time horizons. Both the high significance of the
negative relationship between permanent risk and per capita consumption at
fixed time horizons (specifically with d = 10) and the instability of the same
relationship at the other time horizons provides robust empirical evidence
in all our estimates and for different econometric specifications. A possible
interpretation of this (and food for thought for further analyses) is that it
is probably consistent with the average attitude when people look at risk
and/or with the standard design of the available risk-mitigating mechanisms.
In other words, it seems to hold a strong tendency of computing the optimal
consumption under risk looking at the past performance of income risk at
some fixed time horizons (especially for d = 10) rather than in the continuum.
This interpretation would be consistent with our empirical evidence but calls
for further investigation.
To give some insights into the evolution of the model over time, we break
down the panel by decades too.33 This also helps to get additional insights
into the evolution of the model over time. Table 2 shows these further em-
pirical outcomes. Here for the sake of brevity, the estimated coefficients by
decade of the main variables of Eq. (8) are reported only for the CE version of
the model, whereas only the coefficients of the various proxies of permanent
risk (for d = 5 and d = 10 and for risk assumed as a predetermined variable
which is reported as permanent risk pred. in the table) are reported for the
corresponding precautionary saving specification of the same model. Also in
33Going backwards from the last available observation, we set up the following decades:
decade 1 (1960-1969); decade 2 (1970-1979); decade 3 (1980-1989); decade 4 (1990-1999);
decade 5 (2000-2008). Results for decade 1950-1959 are not available since we cannot
observe consumption volatility for d previous periods.
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this case, with the exception of the first decade, the LSDV coefficients appear
to be downward biased than the system GMM ones. Regarding the negative
relationship between permanent risk and per capita consumption highlighted
for the full period, it turns out to be more significant in the last decade (from
2000 onwards). This looks consistent with the more recent literature that
underlines how the relevance and significance of the negative incidence of ag-
gregate risk/macrofluctuations are actually rising in recent years, on average
and ceteris paribus.
Acknowledging that lower frequency data are likely to be more robust (see
sub-section 2.4.2), as a robustness check for the validity of the estimates, we
carry out the same estimates also averaging data over 3-year spans. Unfor-
tunately, this dramatically reduces the number of observations (from about
6,000 to about 2,000 and below 1,500 if we compare the estimates with per-
manent risk with d = 10) and smooths the data reducing the relevance of
consumption smoothing. As a matter of fact, the coefficients of lagged con-
sumption and lagged income (whose ratio determines the long-term propen-
sity to consume) are weakly significant in the SGMM specification even in
the certainty equivalent specification (columns 2 and 3). Moreover, averages
tend to smooth the risk component too. Notwithstanding the above caveats,
Table 2D-6 in Appendix 2D shows that the negative relationship between
consumption and permanent risk still holds, even if it turns out to be only
weakly significant with permanent risk computed over a 10-year time span
(when we are actually using less than 1,500 observations.)
As stated by the theory of precautionary saving, income and past con-
sumption levels are sufficient statistics to absorb the most important factors
for current consumption (see Appendix 2A) and there are no hints in the the-
ory that suggest heterogeneity in country paths of adjustment to their respec-
tive steady state consumption other than via income. On the other hand, we
should admit that a number of possible country time variant characteristics
may matter as well in our empirical analysis (e.g. consumption distribution;
the size of the government sector, etc.). Unfortunately, these statistics are
not provided by the PWT and neither are they easily obtainable from other
data sources. However, to get some feeling for the relevance of such hetero-
geneous factors in driving consumption convergence, as a further robustness
check, we also run the model by adding a full set of country-specific trends.
This is not possible for system GMM estimates since instrument prolifer-
ation soon becomes an issue (the instrument count grows extremely large
relative to the sample size) but we can run the test using LSDV. As in the
main estimates, we should acknowledge these further outcomes as probably
being downward biased than the true parameters. Table 2D-7 in Appendix
2D reports the estimated coefficients with country-specific trends. As can be
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seen in the table, while the estimates turn out to be more robust and the
coefficients for income risk decrease slightly in magnitude and significance,
the negative relationship still holds.
To control for the presence of heterogeneity in the conditional distribution
of per capita consumption according to countries’ income, we run the same
estimates by also clustering countries by income deciles. Since the estimates
by deciles introduce a truncation of the dependent variable that can yield
potentially biased estimates, we need to control for this source of sample
selectivity (or non-random) bias.34 In this case, we are perfectly aware of the
selection process that governs this sample selectivity bias and we can solve
the problem by applying a Heckman two-step procedure. This requires us
to run a selection equation prior to the main equation which determines, for
each income decile, whether the dependent variable is observed (the selection
mechanism). This selection equation is a probit equation which includes
all the relevant exogenous variables of the main equation plus the value of
the per capita real income as the identifying variable, i.e., the variable that
determines the selection process into income deciles.35 The selection equation
estimates are then used to construct proxies of the inverse of the “Mills ratio”
term36. This term is then included in the main equation regressions where
only the truncated dependent variable is considered to derive the so-called
“selection coefficient” (θ). This coefficient represents the product of the
correlation coefficient between the error in the selection equation and the
error in the main equation, and the standard error of the main equation.
Thus a simple t-test of whether H0 : θ = 0 is a workable test for sample
selectivity bias.
Table 3 shows the empirical outcomes of the estimates by income deciles.
Note that here for the sake of brevity (to avoid having too many columns for
each decile), for the estimates with permanent risk as predetermined variable
we report only the estimated coefficients of the permanent risk (named as
“permanent risk pred”) at the end of the table. As expected, the selectivity
bias cannot be ruled out with high probability in most cases (as witnessed by
the strong significance of the estimated coefficients of the inverse Mills ratios).
It is worth noting beforehand that the precision of the estimated coefficients is
dependent on the density of the points at each decile. In this light, we should
34This is something that is different from the standard censored Tobit model since we
only observe the complete regression model after the selection process into income deciles
has actually occurred.
35In this case, the Panel Probit technique with country fixed effects is assumed to be
unbiased since T is large and n not small. For more details, see Wooldridge (2002).
36It is defined as λi =
φ[x
′
iβ]
Φ[x
′
iβ]
. For more details, see Wooldridge (2002).
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2.4 The empirical strategy and cross-country estimates
handle these estimates with care as suggested by a perfect Hansen statistic of
1.000 as well as the apparent absence of selectivity bias for the two extreme
deciles. On the other hand, the hypothesis of no serial correlation in the
first-differenced errors is not close to being rejected in any of the empirical
exercises by deciles.37 The most interesting feature of this further empirical
exercise is that precautionary saving behaviour is confirmed, on average and
ceteris paribus, and this phenomenon is widespread, with some exceptions,
across the entire income distribution, poorest deciles included (even if this is
not significant for the poorest one).
For sensitivity purposes and to avoid the likely selection bias due to coun-
tries’ past performances, we report in Table 2D-8 additional estimates by
deciles in which countries have been classified according to their income in
the first decade of the observed time span (1960-69). This avoids the bias to
classify countries as relatively poor and/or relatively rich according to their
actual performance during the observed time span rather than their actual
economic situation at the beginning of the observed period. This correction
is particular relevant for countries that have followed a strong evolutionary
path, e.g. China. The empirical outcomes for these new estimates by income
deciles do not substantially differ from the previous ones. Precautionary sav-
ing behaviour is still confirmed and it is still widespread across the income
distribution, including the poorer countries in the world which actually show,
on average and ceteris paribus, a significant phenomenon of ‘extra-saving”
associated with aggregate risk.
To summarise, our empirical long-run cross-country panel exercise shows
substantial evidence of a robust negative relationship between permanent risk
and per capita consumption. This empirical evidence is widespread across the
entire income distribution. However, it is robust for risk computed over spe-
cific time horizons and for more recent decades. This empirical evidence is, on
the one hand, consistent with the theory that sees consumption fluctuations
as optimal responses to risk. On the other hand, it is also consistent with the
common concern over a likely “precautionary-investment”/‘volatility trap”
effect which has been highlighted in the most recent models of consumption
under uncertainty (Reis, 2009; Cherif and Hasanov, 2012). This is probably
linked to a change in portfolio allocation between risky capital and safe assets
with risk-averse agents shying away from risky investment and, possibly, also
causes indirect welfare cost by hampering future consumption possibilities
(Loayza et al., 2007). In this respect, this empirical evidence implies a per-
37As specified above, the likely absence of serial correlation in the first-differenced errors
at an order greater than one is the most common test for the validity of instruments since if
some instruments are endogenous to the error term in differences they become potentially
invalid (Roodman, 2009).
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manent lower smooth path of consumption with permanent negative effects
on welfare.
As underlined in Section 2, there is also a debate on the relative magni-
tude of the welfare cost of risk. In this respect, this work is innovative with
regard to the existing literature by proposing a way to look empirically at
the cost of volatility on welfare other than via the usual compensation pa-
rameters of household preference for stability (see, for instance, Lucas, 1987,
2003 and Reis, 2009). By focusing on the impact of risk on consumption be-
haviour and the implied changes in portfolio allocation between risky capital
and safe assets, we can provide useful insights into the welfare cost of risk.
Specifically, we can derive a relative measure of the net contribution of risk
on consumption behaviour, on average and ceteris paribus, by standardising
the variables and derive standardised coefficients. The estimated standard-
ised coefficients of Eq.(8) are reported in Table 2D-5 (for the sake of brevity,
only the full sample estimates are reported).38 The relative lower magnitude
of the estimated standardised coefficients for permanent risk compared with
all the other consumption determinants shows that, in line with the Lucas
(1987, 2003) computation, the cost of fluctuations should be perceived to be
low in terms of welfare. Its impact in terms of consumption volatility has
been approximately equal to half of the overall impact of a change in the
short-run propensity to consume.39
2.5 Conclusion
Unlike previous work on the cost of macro volatility, we perform an em-
pirical strategy grounded on the theory of precautionary saving in a long-run
pre-crisis period (1950-2009) and wide cross-country setting (147 countries).
Our empirical model estimates a significant negative relationship, on aver-
age and ceteris paribus, between permanent risk and per capita consumption.
This empirical evidence is widespread across the entire income distribution.
However, it is robust for risk computed over specific time horizons and for
more recent decades.
This conclusion is, on the one hand, consistent with the theory that sees
consumption fluctuations as optimal responses to risk. On the other hand, it
38Note that the estimates based on standardised variables do not include the constant
term. This is because each standardised variable has a mean of 0 and hence cons =
µ̂Y − b1 ∗ µ̂x1 − b2 ∗ µ̂x2 = 0
39The impact of standardised coefficients on the dependent variable is assessed as its
change in terms of standard deviation induced by a change of one standard deviation of
the independent variable.
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is also consistent with a likely “precautionary-investment”/‘volatility trap”
effect that, in turn, implies a permanent lower smooth path of consumption
with permanent negative effects on welfare. Our empirical results are consis-
tent with the previous empirical literature and suggest the need to be aware
of a likely omitted variable bias in performing certainty equivalent analyses,
i.e., not controlling for the precautionary saving component. However, they
cannot refute Lucas’s (1987, 2003) view that the cost of fluctuations should
be perceived to be low in terms of welfare implications.
Our empirical evidence provides new insights into the long-standing de-
bate over the costs of fluctuations. It shows that countries - including poorer
ones - hold ”extra saving”, in a long-run perspective, because of economic
fluctuations. This phenomenon is neither transitory nor specific to the cur-
rent “crisis period”, even if it is increasing over time.
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Appendix 2A - Consumption with Constant
Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) Utility
Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Caballero (1990 and 1991), Weil (1990),
Guiso et al., (1992), Caroll (2013) among others, assume that agents max-
imise the expected value of the following time-separable Constant Absolute
Risk Aversion (CARA) utility function.
maxEt
[ ∞∑
t=0
βte−ρct
]
(2A-1)
where β is a subjective discount rate of consumption (time preference)
and ρ is the degree of absolute risk aversion.40 Eq. (2A-1) is subject to the
following standard budget constraint:
wt+1 = Rwt + yt+1 − ct+1 (2A-2)
where R = (1 + r) is the interest factor (assumed to be constant); w is
individual wealth (wt is given) and yt is the consumer’s idiosyncratic income.
This latter exhibits a random-walk deviation from an exogenously growing
measure of permanent income:
yt+1 = ŷt + ψt+1 (2A-3)
In the perfect foresight version of the model (where ψt = 0 ∀t), the Euler
equation is:
e−ρct = Rβe−ρct+1 (2A-4)
1 = Rβe−ρ(ct+1−ct) (2A-5)
Rβ = eρ(ct+1−ct) (2A-6)
Taking logs:
ρ(ct+1 − ct) = ln(Rβ) (2A-7)
ct+1 = ct + ln(Rβ)
1
ρ (2A-8)
40Because of the use of exponential utility in this exercise the degree of absolute risk
aversion is assumed to be equal to the degree of absolute prudence.
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Starting from Eq.2A-8 let now assume a stochastic environment with
permanent income shocks distributed normally, i.e., ψt ∼ N(0, σ2ψ). For the
sake of simplicity let us assume also Rβ = 1. Eq. 2A-8 becomes:41
ct+1 = ct +
1
2
ρσ2ψ + t+1 (2A-9)
Since the intertemporal budget constraint must hold in every state of
the world the expected present discount value of consumption must equal
current wealth plus the expectation of the present discount value of income
as follows:
Et[PVt(c)] = wt + Et[PVt(y)] (2A-10)
where PV is the present discount value. Thus we first derive the present
discount value of consumption as follows:
PVt(c) = ct +
(ct +
1
2
ρσ2ψ + t+1)
R
+
(ct +
1
2
ρσ2ψ + t+1 +
1
2
ρσ2ψ + t+2)
R2
+ ...
(2A-11)
and its expected value as follows:
Et[PVt(c)] = ct +
ct
R
+
ct
R2
+ ...+
1
2
ρσ2ψ
R
+
21
2
ρσ2ψ
R2
+
31
2
ρσ2ψ
R3
+ ... =
=ct(1 +R
−1 +R−2 + ...) + 1
2
ρσ2ψ
∞∑
j=1
j
rj
(2A-12)
Since if R > 1 then
∞∑
j=0
j
rj
=
(
R
(R−1)2
)
, the expectation of the infinite
horizon present discount value of consumption becomes:
Et[PVt(c)] = ct
(
1
1− 1
R
)
+
(
1
2
ρσ2ψR
(1−R)2
)
(2A-13)
Then we derive the present discount value of income as follows:
PVt(y) = ŷt +
(ŷt + ψt+1)
R
+
(ŷt + ψt+1 + ψt+2)
R2
+ ... (2A-14)
41Please note that the inter-temporal substitution of consumption (the last term in Eq.
2A-8) takes here the form of additive changes in the level of consumption (while in CRRA
is a multiplicative term of the growth rate of consumption).
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and its expected value as follows:
Et[PVt(y)] = ŷt
∞∑
j=0
R−j = ŷt
(
1
1− 1
R
)
(2A-15)
And derive Eq.2A-16 as follows:
ct
(
1
1− 1
R
)
= wt + ŷt
(
1
1− 1
R
)
−
(
1
2
ρσ2ψR
(1−R)2
)
(2A-16)
Re-arranging we finally got:
ct = wt
R− 1
R
+ ŷt − (R− 1)
1
2
ρ
(1−R)2σ
2
ψ (2A-17)
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Appendix 2B - Decomposition of observed volatil-
ity in income innovations
Carroll and Samwick (1997) propose a simple method for decomposing
the volatility of income innovations into a transitory and a permanent com-
ponent. First, they assume that the log of permanent income follows the
process below:
ŷt = gt + ŷt−1 + ηt (2B-1)
where gt represents growth due to predictable components (m) as follows:
gt = mt − mt−1, and ηt is a shock to permanent income. If we remove
the predictable component of income growth as follows: y˜t = ŷt − mt and
y˜t−1 = ŷt−1 −mt−1, we can rewrite:
y˜t = y˜t−1 + ηt (2B-2)
Second, they assume that the log of current income is given by y˜t plus a
transitory error term:
yt = y˜t + t (2B-3)
On the assumption that both ηt and t are white noise and uncorrelated
with each other at all leads and lags, we can derive the d-year income differ-
ence as follows:
yt+d − yt = y˜t+d − y˜t + t+d − t (2B-4)
Substituting Eq.2B-2 into Eq.2B-4 recursively yields:
yt+d − yt = ηt+1 + ηt+2 + ...+ ηt+d + t+d − t (2B-5)
Hence, the d-year second moment is
var(υyd) = dσ
2
η + 2σ
2
 (2B-6)
where σ2η and σ
2
 are, respectively, the variances of the permanent and
transitory shocks to income.
To apply this decomposition method to our analysis, on the assumption
of no individual specific growth rates for income other than those predictable,
we compute the variance of υyd for each country i as follows:
var(υyid) = υ
2
yid (2B-7)
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We then use two υ2yid of different lengths to estimate the permanent com-
ponent of the variance of income innovation for each i as follows:
s2ηi = υ
2
yid − υ2yid−1 (2B-8)
To get also a measure of s2i it is sufficient to acknowledge that:
s2ηi = ds
2
ηi
+ 2s2i − υ2yid−1 (2B-9)
and finally yield s2i as follows:
s2i =
υ2yid−1 − (d− 1)sη2i
2
(2B-10)
where E(s2pi) = σ
2
p and E(s
2
ei
) = σ2 and σ
2
p and σ
2
 are the variances of
the permanent and transitory shocks to income, respectively.
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Appendix 2C - The derivation of the uncon-
strained version of the ECM
Starting from the ARDL (1,1) version of the consumption model:
ct = β0 + β1yt + β2yt−1 + β3ct−1 + ut (2C-1)
We subtract ct−1 on both sides and take into account of the steady state
equilibrium by acknowledging that β2 = β(1− β3)− β1 as follows:
ct − ct−1 = β0 + β1yt + [β(1− β3)− β1]yt−1 + β3ct−1 − ct−1 + ut (2C-2)
∆ct = β0 + β1yt + β(1− β3)yt−1 − β1yt−1 − (1− β3)ct−1 + ut (2C-3)
∆ct = β0 + β1(yt − yt−1) + β(1− β3)yt−1 − (1− β3)ct−1 + ut (2C-4)
∆ct = β0 + β1∆yt − (1− β3)ct−1 + β(1− β3)yt−1 + ut (2C-5)
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Appendix 2D - Tables
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2.5 Conclusion
Table 2D-3: Main descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical
analysis
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All sample
gdp worker 8059 18984.9 22793.31 320.2335 313082.8 pc cons. 8059 4983.916 5745.357 107.4675 42741.04
1960-69
gdp worker 1128 11704.1 12260.59 420.9939 57920.37 pc cons. 1128 3020.333 3331.097 107.4675 15272.57
1970-79
gdp worker 1580 17871.85 25031.07 681.4249 313082.8 pc cons. 1580 3967.613 4399.34 158.3371 19655.31
1980-89
gdp worker 1614 19648.43 23378.98 711.808 271261.9 pc cons. 1614 4931.654 5338.43 128.0619 24775.35
1990-99
gdp worker 1842 20903.86 22664.84 396.7094 128604.1 pc cons. 1842 5634.676 6124.661 112.7644 38989.38
2000-08
gdp worker 1895 25154.58 27027.87 320.2335 213682.1 pc cons. 1895 7010.444 7559.901 120.4792 42741.04
percentiles
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
gdp worker 1712.68 3320.23 10573.5 25993.3 50280.5 pc cons. 585.534 967.983 2630.41 6615.99 13857.6
Source: PWT 7.0. All variables are in 2005 International dollar per person.
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2.5 Conclusion
Table 2D-4: CE and PS ARDL models under permanent risk (dependent
variable: first diff. of annual pc consumption): sensitivity tests for permanent
risk at different time horizons
LSDV SGMM 2SGMM PSGMM P2SGMM
permanent risk (d=5) -0.0396 -0.821 -0.821+ -0.775** -0.637*
(-0.37) (-1.24) (-1.47) (-2.07) (-1.78)
permanent risk (d=6) 0.327** 1.511+ 1.247 0.397** 0.422
(1.99) (1.62) (1.14) (2.14) (0.49)
permanent risk (d=7) 0.0847 1.016 1.156+ 0.0157 0.402
(0.93) (1.37) (1.65) (0.12) (0.63)
permanent risk (d=8) -0.212 -1.278 -1.592+ -0.185 -0.924
(-0.58) (-1.44) (-1.60) (-0.47) (-1.09)
permanent risk (d=9) -0.304 0.394 0.730 -0.332 0.635
(-1.05) (0.41) (0.67) (-1.06) (0.89)
permanent risk (d=10) -0.681** -2.710* -2.812* -0.868*** -2.551***
(-2.24) (-1.82) (-1.68) (-2.59) (-2.71)
permanent risk (d=11) -0.0308 -0.123** -0.134** -0.0281 -0.0685
(-1.38) (-2.08) (-2.59) (-1.38) (-0.82)
permanent risk (d=12) -0.0371** -0.0551 -0.0582 -0.0344* -0.0538
(-2.02) (-1.28) (-1.25) (-1.84) (-1.25)
permanent risk (d=13) -0.0252 0.118 0.0834 -0.00886 0.107
(-0.97) (0.81) (0.71) (-0.30) (0.89)
permanent risk (d=14) -0.0375+ 0.0828 0.128 -0.0311 -0.00309
(-1.45) (0.54) (1.12) (-0.97) (-0.03)
permanent risk (d=15) -0.0397+ 0.00338 -0.0170 -0.0323 -0.0329
(-1.45) (0.02) (-0.11) (-1.01) (-0.31)
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Chapter 3
Essay 3 - Trade openness and
vulnerability to poverty in
Vietnam under Doi Moi
This Essay follows up the existing poverty assessments of trade liberal-
isation in Vietnam under Doi Moi. It looks specifically at the relationship
between trade liberalisation and vulnerability to poverty. To this end, it first
applies, a VEP framework to six recent living standard surveys in Vietnam
(covering the period 1992-2008) to assess the presence of heterogeneity of vul-
nerability to poverty across industries clustered by different degrees of “trade
exposure” and their evolution over time. Second, it assesses the relative influ-
ence of ex-ante versus ex-post factors on consumption levels and variability,
overall and by trading industries. The following results are obtained: i) a
downward trend in vulnerability to poverty in Vietnam together with an in-
creased share of its stochastic (risk) determinant; ii) a relative increase of
the percentage of vulnerable people in the relatively higher “trade-exposed”
groups of industries; iii) the higher relevance of the ex-ante stochastic (risk)
component in the higher “trade-exposed” group of industries. The above re-
sults are key for policymaking. They highlight a link between trade openness
and risk-induced vulnerability as well as the need to target vulnerability to
poverty even in a trade liberalisation scenario characterised by decreasing
poverty.
Keywords: trade openness, vulnerability, poverty, risk, consumption be-
haviour, Vietnam.
JEL: F14, O12, D12, C31
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3.1 Introduction
3.1 Introduction
Following the so-called “Asian option” of transition, from the early 1990s
Vietnam adopted the Doi Moi (renovation) process, a combination of lib-
eralisation, stabilisation and structural reforms. Within the liberalisation
component, Vietnam experienced two main waves of trade liberalisation, one
in the 1990s and a second in the 2000s (Coello at al., 2010). The first wave
lasted from the initial opening of the country until approximately 2001 and
foresaw the total abolition of trade licences and the removal of most quanti-
tative restrictions (Than, 2005). The second wave - still in place - includes
the full involvement of the country in the world network of reciprocal trade
agreements (both multilateral, see the WTO accession in January 2007, and
bilateral, see the agreements signed with the USA in 2001 as well as the FTA
negotiations launched with the EU in 2012).
An extensive empirical investigation on trade liberalisation and poverty
dynamics in Vietnam has been carried out to date (Irvin, 1997; Liu, 2001;
Fritzen, 2002; Jenkins, 2004; Nadvi et al., 2004; van de Walle and Cratty,
2004; Jensen and Tarp, 2005; Nguyen and Ezaki, 2005; Fujii and Roland-
Holst, 2007; Niimi et al., 2007; Abbott et al., 2009 ; Heo and Doanh, 2009;
Coello et al., 2010). Empirical analyses consistently highlight the increased
importance of international trade in the Vietnamese economy as well as the
positive correlation between trade liberalisation, growth and poverty reduc-
tion.1
However, the above analyses have focused mainly on the first sub-period,
when the process of liberalisation was still restricted and subject to trade
licences. Moreover, they do not provide any clue to the relationship between
openness and vulnerability to poverty. This is because they generally over-
look the possible impact of the opening-up process on households’ exposure
to risk as well the role of trade openness as one of the possible channels of
risk.
Following on from the existing debate on vulnerability induced by trade
openness (see Essay 1), this work aims to overcome the above knowledge
gaps, starting with a preliminary and workable step: assessing the presence
1Critics also highlight the relatively high concentration of poor households near the
poverty line during the 1990s as a likely explanation for the pro-poor nature of growth in
Vietnam. They also highlight the persistence of a high poverty gap in rural areas, in the
Northern Mountain and the inland Central Highland regions as well as increased inequality
throughout the country, resulting in an extensive urban-rural division, with the richest 20
per cent of the population living in urban areas (Heo and Doanh, 2009). Furthermore,
trade openness seems to have promoted a distributional impact within the rice sector too,
further penalising the poorer small net producers (Coello et al., 2010). Last but not least,
80 per cent of the poor are still living (and working) in rural areas.
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of heterogeneity in households’ vulnerability according to the relative degree
of trade exposure of their sector of employment. Of course, the presence
of significant differences in vulnerability patterns by trading sector does not
provide information on the nature of the foreign risks and/or their channels of
transmission to household welfare which is outside the scope of this empirical
exercise. Moreover, because of the lack of panel data, our analysis is not
able to directly control for cross-sectional household heterogeneity or for
measurement error and their evolution over time. The problem is that the
cross-sectional variation in vulnerability to poverty across the various trade-
exposed sectors can actually be driven by a number of factors other than
risk (e.g., differences in household characteristics across sectors due to self-
selection) that are unobservable to the researcher.
Acknowledging the above empirical constraints, the added value of this
analysis lies in taking advantage of the full set of available rounds of house-
hold surveys in Vietnam to give a careful interpretation of the cross-sectional
evidence of the relationship between household vulnerability and trade open-
ness in “trade-related” industries. Specifically, it is argued that the assess-
ment of an increasing negative relationship between the stochastic component
of income and consumption in the case of households involved in the more
exposed trading sectors can only reasonably be interpreted as related to risk.
Conversely, supposing that the above relationship is not due to risk - but to
households’ unobservable heterogeneity - it would imply a partial revision of
the assumed benefits from trade openness, which is worth investigating too.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: using six living standard sur-
veys in Vietnam (covering the period 1992-2008), we first assess the percent-
age and the evolution of vulnerable people across the different sectors of the
economy organised according to their relative degree of trade exposure; sec-
ond, we provide an assessment of how much of the households’ consumption
variation (which is at the core of vulnerability analysis) can be explained
by its stochastic ex-ante component, namely the variance of income within
trade-exposed defined groups, as well as by actual income shocks, defined as
the component of income variation unexplained by observables.
Our results are the following: a downward trend in vulnerability to
poverty in Vietnam together with an increased share of its stochastic (risk)
determinant; a relative increase in the percentage of vulnerable people in the
relatively more trade-exposed sectors; iii) the non-decreasing relevance (both
in terms of net mean contribution on expected average and variance of house-
hold consumption) of the ex-ante stochastic (risk) component in the higher
“trade-exposed” groups of industries. The above results are key for poli-
cymaking. They highlight a link between trade openness and risk-induced
vulnerability as well as the need to target vulnerability to poverty even in a
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trade liberalisation scenario characterised by decreasing poverty.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 reviews the literature and
presents the conceptual framework; section 3 provides details on the mea-
surement of vulnerability to poverty; section 4 presents the empirical results
and section 5 concludes.
3.2 Trade and vulnerability to poverty: liter-
ature review and conceptual framework
Notwithstanding differences in conceptual approaches and empirical meth-
ods, the literature on trade liberalisation and poverty dynamics in Vietnam
has reached consensus on the following issues: price liberalisation has had
a great impact on agricultural households and consumers since 1986 (Ni-
imi et al., 2007) with poverty reduction figures for rice net producers better
than for rice net consumers (Heo and Doanh, 2009); trade liberalisation has
been beneficial to the poor thanks to the highly labour intensive structure of
the Vietnamese exports;2 the negative effects of trade liberalisation occurred
mainly in coffee production (Ha and Shively, 2008).
However, a key issue remains unanswered: Has trade openness magnified
households’ exposure to risk and raised vulnerability to poverty? The topic
is currently hotly debated by practitioners, whereas it is largely ignored by
trade literature (see Essay 1). In principle, trade can magnify risks in two
ways: by changing the riskiness of existing activities, for instance, by altering
the weight of foreign compared with domestic shocks faced by the economy,
or by changing the emphasis among the different activities households engage
in such as, for example, switching from subsistence food crops to cash crops
(McCulloch et al., 2001). Hence, trade openness could alter households’ op-
timal portfolios so that their current ones become sub-optimal ex-ante.3 This
is especially true for the poor, due to their poor ability to take advantage of
the positive opportunities created by trade reforms, their weak capabilities to
insure themselves from adverse impacts and, possibly, the lack of information
on the risks associated with the new activities induced by openness (Winters
2Abbott et al. (2009) claim that the poverty impacts of trade reforms in Vietnam are
even larger than those anticipated by existing model predictions, because of the intrinsic
limitations of the most common applied methods and because they generally overlook the
fact that institutional rather than tariff reforms have been the main driving factor behind
recent development in Vietnam.
3Of course, ex-post, a household may lose out because of unlucky realisations. Hence,
increases in observed poverty can be consistent with ex-ante improvements in welfare if
households trade higher mean incomes for higher variances (Winters et al., 2004).
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et al., 2004). Thus, they suffer the costs of trade reforms without reaping any
compensating benefits in the form of higher average earnings (see Morduch,
1994). This, together with the presence of risky assets (Elbers et al., 2007)
may explain ex-ante their unwillingness to pursue high average returns linked
to the different activities opened up by trade reforms, resulting in poverty
traps (Carter and Barret, 2006; Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011). Moreover,
the poor can be less able to protect themselves from the adverse effects of a
new set of man-made foreign shocks and incentives. This is because tradi-
tional mechanisms may not work as well as in the pre-liberalisation scenario,
hampering people’s standard management strategies (Dercon, 2001; Tesliuc
and Lindert, 2004). Trade openness can also affect government ability to
adopt price stabilisation policies and/or contribute to the elimination of in-
stitutions or policies aimed at smoothing domestic prices (Winters, 2002;
Winters et al., 2004). In all the above cases, trade openness can have an
impact on households’ optimal portfolios and, eventually, lead to net welfare
effects that are less positive than expected in the long run (Winters, 2002;
Winters and al., 2004; Calvo and Dercon, 2007a).
This issue, though very relevant, has been largely overlooked by the em-
pirical literature on trade because it implies the capacity to assess the coun-
terfactual situation, i.e., the unobservable level of consumption that would
have prevailed in the absence of risk, net of the mean effects generated by
trade. Looking at consumption behaviour as a key behavioural tool in ex-
plaining households’ choices under risk, in our analysis we assume that vul-
nerability passes through a deviation from a smooth path of consumption.
In other words, we assume that the strategies households employ both to
mitigate risks (that is, risk-induced ex-ante changing behaviour, Elbers and
Gunning, 2007; Giles and Yoo, 2007; Jalan and Ravaillon, 2001) and cope
with shocks (Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Udry, 1994; Townsend, 1994, 1995;
Besley, 1995; Morduch, 2002) can be costly in the short run even if the
overall impact in the long run is net beneficial (Ravallion 1988; Morduch
1994; Dercon, 2005). Moreover, we assume these costs to be diversified in
terms of consumption behaviour, with the ex-ante risk-induced component
of vulnerability considered a proper measure of vulnerability.
By decomposing vulnerability into its ex-ante and ex-post components,
we test whether differences in the ex-ante component across groups can be
associated with different degrees of trade exposure. While, in fact, incomes
from non-traded sectors are mainly affected by domestic risks (for example,
bad weather, crop failure, livestock diseases, etc.), people engaged in import-
and export-related sectors are also supposed to face foreign markets risks (for
example, international price fluctuations, exchange rate fluctuations, etc.).
We do not really know whether or not domestic and foreign risks are posi-
92
3.3 Measuring trade-induced vulnerability
tively or negatively correlated (the empirical evidence on this has been quite
inconclusive, McCulloch et al., 2001). However, it is reasonable to expect
a certain degree of risk heterogeneity associated with the heterogeneity of
households’ trade exposure. For instance, in the Vietnamese context, poor
households in the midst of trade reform have two options in principle: i) rely,
with regard to ongoing trade reforms, on conservative choices (for example,
subsistence farming) as a main risk management strategy: this choice could
help to insulate them from trade-related risks, but leaves them vulnerable to
pre-liberalisation ones (for example, natural ones), possibly taking them into
a cycle of poverty; ii) carry out progressive choices4 (for example, moving to
export crops), with an expected increase in mean income as well as in income
variance. Thanks to this choice they could climb out of poverty, but remain
vulnerable to both pre- and post-liberalisation risks. As a result, these two
categories face different kinds of risks and are forced to apply different risk
management strategies as well as to rely on different risk coping strategies
when shocks occur. As a result, they will probably show different behavioural
choices ex-ante and different welfare impacts ex-post.
3.3 Measuring trade-induced vulnerability
In this empirical exercise, we first apply the most common measure of
vulnerability5, i.e. the ”Vulnerability to Expected Poverty” (VEP) method
(Pritchett et al., 2000; Christiaensen and Subbarao, 2005; Chaudhuri and
Datt 2001; Chaudhuri et al., 2002 and Chaudhuri 2003; Kamanou and Mor-
duch, 2004; Gunther and Harttgen, 2009). The reason is twofold: i) it helps
us derive a vulnerability measure using the single rounds of the available
cross-sectional household data for the period 1992-2008; ii) it is consistent
with existing poverty analyses since it provides results in terms of expected
values of the common Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of decomposable
poverty measures.
The VEP method looks at vulnerability as the probability that a house-
hold will fall into poverty in the near future.6 To this end, it adapts the
standard FGT index (Foster et al., 1984) to a stochastic environment and
takes its expected value as follows:
4The term progressive is used here for ongoing trade reforms.
5A first taxonomy of the main methods applied in vulnerability analysis has been
provided by Hoddinott and Quisumbing (2003). A slight update to this is provided in
Appendix 1.5.
6Further details on the computation of this measure for different time horizons will be
provided later on.
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Vα,ht = F (z)
∫ z
0
(
max
{
0,
z − ch,k
z
})α
f(ch,k)
F (z)
dch,k (1)
where ch is household consumption; z is the standard poverty line; F (.)
and f(.) indicate, respectively, the cumulative distribution and the density
function of consumption at time k7. Since we rely on the headcount measure-
ment of poverty (α = 0), our VEP measure is reduced to the probability that
the household will experience poverty, i.e V = F (z).8 The distribution F is
taken as given and reflects both household exposure to shocks (idiosyncratic
or covariant) and the ability to cope with them. More specifically, the VEP
index measures ”vulnerability to poverty” as the probability that household
h will be poor, as follows:
Vα,ht = Pr(lnch,k < lnz|Xht) = Φ( lnz − lnĉh,k√
σ̂2h,k
) (2)
where Φ is the cumulative function of the standard normal (see Appendix
1.5 in Essay 1 for additional details on the VEP measure) and k is the number
of years in the future of the chosen time horizon.
The VEP method also provides a first decomposition between ”poverty-
induced” vulnerability and ”risk-induced” vulnerability (Gunther and Harttgen,
2008). The first component refers to vulnerable households with estimated
expected mean consumption below the poverty line (i.e., vulnerability is
mainly driven by permanent low consumption prospects); the second refers
to vulnerable households with estimated expected mean consumption above
the poverty line, but high estimated variance of consumption (i.e., vulnera-
bility is mainly driven by consumption volatility). However, VEP does not
model risk explicitly, but assumes that the observed inter-household distri-
bution of consumption at a point in time represents the future distribution
of consumption across states of the nature for each household.
The VEP method suffers various shortcomings, some related to problems
caused by the FGT measures of poverty and others specific to the stochastic
nature of the analysis and underlying assumptions. The main shortcoming
is given by the fact that it, generally speaking, overlooks the key role of the
7Eq. 1 is obtained by multiplying the expected value of the poverty index by F (z)/F (z).
For more information on the derivation procedure of Equation 1, see Christiaensen and
Boisvert, 2000.
8The majority of works rely on this choice (Christiaensen and Boisvert, 2000; Pritchett
et al., 2000; Chaudhuri and Datt, 2001; Chaudhuri et al., 2002), but there are also some
VEP applications that look at the depth of poverty (α = 1) and at the spread of its
distribution (α = 2) (see, for example, Ravallion, 1988).
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behavioural response to risk. Practically speaking, a household that adopted
complete self-insurance mechanisms at the cost of lower mean welfare would
be registered as unaffected by risk, hence attributing its low level of welfare
entirely to non-stochastic components of poverty. In other words, it produces
a structural underestimation of the risk component of vulnerability with a
parallel overestimation of its poverty component, leading to biased outcomes
(Elbers and Gunning, 2003). Moreover, it does not provide any clue to
distinguishing whether vulnerability is properly generated ex-ante (mainly
linked to a lack of mitigating risk strategies) or ex-post (mainly associated
with a lack of coping mechanisms).
To avoid this shortcoming and take into account the simple evidence that
risk affects ex-ante households’ savings decisions and thereby their consump-
tion level, following on from Elbers et al. (2007), Elbers et al. (2009) and
Carter and Ikegami (2009), we complement VEP outcomes with an empirical
test on the relative importance of the various determinants of consumption
behaviour under risk to infer the relative importance of the various compo-
nents of vulnerability (non-stochastic, risk induced and shocks). Following
Achen (1982), here we explore “importance” both in the sense of signifi-
cant potential effects (i.e., the net mean contribution of each consumption
behaviour’s determinants) and in terms of dispersion effects (i.e., the net
contribution to explaining the variance of consumption behaviour).
To this end, here we follow a consolidated literature that looks at the
household’s consumption in any period as determined by wealth, current
income, uncertainty over future income as well as behavioural responses to
cope with and manage risks (Deaton 1992; Browning and Lusardi, 1996;
Chaudhuri, 2003; Dercon, 2005). We also follow the previous literature on
poverty in Vietnam (Glewwe et al., 2002; Minot and Baulch, 2005; Niimi et
al., 2007; Justino et al., 2008; Cuong et al., 2010; Nguyen and Winters, 2011)
that assumes that all these factors are functions of a variety of observable
household characteristics such as demographics, education and occupation,
and depend on a set of characteristics related to the surrounding economic
environment. To isolate the separate impact of the ex-ante permanent risk,
we follow the same precautionary saving framework introduced in Essay 2
(Caroll, 2001; Kimball, 1990; Caballero, 1990; Deaton, 1992) and filter out
the ex-ante permanent risk from possible measurement errors by applying
the same decomposition method as Carroll and Samwick (1997). It is worth
recalling here that this empirical exercise cannot be considered a proper
exogenous test for the precautionary saving theory because of the lack of
panel data. This is an unavoidable empirical constraint. Thus, we should
assume the empirical outcomes of the risk channel as upper bounds of the
true impacts (by the way, likely endogeneity in the other determinants of
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current consumption would actually soften the relevance of the risk channel
thus lowering our upper bound reference). Furthermore, in the final part of
the empirical analysis, we will demonstrate the likely inconsistency of the
alternative hypotheses.
This follows the following simple linear econometric specification:9
cht = α + βXht + ϕVt + ht (3)
where cht is the log of per capita consumption of household h at time t;
Xht and Vt are two vectors of exogenous variables which control, respectively,
for the household’s and village’s characteristics; ht is the error term. While
the non-random consumption is assumed to be simply equal to the predicted
value of the Eq. 3, to estimate its stochastic component we need to identify an
observable and exogenous proxy of risk. The most commonly applied method
of extracting parsimonious information on risk from data is to calculate the
variance of innovations to income. This is usually performed (Carroll and
Samwick 1997, 1998; Hubbard et al, 1994; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002;
Jalan and Ravallion, 2001; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004; Storesletten et al.,
2004) by calculating the variance of the residuals (µht) of an income equation
such as the following:
yht = τ + γZht + piVt + µht (4)
where yht is the log of per capita income, Z is similar to X in Eq. 3
with the inclusion of the occupation characteristics10, and V is the same
set of commune characteristics as in Eq. 3. We also insert dummies for
trade categories in the income regression. We believe in fact that it is more
plausible to assume that households actually know which group they are in
and hence that they make reference to their group average and not to the
overall average income (i.e., they do not consider the inter-group differences
in income as risk as implicitly assumed if we do not control for trade group
dummies in the income regression). Moreover, in each round of observations,
we compute the variance of the income innovations by “trade-related” groups
as follows:
σ2ygt =
n∑
h=1
(µhgt − µ¯gt)2/n (5)
9Here we are implicitly assuming that consumption is log normally distributed. Brown-
ing and Lusardi (1996) provide an excellent survey of the empirical test on precautionary
saving based on linear regression.
10The occupation characteristics are assumed to influence consumption behaviour only
through income.
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where µhgt indicates income innovation of household h in trading group
g in round t of observations. Following Skinner (1988), Guiso et al. (1992),
Blundell and Stoker (1999), Banks et al., (2001) and Giles and Yoo (2007),
we further rescale it by a specific factor (piht) based on household expected
wealth. In particular, consistent with the adoption of the CRRA utility
function, we assume that poorer individuals are more responsive to changes
in risk, scaling up the variance of income innovations by the square of the
ratio between current household’s income and expected lifetime wealth.11
Our final proxy for income innovation is thus the following:
σ2yht = pihtσ
2
ygt (6)
where piht =
(
yht
wˆht
)2
and wˆht is a measure of the expected wealth. As well
as its theoretical foundation, the scaling term has the additional advantage
of allowing us to obtain a risk measure that is specific to each household in
the sample in each period, further differentiating risk exposure across the
households belonging to the same trading group.
It is worth noting that, since the lack of panel data prevents us from
exploiting the time dimension, here we are assuming the unexplained com-
ponent of income in cross-section data in Eq. 4 to proximate stochastic
innovation. While it is true that the unexplained component probably also
contains non-stochastic unobservables as well as measurement error, it is not
necessarily true for the variances of income innovations within sub-samples
of households grouped according to their trade openness position. We will
come back to this important caveat later on when looking at the empirical
outcomes.
To provide a separate measure of the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on
consumption in addition to the ex-ante impact of risk (the former influenced
by the available coping mechanisms of the households, the latter by their
mitigating strategies), we rely on objective measures based on income reali-
sations. Considering that the self-reported measures of idiosyncratic shocks
can be biased by subjective perceptions, we calculate the income shock vari-
able using an objective measure such as the ratio between the household
residual from Eq. 4 and the predicted level of log income, as follows:
11According to Skinner (1988) and Guiso et al (1992), the exponent of the scaling
factor measures the sensitivity to the level of expected wealth exhibited by the reaction to
uncertainty. If the exponent is more than zero, the effect of risk on consumption declines
with the household’s resources and the decline is faster the higher the value. Usually, the
adopted value is two and this is why we use the square of that ratio.
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ζyht =
µˆht
yˆht
(7)
In order to obtain true idiosyncratic shocks, we insert a series of provincial
dummies into the Eq. 4 which allow us to ”clean” the residual of its covariate
component. Finally, we disentangle the positive (ζ+y ) from the negative (ζ
−
y )
shocks in order to consider the possibility that the households are credit
constrained and thus unable to fully smooth their consumption in the event
of negative shocks.
The last step is to exploit the proxies for risk and shock to retrieve our
ex-ante and ex-post consumption counterfactuals, as follows:
cht = α + βXht + ϕVt + θ1σ
2
yht + θ2ζ
+
y + θ3ζ
−
y + ht (8)
3.4 The empirical analysis
Data
Because of the lack of panel data covering the entire period under analysis,
our empirical exercise relies on cross-sectional data for the following years:
1992, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. Data come from two different sets
of Vietnamese household surveys (VLSS and VHLSS). The VLSS was un-
dertaken in the period 1992/93 using a sample of 4,800 households, of which
4,000 were re-interviewed in 1997/98, out of a sample of 6,000 households
in total. The VHLSS collected information from a new sample of 29,530
households in 2002; 9,188 in 2004; 9,189 in 2006 and 2008. Unfortunately, as
reported by Pham and Reilly (2007) and Le and Booth (2010), the sampling
frame for VHLSS differs substantially from that of VLSS: whereas VLSS used
the 1989 Population Census, the VHLSS 2002 exploited the Population and
Housing Census from 1999. As a result, while there are short panel sam-
ples from the last waves, no household was re-interviewed between the VLSS
and the VHLSS and, generally speaking, a comparison between VLSS and
VHLSS rounds is not possible.12 It is generally agreed that VHLSS data
can be considered to be of higher quality than VLSS and provide legitimate
nationally representative household data based on stratified random sam-
ples. However, it has been demonstrated that households residing in VHLSS
communes were on average better off in 1999 and are still better off in 2009
12As a matter of fact, we register a clear jump in the magnitude of our empirical esti-
mates from VLSS to VHLSS rounds.
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than the households living in non-VHLSS communes since durable goods
such as televisions, motorbikes, phones, refrigerators and even computers are
more widespread in the VHLSS-communes (for more details, see Hansen and
Dang Le, 2013). If this is the case, it implies an overall downward bias of our
subsequent estimates of “upper bound” vulnerability (our proxies of wealth
in the denominator of the scaling factor tend to be overestimated) with no
consequences in relative terms.
The variable used for consumption is the real per capita food and non-
food expenditure in the past 12 months re-adjusted by price indexes of re-
gions and months. Food expenditure includes information on both mar-
ket purchases and consumption from home production of 58 items while
the non-food expenditure collects information on 32 items such as fabric,
clothing, blankets, pillow, tailoring or laundry service, shoes, nylon sheet-
ing, electrical equipment, etc. Poverty lines for computing vulnerability are
expressed in Vietnamese dongs as follows: 1,160,000 for 1992; 1,790,000 for
1998; 1,915,000 for 2002; 2,070,000 for 2004; 2,559,000 for 2006; 3,360,000
for 2008.13 The variable used for household real per capita income, has been
derived by aggregating income into six major categories: income from crops,
income from agricultural sidelines, household business income, wage income,
gifts and remittances, and other residuals sources of income. Income from
crops is net income (gross revenue minus current expenditures) from rice;
other cereals, vegetables, and annual crops; industrial crops; fruit crops; and
crop by-products such as straw, leaves, etc. Agricultural sidelines include
livestock and other animal products, agricultural services, forestry services,
hunting, trapping, and domesticating wild animals, and aquaculture. House-
hold business income is net income from non-agriculture, non-forestry, and
non-aquaculture businesses run by the household and includes the process-
ing of agricultural, forestry and aquaculture products. Wage income includes
salary or wage payments plus additional payments such as holiday contribu-
tions, social insurance payments, etc. for all jobs held by individuals during
the past 12 months. Gifts and remittances include payments from both
domestic and overseas sources. Finally, “other” residual sources of income
include items such as government transfers and earned interest as well as
rental income from land and housing. The income variable has been also
re-adjusted by price indexes of regions and months.
We cannot avoid possible measurement errors for these key variables.
However, when errors are mean zero random errors and the variable with er-
13For the regional deflators, we use the indices provided by the GSO in the VHLSS. We
also replicate the same exercise using the different set of regional deflators provided by
Brian McCaig and the results do not change significantly.
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rors is used as a dependent variable, as in our case, it is well known that those
errors will not cause estimation bias.14 Furthermore, as suggested by Nakata
et al. (2009), measurement errors in retrospective expenditure seem to be
systematically related to household size. This suggests that the inclusion of
household size as one of the control variables in our regressions contributes
to mitigating biases arising from measurement errors in consumption.
The set of covariates used for our consumption estimates includes house-
hold characteristics (such as characteristics of the head of household, i.e., lin-
ear and quadratic age, marital status, sex, linear and quadratic terms of fam-
ily size and number of children); education achievements (primary, secondary,
upper secondary, technical/vocational, university) as well as village-level in-
frastructure characteristics (such as the presence of roads, water pipelines,
public transports, urban/rural environment). We also include province dum-
mies to control for spatial heterogeneity.
As regards the measure for expected wealth in the denominator of the
scaling factor, while it is widely recognised that living standards are deter-
mined by a multitude of factors, consumption expenditure remains the most
popular measure in low- and middle-income settings. As a matter of fact,
previous empirical analyses that use scaling factors (Banks et al., 2001; Giles
and Yoo, 2007) replace expected wealth in the denominator of the scaling
factor with the observed level of consumption. However, the presence of
period t consumption in the scaling term makes it likely that errors in the
measurement of this term will be correlated with errors in the measurement
of the dependent variable (Giles and Yoo, 2007). To this end, Banks et al.,
(2001) and Giles and Yoo (2007) use lagged observed consumption in the
scaling term in their estimates (as we will do in Essay 4). Since in this
exercise, we cannot rely on panel data, alternative strategies to avoid en-
dogeneity bias in the estimates should be taken into account. In a popular
work, Filmer and Prichett (2001) suggest that asset indices are as reliable
as conventionally measured consumption expenditure as a proxy of house-
hold living standards. Following this approach, two alternative strategies
are tested to proxy for wealth (the denominator) in the pi term used in eq.
6. First, we use the current value in thousand dong of the households fixed
assets and durable goods. VLSS and VHLSS collect the current value (at
the time of interview) of about 59 goods not considered in the household
expenditure plus the value of dwelling. Table 3A-2 in Appendix 3A provides
the details on these assets and durable goods whereas Tables 3A-3 and 3A-
4report the main descriptive statistics of the final variable overall and by
14In contrast, when errors are correlated with independent variables or involve a mean-
reverting pattern, bias in estimation will arise (Gibson & Bonggeun, 2007).
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trade groups. Since the adoption of a price index could determine spurious
correlation with the LHS variable, which is deflated too, both income and
assets in the scaling term are reported in current values.
Second, as an alternative strategy, to prevent any possible bias due to
price influence and handle the vexing problem of choosing appropriate weights,
similarly to what has been done by Povel (2015), we proxy the expected
wealth in the denominator of the scaling factor using the linear combination
of the principal component factors of a sub-set of housing characteristics and
physical land availability. Unfortunately, this approach can only be used
for the VHLSS dataset since in the case of the VLSS rounds, the use of
this index dramatically reduces the number of observations because of the
high number of missing values. Table 3C-2 in Appendix 3C reports the list
of the housing characteristics used in the principal component analysis and
some descriptive statistics. Table 3C-3 reports the set of linear coefficients
(i.e., factor loadings) of the first two common factors (i.e., those factors with
eigenvalues greater than one). To improve the interpretability of the retained
factors we applied the standard orthogonal varimax rotation (Kaiser 1958).
Rotating the factors means re-expressing them to maximise their differences
(i.e., so that loadings on a few variables are as large as possible and loadings
on the rest of the variables are as small as possible). We have this freedom
to re-express the factors because of the inherent indeterminate nature of the
factor model (e.g., if z1 and z2 are two factors, then z1 + z2 and z1 − z2 are
equally valid solutions). The orthogonal rotated factor loadings are every bit
as good as the original loadings. As a matter of fact, if we plot the rotated
factor loadings, as in Fig. 3C-1, their interpretation appears to be straight-
forward: factor 1 gathers the housing characteristics whereas factor 2 focuses
on property, land and area availability.
To group households according to the trade openness of their sector of
specialisation, since VLSS and VHLSS surveys do not relate production and
external trade, we acknowledge here the work done by Coello et al. (2010).
They matched the ISIC code of any sector with the SITC classification used
in trade data and classified sectors as follows: export manufactured goods;
import competing manufactured goods; non traded services; agriculture. A
further breakdown of agricultural sector is also provided, as follows: rice
(considered separately because of its special status); main export agricul-
tural products, other export agricultural products, import-competing crops
and subsistence crops. This allows us to come up with eight trade-related
production sectors (see Table A.1 for details on the surveyed industries in-
cluded in each sector).15 Table A.2 shows the main characteristics for each
15The classification of industries as net exporters or net importers is made according
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production group across time in terms of mean consumption, income, assets
and poverty levels.16 It shows that the vast majority of sampled house-
holds is involved in rice production where mean income and consumption
are significantly lower than in the other sectors (with the relevant exception
of import-competing crops in 2008). Generally speaking, people involved
in non-farm activities are on average richer than farmers. Among the non-
farm activities, the highest mean income and consumption levels in almost
all rounds of observations are registered in non-traded services followed by
import-competing manufacturing. However, in 2008, both farm and non-farm
exports actually increased their income and consumption levels. A relative
lower incidence of poverty in non-farm sectors compared with the farm ones
should also be noted as well as a relatively strong decrease of its incidence in
non-traded farm activities (covering, however, a limited range of sectors and
a small percentage of the total workforce). Generally speaking, the incidence
of poverty seems to be structurally lower in non-farm activities than in farm
ones with the relevant exception of farm main-exports and non-traded crops.
Vulnerability by trade-related sector in Vietnam
Table 1 adds new pieces of information to the standard picture of poverty
and trade liberalisation in Vietnam under Doi Moi, by reporting the vul-
nerability rates (both the overall VEP rate and the risk-induced VEP sub-
component)for each round of household data alongside the poverty rates
(both those computed from the survey and those reported by the Vietnam
General Statistics Office, GSO). Following Chaudhuri (2003) in this empir-
ical exercise we have considered a household vulnerable if its probability to
register a consumption below the poverty line is higher than 0.50. Appendix
3B shows how vulnerability rates change along with changes in the probabil-
ity thresholds and gives details of the VEP estimation procedure. It is worth
noting that these are cross-sectional measures of vulnerability. They should
be seen as “snapshots” of the expectation to be poor “in the near future”.
As common practice, in this exercise we consider households as vulnerable
if they show a probability higher than 0.50 to fall into poverty at least once
in the following two years.17 It is worth noting that ex-ante vulnerability
to the average trade flows in 2002. For additional details on the procedure adopted, see
Coello et al. (2010).
16To group the households, we used the characteristics of the head of the family. We
also performed the same exercise according to the occupation status and sector of activity
of the majority of household members. The outcomes do not change significantly.
17To make clear-cut computations on a specific number of years in the future, a common
procedure is to compute vulnerability as one minus the probability of no episodes of
poverty times the number of years of the chosen time horizon in the future (k), as follows:
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and ex-post poverty should be viewed as different statistics: while we can
compare their evolution over time, we cannot draw any cross comparisons
between them.18 At first sight, it is evident from Table 1 that there is a
decreasing trend in both poverty and vulnerability rates. The percentage
of vulnerable people decreased from around 56 per cent of the total popu-
lation in 1992 to 8.3 per cent in 2008. However, the table actually shows a
roughly constant path of the share of the risk-induced component of vulner-
ability (i.e., the component of vulnerability associated with a high estimated
variance of consumption, but expected consumption above the poverty line)
after an initial drop at the eve of the liberalisation process (between 1992
and 1998). During the period 1998-2008 it never fell below the threshold of
31 per cent of the overall VEP. As we will see below, this is a significant issue
that needs careful investigation.
Table 1: Vulnerability and Poverty in Vietnam (1992-2008)
1992 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008
Poverty Rate in the Survey (%) 55.21 29.89 27.99 19.44 15.33 16.40
Poverty Rate (%) GSO 58,1 37,4 28,9 19,5 16.00 14,5
VEP Rate (%) 56.11 21.50 18.26 10.77 7.06 8.31
Risk-induced VEP (% vulnerable) 18.74 33.73 30.99 31.24 32.64 31.06
It is now time to undertake the most difficult task in our analysis: inves-
tigate the presence of a likely relationship between risk-induced vulnerability
and trade liberalisation in Vietnam. The simple evidence that the two phe-
nomena coexist under Doi Moi cannot be the only argument in favour of a
direct link between the two. At the same time, this coexistence makes the
effort worthwhile. Table 2 reports the poverty and vulnerability statistics
by trading sector. For each surveyed year, in the first two columns it shows
the characteristics of households in terms of income distribution (proxied by
the percentage of population below the fourth decile of the income distribu-
tion) and poverty rates (percentage of population below the poverty line).
In the last two columns for each surveyed year, it shows as in Table 1 the
total percentage of vulnerable households and the percentage of vulnerable
households that are considered as risk induced. As can be seen in the Ta-
ble 2, under the period of observation, the percentage of vulnerable people
decreased in all trade-related sectors following a quite regular pattern (with
some jumps moving from VLSS to VHLSS, probably due to the substantial
Vh,t+k = 1 − [P (lncht > lnz)]k , given the information set at t. In this exercise we use
k = 2.
18Imai et al., (2011) suggest a method of making such a comparison by means of a
multinomial logit model, adding V EPh,t−1 as one of the arguments.
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difference in the sampling frame between the two surveys). As a result, in
2008 (our last year of observation), all trade-related sectors register, without
exception, a lower percentage of vulnerable households than in 1992. Never-
theless, farm activities show higher percentages than non-farm ones with the
relevant exception of non-traded crops.
According to our VEP estimates, the sectors with the lowest percentage
of vulnerable households are non-traded services (they also show the low-
est percentage of poor people and, in general, of people with income below
the fourth decile19) and non-traded crops (in both cases, the percentage of
vulnerable households is below 2% in 2008). Among farm activities, the
production sector with the highest percentage of vulnerable households is
import-competing sectors followed by rice. Acknowledging the peculiar na-
ture of the rice sector which is, at the same time, the main production sector
and the main source of food for Vietnamese households, the last two rows of
Table 2 also show the decomposition of vulnerability patterns between rice
net producers and net consumer households where both the percentages of
the poor and vulnerable are higher among net rice producers than among
net rice consumers. Notwithstanding the fact that households involved in
main-export crops share similar mean income/consumption levels with those
involved in non-traded services (see Table A.2), the percentage of vulnera-
ble people in the former is permanently higher than in the latter. This is
noteworthy if we consider the relatively low incidence of poor households
in export crops and the relative equal distribution of income across deciles
that characterise it (see the first two columns in Table 2). Hence, we can
argue, first of all, that the hypothesis of heterogeneity in vulnerability by
trade sector is not rejected by the empirical data in Vietnam. Furthermore,
it should be noted that all non-farm activities register in 2008, generally
speaking, a higher share of risk-induced vulnerability than farm ones where
import-competing crops and rice seem to be the least exposed. Although this
share is computed on a smaller total, this is a relevant issue for policymak-
ing. However, it is intrinsically related to one of the main VEP weaknesses
(i.e., the inability to model risk explicitly)20. To this end, the next section
tries to overcome the VEP approach, specifically, by shedding light on the
black box of the risk-induced VEP component and disentangling the relative
“importance” of its various determinants.
19Note that, except in 1992, there are no poor households in the fifth or higher decile of
income.
20It is worth recalling here that the VEP measure assumes that the observed inter-
household distribution of consumption at a point in time represents the future distribution
of consumption across states of the nature for each household.
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The net contribution of “risk-induced” determinants of vulnerability
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients of our consumption regression
(eq. 8) for each round of the observations. In these estimates, the current
value in thousand dong of the households’ fixed assets and durable goods
has been used as a proxy for wealth in the denominator of the scaling factor.
The estimated coefficients of the same equation using the linear combination
of the principal component factors of a sub-set of housing characteristics and
physical land availability as a proxy for wealth in the denominator of the
scaling factor are reported in Table 3C-4 in Appendix 3C. For an idea of how
these alternative strategies actually soften possible endogeneity bias in the
relationship between current consumption and expected wealth, Table 3C-5
in Appendix 3C reports the coefficients of the same estimates using observed
consumption as a measure of wealth in the scaling factor.
As shown in Table 3, all the covariates are statistically significant and
show the expected signs. The signs of age and its square coefficients con-
firm, in principle, the well-known concave age-consumption profile, even if
the decreasing rate is in this case meaningless. Not surprisingly, having chil-
dren reduces household per capita consumption while being married increases
it. Whether the head of the household is male or female is correlated with
consumption too. The education variables also behave as expected, that is,
higher levels of education actually correspond to higher levels of consump-
tion. Lastly, the presence of a set of village characteristics (urban status and
availability of paved roads, electricity, tap water and public transport) are
associated with a higher level of consumption too.
The striking feature of our empirical exercise lies in the fact that both our
ex-post and ex-ante stochastic components of income are significantly corre-
lated with household consumption behaviour.21 More specifically, in each of
the surveys under analysis there is a negative correlation between the ex-ante
component of income innovation and expected consumption (although this
is not statistically significant for some of the available rounds). The same
relation holds for the ex-post negative shocks.
Even if our exercise cannot be considered a proper test of the precaution-
ary saving theory - because of its static nature - our results are consistent
with the provisions made by the theory, that is, ex-ante risk implies a lower
level of current consumption. In other words, our consumption estimates
confirm that households are, generally speaking, lowering their current path
of consumption because of both ex-ante risk (as a function of mitigating
strategies) and ex-post negative shocks (as a function of coping strategies)
21The outcomes of the income equation (eq. 4) which are used to separate the ex-ante
and ex-post components of risk, are reported in Table 3A-5 in Appendix 3A.
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Table 3: Consumption estimates (1992-2008)
1992 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008
Demographic characteristics
Age of the household head 0.0129*** 0.0187*** 0.0116*** 0.00875*** 0.0115*** 0.0142***
(0.00326) (0.00289) (0.00103) (0.00204) (0.00217) (0.00246)
Age2 of the household head -0.000103*** -0.000155*** -0.0000974*** -0.0000653*** -0.0000996*** -0.000122***
(0.0000328) (0.0000276) (0.00000983) (0.0000190) (0.0000209) (0.0000232)
Household Size -0.0561*** -0.110*** -0.0816*** -0.0742*** -0.0623*** -0.0551***
(0.0119) (0.00968) (0.00401) (0.00723) (0.00808) (0.0104)
Household Size2 0.00214*** 0.00491*** 0.00407*** 0.00369*** 0.00271*** 0.00142+
(0.000761) (0.000797) (0.000336) (0.000605) (0.000702) (0.000951)
No. of Children -0.0476*** -0.0657*** -0.103*** -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.113***
(0.00712) (0.00557) (0.00245) (0.00443) (0.00486) (0.00575)
Married hh head (yes=1) 0.0660*** 0.127*** 0.0863*** 0.0935*** 0.0802*** 0.0773***
(0.0222) (0.0171) (0.00757) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0187)
hh head sex (male=1) -0.0571*** -0.0482*** -0.0670*** -0.0962*** -0.0749*** -0.0664***
(0.0183) (0.0150) (0.00653) (0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0147)
Education
Prim educ (yes=1) 0.0898*** 0.117*** 0.144*** 0.169*** 0.159*** 0.201***
(0.0183) (0.0257) (0.00598) (0.0105) (0.0114) (0.0128)
Low secondary educ (yes=1) 0.144*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.308*** 0.288*** 0.325***
(0.0220) (0.0293) (0.00670) (0.0121) (0.0125) (0.0137)
Upper secondary educ (yes=1) 0.243*** 0.402*** 0.413*** 0.417*** 0.408*** 0.404***
(0.0312) (0.0321) (0.00905) (0.0169) (0.0176) (0.0191)
Tech/voc edu (yes=1) 0.218*** 0.402*** 0.520*** 0.533*** 0.543*** 0.515***
(0.0256) (0.0344) (0.0104) (0.0155) (0.0162) (0.0180)
Univers. Edu (yes=1) 0.436*** 0.676*** 0.731*** 0.741*** 0.775*** 0.741***
(0.0495) (0.0436) (0.0125) (0.0216) (0.0200) (0.0241)
Village characteristics
Geographical loc (urban=1) 0.220*** 0.290*** 0.274*** 0.267*** 0.176*** 0.0759***
(0.0606) (0.0318) (0.0125) (0.0176) (0.0219) (0.0218)
Roads (yes=1) 0.0156 0.0624* -0.00638 0.0486*** 0.0249+ 0.0347*
(0.0403) (0.0371) (0.0132) (0.0163) (0.0152) (0.0189)
Electricity (yes=1) 0.0537 0.173*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.254*** 0.195***
(0.0476) (0.0456) (0.0166) (0.0315) (0.0387) (0.0520)
Water (yes=1) 0.0705 0.0690* 0.122*** 0.0160 0.0669*** 0.0616***
(0.0605) (0.0354) (0.0122) (0.0154) (0.0198) (0.0191)
Transport (yes=1) -0.0455+ 0.00983 0.0439*** 0.0457*** 0.0290*** 0.0485***
(0.0278) (0.0211) (0.00849) (0.00999) (0.0101) (0.0115)
Ex-Ante Components
Income risk -0.00221*** -0.000222 -0.00204*** -0.00400 -0.000916** -0.00860
(0.000639) (0.000987) (0.000525) (0.00474) (0.000443) (0.00772)
Ex-Post Components
Positive Income Shock 2.011*** 3.089*** 4.376*** 4.410*** 4.161*** 3.613***
(0.175) (0.165) (0.0897) (0.131) (0.139) (0.158)
Negative Income Shock -1.637*** -1.757*** -5.197*** -4.041*** -4.810*** -4.088***
(0.161) (0.152) (0.0922) (0.156) (0.157) (0.180)
Constant 6.788*** 6.868*** 7.486*** 7.964*** 7.723*** 8.412***
(0.100) (0.0950) (0.0578) (0.0848) (0.0902) (0.101)
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.524 0.653 0.749 0.714 0.683 0.623
Obs 3377 5212 26304 7820 7801 6307
+p≤ 0.15; ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01
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with negative welfare implications in their consumption prospects. It also
highlights the presence of ex-ante welfare effects (i.e., changing behaviour in
consumption because of “ex-ante” risk) for households that did not actually
experience any shock. Note that this is based on a better identification strat-
egy able to separate ex-ante and ex-post risks. However, as will be discussed
below, we cannot rule out measurement errors and unobservable bias because
of the lack of panel data.
Table 4 shows the standardised coefficients in Eq. 8.22 As can be seen
in Fig. 1, which plots the standardised coefficients in Eq.8, the ex-ante
stochastic component (i.e., the income risk variable) does not matter as much
as the other components.23 However, if we look at the evolution of its net
contribution over time 24 for the entire period under observation (1992-2008),
we see that the risk component influences consumption negatively in every
round of observations and does not evidence a clear downward trend (with
the significant exception of a strong reduction from 1992 to 1998 within the
VLSS, see Fig. 2)
Table 3C-1 in Appendix 3C reports additional estimates for eq. 8 which
also include dummies for trade categories. On the one hand, this helps us
capture possible unobservable income effects other than those already con-
trolled for by the observable characteristics, neutralising differences in av-
erage income between groups (i.e., households in different trade categories
show heterogeneous consumption because of heterogeneous income). On the
other hand, while the risk term is supposed to capture in principle both
within and between group effects, the inclusion of trade categories acknowl-
edges that some risks can be common to households in the same trade group
and allows us to isolate the risk effect within groups (i.e., risks are identi-
fied within the groups) better than in the estimates reported in Table 3.25
The outcomes reported in Table 3C-1 show the following stylised facts: i)
the trade dummies show, generally speaking, negative coefficients, i.e., they
are associated with lower consumption prospects than the reference category
(non-farm non-trade); ii) the overall fit of the model with the trade dummies
slightly improves; iii) the coefficients of the risk terms do not change signifi-
22Standardised coefficients are simply the regression coefficients when all variables have
been standardised to mean zero and variance one (z scores). For more details, see Achen
(1982).
23These outcomes are very much in line with the other Essays in this thesis and with
Lucas (2003)’s computations.
24The net contribution on consumption behaviour is here intended simply as its “level
importance”, computed by multiplying the mean of the independent variable by its coef-
ficient.
25It is useful here to remark that equality of the means and variances of income residuals
by trade categories is rejected by the data.
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Table 4: Consumption estimates: standardised coefficients
1992 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008
Demographic characteristics
Age of the household head 0.382*** 0.432*** 0.270*** 0.198*** 0.261*** 0.343***
(0.00326) (0.00289) (0.00103) (0.00204) (0.00217) (0.00246)
Age2 of the household head -0.300*** -0.367*** -0.237*** -0.157*** -0.238*** -0.310***
(0.0000328) (0.0000276) (0.00000983) (0.0000190) (0.0000209) (0.0000232)
Household Size -0.241*** -0.360*** -0.246*** -0.214*** -0.181*** -0.168***
(0.0119) (0.00968) (0.00401) (0.00723) (0.00808) (0.0104)
Household Size2 0.114*** 0.187*** 0.136*** 0.119*** 0.084*** 0.045+
(0.000761) (0.000797) (0.000336) (0.000605) (0.000702) (0.000951)
No. of Children -0.133*** -0.144*** -0.203*** -0.213*** -0.214*** -0.220***
(0.00712) (0.00557) (0.00245) (0.00443) (0.00486) (0.00575)
Married hh head (yes=1) 0.052*** 0.085*** 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.052*** 0.051***
(0.0222) (0.0171) (0.00757) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0187)
hh head sex (male=1) -0.052*** -0.037*** -0.048*** -0.068*** -0.055*** -0.050***
(0.0183) (0.0150) (0.00653) (0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0147)
Education
Prim educ (yes=1) 0.079*** 0.095*** 0.107*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.166***
(0.0183) (0.0257) (0.00598) (0.0105) (0.0114) (0.0128)
Low secondary educ (yes=1) 0.129*** 0.210*** 0.196*** 0.229*** 0.228*** 0.275***
(0.0220) (0.0293) (0.00670) (0.0121) (0.0125) (0.0137)
Upper secondary educ (yes=1) 0.111*** 0.232*** 0.193*** 0.183*** 0.187*** 0.193***
(0.0312) (0.0321) (0.00905) (0.0169) (0.0176) (0.0191)
Tech/voc edu (yes=1) 0.137*** 0.160*** 0.219*** 0.282*** 0.288*** 0.286***
(0.0256) (0.0344) (0.0104) (0.0155) (0.0162) (0.0180)
Univers. Edu (yes=1) 0.138*** 0.212*** 0.227*** 0.237*** 0.257*** 0.232***
(0.0495) (0.0436) (0.0125) (0.0216) (0.0200) (0.0241)
Village characteristics
Geographical loc (urban=1) 0.188*** 0.224*** 0.196*** 0.189*** 0.131*** 0.053***
(0.0606) (0.0318) (0.0125) (0.0176) (0.0219) (0.0218)
Roads (yes=1) 0.010 0.033* -0.003 0.024*** 0.013+ 0.019*
(0.0403) (0.0371) (0.0132) (0.0163) (0.0152) (0.0189)
Electricity (yes=1) 0.030 0.077*** 0.051*** 0.026*** 0.042*** 0.036***
(0.0476) (0.0456) (0.0166) (0.0315) (0.0387) (0.0520)
Water (yes=1) 0.063 0.052* 0.082*** 0.012 0.053*** 0.051***
(0.0605) (0.0354) (0.0122) (0.0154) (0.0198) (0.0191)
Transport (yes=1) -0.044+ 0.008 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.025*** 0.045***
(0.0278) (0.0211) (0.00849) (0.00999) (0.0101) (0.0115)
Ex-Ante Components
Income risk -0.064*** -0.002 -0.012*** -0.005 -0.007** -0.008
(0.000639) (0.000987) (0.000525) (0.00474) (0.000443) (0.00772)
Ex-Post Components
Positive Income Shock 0.218*** 0.238*** 0.268*** 0.275*** 0.248*** 0.232***
(0.175) (0.165) (0.0897) (0.131) (0.139) (0.158)
Negative Income Shock -0.144*** -0.132*** -0.286*** -0.240*** -0.269*** -0.256***
(0.161) (0.152) (0.0922) (0.156) (0.157) (0.180)
Constant 6.788*** 6.868*** 7.486*** 7.964*** 7.723*** 8.412***
(0.100) (0.0950) (0.0578) (0.0848) (0.0902) (0.101)
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.524 0.653 0.749 0.714 0.683 0.623
Obs 3377 5212 26304 7820 7801 6307
+p≤ 0.15; ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01
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Figure 1: Dispersion importance of the determinants of household consump-
tion (average values 1992-2008)
110
3.4 The empirical analysis
Figure 2: Evolution of the net contribution of the “ex-ante” stochastic de-
terminants on average household consumption (1992-2008)
cantly. The above evidence suggests that the trade dummies mainly capture
differences in mean income which do not influence the risk channel depicted
above.
As a further robustness check, Table 3C-4 in Appendix 3C reports ad-
ditional estimates of eq. 8 with a linear combination of housing and land
availability as principal component factors to proxy for wealth in the denom-
inator of the pi term. It also includes the trade dummies in the regression.
It is worth noting that in the case of the VLSS rounds, the use of this index
dramatically reduces the number of observations because of the high num-
ber of missing observations. It actually hampers the degree of confidence of
the regression outcomes for these rounds. In the case of the VHLSS rounds,
however, the negative relationship between income risk and consumption is
still there even if only weakly significant for some rounds. Finally, the same
estimates are reported in Table 3C-5 using observed consumption as a proxy
for the expected wealth of the denominator of the scaling factor. They show
the same pattern. The only difference, as expected, is that the coefficients for
ex-ante risk are higher in magnitude and more significant in all rounds. In
short, the negative relationship between ex-ante risk and consumption seems
to hold and is robust to alternative empirical proxies for wealth.
Before drawing any conclusion, however, we should mention that the lack
of panel data prevents us from isolating the risk component properly. If we
correctly assume the variance of income innovation as a comprehensive mea-
111
3.4 The empirical analysis
sure of risk component, variance in non-stochastic household heterogeneity
and variance in measurement error, it is apparent that our estimates should
be seen as an upper-bound of the possible welfare impact of the risk com-
ponent. However, is the hypothesis of time-varying heterogeneity and mea-
surement error reasonable?
On the one hand, while the VHLSS data are universally considered to
be of better quality than VLSS and widely used by both national and in-
ternational research communities, as already discussed, we cannot exclude
the presence of time-varying measurement error in income (Lee et al., 2010;
Glewwe, 2011).26 Furthermore, in a dynamic emerging economy like Viet-
nam, in the midst of a deep and comprehensive process of reform such as Doi
Moi, we cannot exclude the presence of time-varying unobserved household
heterogeneity either.
On the other hand, if we come back to the main focus of our analysis, i.e.,
the trade openness debate, and we test whether or not there are likely to be
statistical differences in the ex-ante component of income innovation across
households in relation to their affiliation to each trade-related group, the
F-statistics of the one-way ANOVA and the Levene’s T-test27 reject in each
round of observations the null hypotheses that the means and the variances of
the estimated income residuals are the same across trade-related production
groups (Table 5). We are thus confronting heterogeneity in unexplained
stochastic components when households are gathered by trade-related sectors
(see Figure 3 for the full picture of the dispersion of income residuals across
households by trade-related category for all the available households surveys).
Fig. 4 shows, as in Fig.2, the evolution of the net contribution of the ex-
ante component of income innovation on households’ consumption behaviour
(derived from estimating Eq. 8), by clustering households across groups of
industries classified as traded, not traded and rice, according to Coello et
al. (2010). The picture highlights a relatively higher average of the ex-
ante stochastic component in the case of the trading sectors compared with
the other ones, especially in the most recent rounds, net of the usual jump
between VLSS and VHLSS.
This last result confirms that we are confronting heterogeneity in the
variance of income innovation which is correlated to the relative degrees of
trade openness of production sectors. Again, if we are willing to assume
26For instance, being selected for the VHLSS survey has been seen to have an indepen-
dent increasing positive impact on average household consumption (Hansen and Trung
Dange, 2010).
27The Levine test is similar to the standard one-way Anova test, but less sensitive to the
eventual violation of normality assumption. The null hypothesis of both tests is equality
of variances across trade groups. This is rejected with a probability of below 0.05.
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Table 5: Testing Mean and Variance of the income residuals by trade cate-
gories
Levene’s T-test for equal variances of the income residuals
1992 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008
9.27 4.93 22.72 6.05 6.27 6.43
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
One way ANOVA Test of equality of means under unequal variances
1992 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008
3.78 10.501 43.086 17.107 6.861 18.084
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Figure 3: Box plots of income residuals by trade categories
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Figure 4: Evolution of the net contribution of the risk component on average
household consumption (1992-1008) in traded, not traded and rice sectors
it is the upper bound of a proper measure of the risk component, the plain
conclusion is that, not only is risk increasing over time in Vietnam under Doi
Moi, but that its relevance (in terms of net contribution both to the expected
average and to the variance of household consumption) is proportionally
higher the higher the trade exposure of the sector the household is involved
in.
However, since we acknowledge that we are not able to separate pure risk
from unobserved household heterogeneity and measurement error, we can-
not make this conclusion without considering the opposite hypothesis. To
this end, let us suppose that our ex-ante component is entirely determined
by unobserved household heterogeneity and measurement error. This means
that both the unobservable heterogeneity and measurement error change ac-
cording to household trade exposure across sectors, i.e households working
in a more exposed trading sector are more, and increasingly, severely af-
fected by unobservables and measurement error than households working in
a less trade-exposed sector. This would indeed be an interesting conjecture,
even if it has not been explored by the literature so far. But even so, why
should their impact on consumption behaviour be negative? Such a hypoth-
esis would need to assume that the households that self-select to participate
in the more exposed trade sectors present a set of common characteristics,
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unobserved to the researcher, or alternatively, a common path in their rela-
tive measurement error, that have a negative impact on their consumption
behaviour. If that were the case, it would be a very relevant issue for poli-
cymaking and would also imply a revision of the assumed trade benefits for
the welfare of Vietnamese households working in the most exposed trading
sector, at least partially, i.e., when looking at heterogeneity in their unex-
plained stochastic components of consumption behaviour. My impression,
however, is that we are probably simply assessing what we are looking for:
i.e., the dynamic of risk heterogeneity across households according to their
degree of risk exposure. This is reasonably increasing over time and is rela-
tively higher for the households that are more exposed to trade due to the
relative impact of foreign risks. Furthermore, it is negatively correlated with
ex-ante consumption behaviour even for the households that do not actually
experience any shock.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper presents - to the best of my knowledge - the first compre-
hensive analysis of vulnerability to poverty induced by trade liberalisation in
Vietnam under Doi Moi for the entire period 1992-2008. As a result, a num-
ber of useful insights into the phenomena under analysis can be derived. First
of all, a decreasing trend in vulnerability to poverty along with a decreasing
trend in poverty; second, a non-decreasing share of risk-induced vulnerability
and; third, the non-decreasing importance (both in terms of impact level and
in terms of dispersion) of the vulnerability component of consumption be-
haviour linked to the ex-ante stochastic determinants, an issue traditionally
overlooked by the empirical literature in the field. Finally, our estimates con-
firm that risk exposure varies systematically according to the trade exposure
of surveyed households. Notwithstanding the fact that households involved
in main-export farm activities share similar mean income/consumption levels
with those involved in non-traded non-farm ones, the percentage of vulnera-
ble people in the former is permanently higher than in the latter. While the
nature of the heterogeneity of the ex-ante income innovation by trade-related
sector as well as the role of risk management strategies actually engaged in
by Vietnamese households need more careful investigation, these first empir-
ical outcomes appear to be very relevant to policymaking. They highlight
the need to include possible influences of trade-related risk exposure in the
welfare assessments of the impacts of trade policies.
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Appendix 3A - Tables & Figures
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Table 3A-1: Industries classification by trade-related sectors
Exports Non-Farm Non-traded Non-Farm
Fishing, aquaculture Recycling
Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas Collection, purification and distribution of water
Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur Construction
Footwear Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles
Wood and of products of wood and cork Wholesale trade and commission trade
Office, accounting and computing machinery Retail trade, repair
Hotels and restaurants
Import-competing Non-Farm Land transport; transport via pipelines
Forestry, logging and related service activities Water transport
Mining of uranium and thorium ores Air transport
Food products and beverages Supporting and auxiliary transport activities
Tobacco products Post and telecommunications
Textiles Financial intermediation
Tanning and dressing of leather; luggage Insurance and pension funding
Paper and paper products Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel Real estate activities
Chemicals and chemical products Renting of machinery and equipment
Rubber and plastics products Computer and related activities
Other non-metallic mineral products Research and development
Basic metals Other business activities
Fabricated metal products Public administration and defence
Machinery and equipment Education
Electrical machinery and apparatus Health and social work
Radio, television and communication equipment Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation
Medical, precision and optical instruments Activities of membership organizations n.e.c.
Motor vehicles, trailers Recreational, cultural and sporting activities
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. Other service activities
Private households as employers
Main Export Farm Extraterritorial organizations and bodies
Black pepper
Exports Cashew, coffee Import-Competing Farm
Rubber, tea Apples, grapes
Fresh vegetables
Other Export Farm Indian Corn
Bananas Jackfruit, durian
Cassava manioc Jute, ramie
Coconut Mulberry
Cotton Oranges, limes
Cabbage, cauliflower Other leafy greens
Mango, Papaya Plums, potatoes
Peanuts Suger cane
Pineapple Tobacco
Sesame seeds Tomatoes
Soy beans
Specialty rice Non-traded Farm
Sweet potatoes Custard apple (subsistence)
Litchi, logan, rambutan
Rice Sapodilla
Water morning glory
Source: Coello et al., (2010)
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Table 3A-2: List of fixed assets and durable goods used to proxy households’
wealth
Perennial crop gardens Telephone sets
Aquaculture production area Mobilephones
Fish/shrimp-rearing cages/rafts Sewing, weaving, embroidering machines
Other production land area Other machines and equipment
Buffalo, cow, horse for production and breeding Fishing net
Breeding male and female pig Durable containers for storage
Basic herds of poultry and cattle Other professional equipment
Breeding facilities Video players
Feed grinding machines Color T.V sets
Rice milling machines Black and white T.V sets
Rice plucking off machine Multi-tier stereos
Pesticide sprayers Radios/Cassette
Workshops Recorders/Disc players
Shops Computers
Other production bases Cameras, Video cameras
Cars Refreezerators, Freezers
Tractors Air-condioners
Trailers Washing machines and driers
Tractor ploughs Electric fans
Motorbikes Water heaters
Bicycles Gas cookers
Cart Electric cookers, rice cookers, pressure cookers
Motor boats, ferries ... Trollers of various kinds
Boats, ferries without motor Wardrobes of various kinds
Other means of transportation Beds
Lathes and welding and milling machines Tables, chairs, sofas ...
Punchers Vacuum cleaners, water filters
Wooden sawing machines Microwaves
Pumps Liquidizer, juicer
Power generators Other valuable things
Printers, photocopiers (Antiques, pianos, dressing tables...)
Fax machines
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3.5 Conclusions
Table 3A-5: Income regressions (1992-2008) with dummies for trade cate-
gories
dep.variable: log of real per capita income 1992 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008
Demographic characteristics
Age of the household head 0.000682 0.0173*** 0.0103*** 0.00204 0.0128*** 0.0176***
(0.908) (0.001) (0.000) (0.574) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 of the household head 0.0000117 -0.000136*** -0.0000836*** -0.0000341 -0.000114*** -0.000167***
(0.841) (0.006) (0.000) (0.325) (0.000) (0.000)
Household Size -0.0147 -0.0373** -0.0747*** -0.0256** -0.0619*** -0.0668***
(0.496) (0.048) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000)
Household Size2 0.000731 0.00204 0.00422*** 0.000954 0.00336*** 0.00380**
(0.637) (0.181) (0.000) (0.344) (0.003) (0.029)
No. of Children -0.0872*** -0.113*** -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.110*** -0.117***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married Head 0.0347 0.134*** 0.100*** 0.0782*** 0.113*** 0.117***
(0.326) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Head sex 0.00275 -0.00864 -0.0396*** -0.0598*** -0.0459** -0.0401+
(0.937) (0.757) (0.000) (0.004) (0.013) (0.106)
Education
Primary education 0.119*** 0.103*** 0.131*** 0.125*** 0.141*** 0.161***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lower secondary education 0.206*** 0.280*** 0.228*** 0.238*** 0.244*** 0.287***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Upper secondary education 0.282*** 0.424*** 0.355*** 0.288*** 0.310*** 0.384***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tech/voc education 0.213*** 0.349*** 0.437*** 0.381*** 0.423*** 0.450***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
University 0.305*** 0.559*** 0.569*** 0.550*** 0.517*** 0.640***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Occupation
White-collar 0.0898 0.223*** 0.0914*** 0.103*** 0.112*** 0.133***
(0.156) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Personal services 0.267*** 0.182*** 0.110*** 0.0343 0.0618** 0.00921
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.228) (0.016) (0.757)
Production 0.106* 0.0286 0.0286** -0.0165 -0.0240 -0.00320
(0.052) (0.436) (0.024) (0.478) (0.269) (0.930)
None -0.00468 -0.0462 -0.0173 -0.0830*** -0.0604** -0.0179
(0.913) (0.193) (0.230) (0.003) (0.035) (0.587)
Village characteristics
Urban -0.0574 -0.0840 0.0785*** 0.0114 -0.0538* -0.0987***
(0.655) (0.240) (0.000) (0.695) (0.083) (0.007)
Roads -0.0853 -0.0326 -0.0452** 0.0606** -0.0611** 0.00751
(0.258) (0.613) (0.038) (0.014) (0.026) (0.804)
Electricity 0.0533 0.315*** 0.110*** 0.0843 0.302*** 0.201***
(0.445) (0.000) (0.000) (0.150) (0.000) (0.006)
Water 0.117 0.105 0.0719*** 0.0162 0.0341 0.0616*
(0.314) (0.185) (0.000) (0.518) (0.231) (0.051)
Transport 0.00384 0.0308 0.0408*** 0.0269* 0.0373** 0.0416**
Constant 7.627*** 6.959*** 8.114*** 8.743*** 8.121*** 8.420***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummies for trade categories (0.933) (0.437) (0.003) (0.094) (0.016) (0.015)
Exporting industries 0.0144 -0.0550 -0.0337* 0.0231 -0.00539 -0.00468
(0.857) (0.380) (0.081) (0.435) (0.845) (0.887)
Import-competing industries 0.0457 0.101* 0.0471** 0.0361 0.0661** 0.0506*
(0.463) (0.054) (0.011) (0.197) (0.013) (0.072)
Rice -0.265*** -0.293*** -0.260*** -0.273*** -0.0573** -0.0000530
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.998)
Main export crops 0.182 0.136 -0.103*** -0.0208 0.0811* -0.0187
(0.264) (0.243) (0.000) (0.636) (0.086) (0.706)
Other export crops -0.162* -0.275*** -0.198*** -0.214*** -0.231*** -0.202***
(0.070) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
import-competing crops -0.223** -0.0979+ -0.186*** -0.227*** -0.125*** -0.204***
(0.016) (0.116) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Non-traded food 0.0609 0.0715 -0.0839** -0.193*** -0.188*** -0.134**
(0.660) (0.536) (0.019) (0.001) (0.009) (0.041)
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.263 0.357 0.427 0.353 0.296 0.305
Obs 3377 5212 26304 7820 7801 6307
+p≤ 0.15; ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01
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Appendix 3B - The VEP estimation procedure
VEP method uses an ordinary least squares (OLS) procedure to estimate
a standard reduced-form of the consumption function based on the following
simple linear econometric specification:28
cht = α + βXht + ϕVt + ht (3B-1)
where cht is the log of per capita consumption of household h at time t;
Xand V are two vectors of exogenous variables which control, respectively,
for the households and villages characteristics; it is an error term. It ac-
knowledges the stochastic nature of consumption simply by noting that the
error term in Eq. 3B-1 is not the same for all households (i.e., violation of
the homoskedasticity hypothesis), rather there is heterogeneity in consump-
tion volatility around the mean. Thus, it addresses the issue, by using a
3-steps Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) econometric procedure
suggested by Amemiya (1977). At first, it estimates the residuals from the
equation 3B-1 and run the following estimating process of the error variance
assumed as a function of the same covariates included in the specification of
the consumption process. Specifically, we have:
2ht = δXht + λVht + ηht (3B-2)
Eq. 3B-2 solves the heteroskedasticity problem and contributes to build
up efficient estimates of the expected consumption level. From an economic
perspective, it provides a robust method to link the households characteristics
to the amount of unexplained consumption which is peculiar to vulnerability
analysis. The outcomes of the regressions of Eq. 3B-2 are reported in Table
3B-1.
The predictions of Eq. 3B-2 are thus used to weight the previous equation,
obtaining the following transformed version:
2ht
2ht,OLS
= δ
Xht
2ht,OLS
+ λ
Vht
2ht,OLS
+
ηht
2ht,OLS
(3B-3)
As reported in Chaudhuri (2003), the OLS estimation of Eq. 3B-3 gives
us back an asymptotically efficient FGLS estimate, δFGLS, λFGLS and thus 2
is a consistent estimate of σ2ht, the variance of the idiosyncratic component of
28It is worth noting that such a simple specification of the consumption function has
already been used by previous works on poverty in Vietnam which exploit the same VLSS
and VHLSS surveys, e.g. Glewwe et al. 2002; Minot and Baulch 2005; Niimi et al. 2007;
Justino et al. 2008; Cuong et al. 2010, Nguyen and Winters 2011.
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household consumption. Once we obtain an efficient estimate of the variance
we can finally take the square root of it and transform Eq.3B-1 as follows:
lncht
σ̂ht,FGLS
= θ
Xht
σ̂ht,FGLS
+ φ
Vht
σ̂ht,FGLS
+
ηht
σ̂ht,FGLS
(3B-4)
The OLS estimation of Eq. 3B-4 provides consistent and asymptotically
efficient estimate of θFGLS; φFGLS. It is thus possible to estimate both the
expected log consumption and its variance as follows:29
Ê[(lncht|Xht, Vht)] = θFGLSXht + φFGLSVht (3B-5)
V̂ ar[(lncht|Xht, Yht)] = δFGLSXht +FGLS Vht (3B-6)
To compute the vulnerability rates in Table 1 households are considered
vulnerable to expected poverty if they show a probability of being poor (V̂h)
bigger than that of being non-poor (1−V̂h ), which seems to us a fair decision
strategy. To better clarify the concept, it is useful to provide a representa-
tion of the distribution of the aggregate VEP vulnerability across different
thresholds and comparing it across the different years of observation. Figure
3B-1 shows the relationship between the incidence of vulnerability in the to-
tal population (on the vertical axis) and the different probability thresholds
(on the horizontal axis, ranging from 0 to 1). To understand this relationship
it is useful starting from the extreme cases: when the probability threshold is
set to zero, all the households should be considered as vulnerable (no house-
holds in Vietnam show a probability equal zero to fall below the poverty line);
when the probability threshold is set to one, the vulnerability incidence on
the total population is equal to zero (no households show full probability to
fall below the poverty line). Consequently, it is straightforward to see that
when the probability threshold is set somewhere in between, the percent-
age of vulnerable households over the total population falls somewhere in
between too.
Table 1 in section 3.4 reports the vulnerability rates as percentage of total
population (vertical axis) corresponding to 0.50 on the horizontal axis. For
instance, comparing the picture of 1992 with 1998 it is straightforward to see
the jump in the VEP figures reported in Table 1 (the upper line corresponding
to 0.50 probability threshold is above the 50% of total population on the
vertical axes in 1992 it is in fact 56.11% - and largely below 50% in 1998
29To address measurement errors and likely omitted variable bias, Chaudhuri and Datt
(2001) make a multiplicative adjustment to the estimated variances such that the predicted
mean of the consumption be equal to its observed mean for each year of estimation.
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it is actually 21.50%). Thanks to Figure 3B-1 we can see that a similar
pattern is actually in place for different probability thresholds and that the
decreasing trend of vulnerability is apparent for all the possible thresholds.
This is evident looking at the decreasing slopes of the curves representing
vulnerability which become increasingly convex year after year. From this
figure it is also easy to detect the narrowing gap between the fraction of risk
induced vulnerable within the overall vulnerable population. As we can see
from the Figure 3B-1, the distance between the two lines decrease over time,
indicating that recently most of the Vietnamese households are vulnerable
not because of their structural characteristics, rather because of the presence
of risk.
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Table 3B-1: Variance regressions (1992-2008)
dep.variable:Variance of cons. eq. residuals 1992 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008
Demographic characteristics
Age of the household head 0.00783 -0.00402 0.00944* 0.00346 0.00938 0.0118
(0.00667) (0.0112) (0.00540) (0.0118) (0.0140) (0.0160)
Age2 of the household head -0.000114* 0.0000155 -0.0000884* -0.0000526 -0.0000308 -0.0000395
(0.0000668) (0.000108) (0.0000509) (0.000109) (0.000130) (0.000148)
Household Size -0.0241 0.0469 0.00279 0.0425 -0.158*** -0.212***
(0.0206) (0.0388) (0.0222) (0.0435) (0.0535) (0.0656)
Household Size2 0.000789 -0.00181 -0.00302+ -0.00492 0.0116** 0.0116*
(0.00137) (0.00315) (0.00192) (0.00383) (0.00490) (0.00624)
No. of Children -0.0802*** -0.119*** -0.0211+ -0.0157 -0.0454 0.0501
(0.0149) (0.0235) (0.0131) (0.0279) (0.0331) (0.0389)
Married Head -0.113** -0.132* -0.213*** -0.190** -0.354*** -0.276**
(0.0480) (0.0717) (0.0381) (0.0819) (0.0936) (0.111)
Head sex 0.0581 -0.0388 0.138*** 0.122* 0.199** 0.164*
(0.0406) (0.0607) (0.0320) (0.0685) (0.0784) (0.0952)
Education
Primary education 0.109*** 0.179** 0.240*** 0.101+ 0.0701 0.0608
(0.0396) (0.0799) (0.0302) (0.0630) (0.0733) (0.0839)
Lower secondary education 0.174*** 0.0583 0.240*** 0.0446 0.0352 -0.0255
(0.0445) (0.0880) (0.0328) (0.0686) (0.0796) (0.0902)
Upper secondary education 0.150** -0.0792 -0.0395 0.00624 -0.0289 -0.0186
(0.0717) (0.0993) (0.0449) (0.0960) (0.112) (0.130)
Tech/voc education 0.366*** 0.174+ 0.0241 -0.0299 -0.131 0.114
(0.0563) (0.119) (0.0494) (0.0854) (0.101) (0.115)
University 0.593*** 0.113 0.301*** 0.351*** -0.104 -0.0994
(0.100) (0.137) (0.0621) (0.121) (0.138) (0.164)
Village characteristics
Urban -0.0652 -0.347*** -0.490*** -0.430*** -0.233* 0.332***
(0.106) (0.103) (0.0353) (0.0964) (0.127) (0.129)
Roads 0.118* -0.131 0.189*** -0.0193 0.131 -0.0379
(0.0638) (0.103) (0.0375) (0.0832) (0.0957) (0.110)
Electricity 0.132* 0.0142 0.240*** 0.100 -0.0876 -0.166
(0.0705) (0.118) (0.0501) (0.185) (0.296) (0.315)
Water -0.188* -0.135 -0.306*** 0.0381 0.0422 -0.138
(0.102) (0.108) (0.0337) (0.0881) (0.117) (0.112)
Transport 0.0976** -0.0485 -0.000999 -0.0445 -0.0213 0.0357
(0.0411) (0.0572) (0.0264) (0.0525) (0.0603) (0.0673)
Constant 0.822*** 0.500 -1.696*** -1.387*** -2.275*** -2.894***
(0.213) (0.438) (0.185) (0.446) (0.559) (0.630)
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.297 0.226 0.084 0.043 0.023 0.020
Obs 4222 5446 27140 8117 8162 6702
+p≤ 0.15; ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01
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Figure 3B-1: Incidence of vulnerability for different vulnerability thresholds
by year
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Appendix 3C - Additional consumption esti-
mates (robustness checks)
Figure 3C-1: Visual representation of factor loadings
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Table 3C-1: Consumption estimates (1992-2008) with dummies for trade
categories
1992 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008
Demographic characteristics
Age of the household head 0.0129*** 0.0202*** 0.0140*** 0.0116*** 0.0145*** 0.0158***
(0.00325) (0.00286) (0.000989) (0.00198) (0.00210) (0.00244)
Age2 of the household head -0.000102*** -0.000170*** -0.000114*** -0.0000855*** -0.000120*** -0.000133***
(0.0000325) (0.0000274) (0.00000950) (0.0000185) (0.0000201) (0.0000229)
Household Size -0.0517*** -0.110*** -0.0811*** -0.0754*** -0.0646*** -0.0591***
(0.0117) (0.00972) (0.00386) (0.00714) (0.00760) (0.0101)
Household Size2 0.00195** 0.00496*** 0.00413*** 0.00383*** 0.00299*** 0.00194**
(0.000754) (0.000800) (0.000323) (0.000600) (0.000652) (0.000927)
No. of Children -0.0498*** -0.0652*** -0.103*** -0.111*** -0.113*** -0.113***
(0.00718) (0.00519) (0.00231) (0.00428) (0.00463) (0.00562)
Married Head 0.0660*** 0.124*** 0.0871*** 0.0949*** 0.0906*** 0.0797***
(0.0221) (0.0176) (0.00720) (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0184)
Head sex -0.0492*** -0.0370** -0.0551*** -0.0860*** -0.0704*** -0.0670***
(0.0184) (0.0149) (0.00608) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0143)
Education
Primary education 0.0818*** 0.114*** 0.133*** 0.159*** 0.147*** 0.194***
(0.0178) (0.0250) (0.00559) (0.0101) (0.0108) (0.0124)
Lower secondary education 0.131*** 0.244*** 0.235*** 0.290*** 0.267*** 0.314***
(0.0214) (0.0280) (0.00621) (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0134)
Upper secondary education 0.222*** 0.374*** 0.378*** 0.378*** 0.368*** 0.385***
(0.0319) (0.0305) (0.00846) (0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0187)
Tech/voc education 0.191*** 0.365*** 0.457*** 0.477*** 0.491*** 0.488***
(0.0258) (0.0326) (0.00957) (0.0151) (0.0154) (0.0176)
University 0.387*** 0.627*** 0.661*** 0.669*** 0.701*** 0.691***
(0.0478) (0.0425) (0.0122) (0.0212) (0.0195) (0.0239)
Village characteristics
Urban 0.126** 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.214*** 0.123*** 0.0276
(0.0519) (0.0307) (0.0116) (0.0172) (0.0208) (0.0215)
Roads 0.0235 0.0484 -0.0201+ 0.0337** -0.00357 0.0285+
(0.0374) (0.0342) (0.0122) (0.0153) (0.0142) (0.0183)
Electricity 0.0672+ 0.175*** 0.110*** 0.0994*** 0.246*** 0.195***
(0.0451) (0.0420) (0.0148) (0.0311) (0.0386) (0.0512)
Water 0.0703 0.0534* 0.0967*** 0.00931 0.0554*** 0.0580***
(0.0528) (0.0322) (0.0111) (0.0148) (0.0186) (0.0187)
Transport -0.0519** 0.00199 0.0357*** 0.0367*** 0.0164* 0.0432***
(0.0262) (0.0201) (0.00757) (0.00957) (0.00954) (0.0110)
Ex-Ante Components
Income risk -0.00243*** -0.000253 -0.00228*** -0.00513 -0.00108*** -0.00777
(0.000631) (0.00103) (0.000555) (0.00459) (0.000366) (0.00605)
Ex-Post Components
Positive Income Shock 1.952*** 3.083*** 4.388*** 4.420*** 4.139*** 3.568***
(0.170) (0.159) (0.0873) (0.127) (0.131) (0.152)
Negative Income Shock -1.722*** -1.761*** -5.180*** -4.026*** -4.824*** -4.128***
(0.154) (0.150) (0.0906) (0.152) (0.153) (0.175)
Constant 6.914*** 7.036*** 7.561*** 8.002*** 7.783*** 8.101***
(0.0922) (0.0914) (0.0501) (0.0826) (0.0833) (0.101)
Dummies for trade categories
Exporting industries -0.0383 -0.116*** -0.0725*** -0.0351** -0.0382** 0.00262
(0.0438) (0.0263) (0.0108) (0.0153) (0.0169) (0.0187)
Import-competing industries -0.0680* -0.0333 -0.0261*** -0.0334** -0.0240+ 0.0000625
(0.0360) (0.0299) (0.00882) (0.0147) (0.0153) (0.0163)
Rice -0.176*** -0.204*** -0.218*** -0.205*** -0.223*** -0.155***
(0.0226) (0.0200) (0.00630) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0131)
Main export crops -0.0313 0.0303 -0.0799*** -0.0343 0.0358 0.0894***
(0.0636) (0.0420) (0.0195) (0.0246) (0.0291) (0.0278)
Other export crops -0.121*** -0.174*** -0.180*** -0.159*** -0.133*** -0.0715***
(0.0460) (0.0306) (0.0125) (0.0215) (0.0277) (0.0252)
import-competing crops -0.162*** -0.160*** -0.191*** -0.211*** -0.0833*** -0.0867***
(0.0473) (0.0248) (0.0108) (0.0184) (0.0239) (0.0220)
Non-traded food 0.00948 0.00609 -0.109*** -0.0839*** -0.0506 -0.0321
(0.0646) (0.0514) (0.0172) (0.0316) (0.0385) (0.0349)
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.536 0.667 0.768 0.732 0.707 0.638
Obs 3377 5212 26304 7820 7801 6307
+p≤ 0.15; ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01
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3.5 Conclusions
Table 3C-3: Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness
Lighting 0.5586 0.0519 0.6853
Toilet 0.6736 0.4065 0.3810
Drink 0.7137 0.0274 0.4899
House prop -0.2717 0.4053 0.7619
House type 0.4878 0.5973 0.4053
Living area -0.0695 0.7838 0.3808
Land deciles -0.7294 0.2047 0.4261
Uniqueness is the percentage of variance for the variable that is not explained by the common factors.
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Table 3C-4: Consumption estimates (1992-2008) with wealth in scaling factor
proxied by an index of housing characteristics and land availability (and
dummies for trade categories )
1992 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008
Demographic characteristics
Age of the household head 0.0468*** 0.0142 0.0140*** 0.0129*** 0.0136*** 0.0160***
(0.0148) (0.0221) (0.000989) (0.00217) (0.00245) (0.00260)
Age2 of the household head -0.000530*** -0.0000986 -0.000114*** -0.0000988*** -0.000117*** -0.000135***
(0.000152) (0.000202) (0.00000951) (0.0000202) (0.0000237) (0.0000244)
Household Size -0.0318 -0.134*** -0.0804*** -0.0743*** -0.0649*** -0.0580***
(0.173) (0.0447) (0.00386) (0.00760) (0.00927) (0.0106)
Household Size2 0.00138 0.00906** 0.00408*** 0.00369*** 0.00323*** 0.00186*
(0.0120) (0.00425) (0.000324) (0.000631) (0.000799) (0.000976)
No. of Children -0.0958+ -0.105*** -0.103*** -0.112*** -0.120*** -0.113***
(0.0568) (0.0378) (0.00232) (0.00468) (0.00538) (0.00585)
Married Head 0.131 0.216** 0.0875*** 0.0857*** 0.0853*** 0.0802***
(0.125) (0.0896) (0.00720) (0.0156) (0.0183) (0.0191)
Head sex 0.0180 -0.182** -0.0554*** -0.0773*** -0.0664*** -0.0717***
(0.171) (0.0745) (0.00609) (0.0128) (0.0158) (0.0148)
Education
Primary education 0.00291 0.142 0.133*** 0.156*** 0.146*** 0.194***
(0.188) (0.102) (0.00559) (0.0110) (0.0129) (0.0129)
Lower secondary education -0.0623 0.318*** 0.234*** 0.288*** 0.258*** 0.312***
(0.0727) (0.0834) (0.00622) (0.0127) (0.0139) (0.0140)
Upper secondary education -0.00190 0.378*** 0.378*** 0.369*** 0.367*** 0.382***
(0.0766) (0.0906) (0.00847) (0.0177) (0.0204) (0.0196)
Tech/voc education 0.0574 0.402*** 0.457*** 0.461*** 0.465*** 0.481***
(0.132) (0.126) (0.00961) (0.0163) (0.0194) (0.0186)
University . 0.489*** 0.661*** 0.671*** 0.677*** 0.679***
. (0.153) (0.0122) (0.0231) (0.0314) (0.0245)
Village characteristics
Urban -2.023** -0.0374 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.0846*** 0.0171
(0.767) (0.136) (0.0116) (0.0184) (0.0262) (0.0222)
Roads 0.386* 0.135 -0.0197+ 0.0379** -0.00725 0.0377**
(0.190) (0.221) (0.0123) (0.0157) (0.0160) (0.0190)
Electricity 1.597*** -0.243+ 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.244*** 0.250***
(0.337) (0.155) (0.0148) (0.0332) (0.0426) (0.0603)
Water . 0.0511 0.0966*** 0.00734 0.0333* 0.0706***
. (0.142) (0.0111) (0.0157) (0.0201) (0.0192)
Transport 0.453 -0.00441 0.0359*** 0.0334*** 0.0155+ 0.0377***
(0.400) (0.0577) (0.00758) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0115)
Ex-Ante Components
Income risk -0.00000155 -0.000000156 -1.81e-14*** 1.95e-10+ -4.17e-12** -3.23e-10+
(0.00000291) (0.000000243) (3.67e-15) (1.31e-10) (1.73e-12) (2.22e-10)
Ex-Post Components
Positive Income Shock 2.645** 2.418*** 4.385*** 4.503*** 4.206*** 3.530***
(1.005) (0.357) (0.0873) (0.135) (0.157) (0.160)
Negative Income Shock -2.275+ -0.654 -5.179*** -3.962*** -4.748*** -4.128***
(1.378) (0.908) (0.0907) (0.162) (0.181) (0.185)
Constant 7.258*** 7.182*** 7.703*** 7.687*** 8.528*** 8.395***
(1.329) (0.581) (0.0436) (0.0954) (0.0965) (0.103)
Dummies for trade categories
Exporting industries -0.398 -0.101 -0.0728*** -0.0301* -0.0167 -0.000104
(1.158) (0.129) (0.0108) (0.0170) (0.0236) (0.0192)
Import-competing industries -1.178* 0.0367 -0.0261*** -0.0327** -0.0203 0.00375
(0.671) (0.192) (0.00883) (0.0163) (0.0204) (0.0171)
Rice -1.023+ -0.146** -0.218*** -0.210*** -0.187*** -0.153***
(0.609) (0.0634) (0.00631) (0.0115) (0.0121) (0.0138)
Main export crops . 0.422** -0.0786*** -0.0412+ 0.0685** 0.0902***
. (0.182) (0.0196) (0.0258) (0.0313) (0.0280)
Other export crops -0.917* 0.0739 -0.180*** -0.168*** -0.102*** -0.0790***
(0.526) (0.136) (0.0125) (0.0230) (0.0300) (0.0267)
import-competing crops . -0.0934 -0.190*** -0.219*** -0.0609** -0.0863***
. (0.126) (0.0108) (0.0195) (0.0253) (0.0235)
Non-traded food . -0.151 -0.108*** -0.0681** -0.0448 -0.0317
. (0.113) (0.0172) (0.0339) (0.0400) (0.0357)
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.568 0.508 0.768 0.728 0.668 0.639
Obs 84 305 26274 6733 5410 5723
+p≤ 0.15; ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01
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Table 3C-5: Consumption estimates (1992-2008) with wealth in scaling factor
proxied by observed consumption
1992 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008
Demographic characteristics
Age of the household head 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.003 0.010*** 0.015***
Age2 of the household head -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Household Size -0.061*** -0.087*** -0.086*** -0.075*** -0.084*** -0.090***
Household Size2 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
No. of Children -0.080*** -0.096*** -0.108*** -0.116*** -0.113*** -0.116***
Married Head 0.084*** 0.121*** 0.088*** 0.098*** 0.067*** 0.040**
Head sex -0.067*** -0.040*** -0.064*** -0.105*** -0.054*** -0.02
Education
Primary education 0.154*** 0.127*** 0.152*** 0.176*** 0.172*** 0.219***
Lower secondary education 0.264*** 0.307*** 0.273*** 0.331*** 0.301*** 0.350***
Upper secondary education 0.371*** 0.466*** 0.437*** 0.470*** 0.440*** 0.456***
Tech/voc education 0.357*** 0.492*** 0.553*** 0.601*** 0.583*** 0.571***
University 0.595*** 0.755*** 0.772*** 0.866*** 0.812*** 0.858***
Village characteristics
Urban 0.280*** 0.324*** 0.296*** 0.278*** 0.188*** 0.121***
Roads -0.032 0.079** -0.018 0.072*** 0.025 0.028
Electricity 0.071 0.227*** 0.144*** 0.137*** 0.305*** 0.183***
Water 0.142* 0.160*** 0.136*** 0.044*** 0.052** 0.032*
Transport -0.017 0.035* 0.051*** 0.062*** 0.048*** 0.049***
Ex-Ante Components
Income risk -0.534*** -1.907*** -2.306*** -2.934*** -3.944*** -3.246***
Ex-Post Components
Positive Income Shock 2.915*** 5.091*** 5.144*** 5.592*** 5.516*** 5.102***
Negative Income Shock 1.585*** 2.900*** 5.867*** 4.983*** 5.710*** 5.185***
Constant 6.799*** 7.869*** 8.674*** 9.202*** 9.416*** 9.565***
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.601 0.757 0.807 0.792 0.772 0.73
Obs 4222 5446 27140 8117 8162 6702
*p≤ 0.10; ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01
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Chapter 4
Essay 4 - Trade openness and
vulnerability to poverty in
Vietnam: a panel empirical test
in the period 2002-2006
This paper assesses trade-induced vulnerability in Vietnam by presenting
an extended version of Ligon and Schechter’s (2003) measure of Vulnerability
as low Expected Utility (VEU) and using the VHLSS panel data available
for 2002-06. The empirical results show that risk-induced vulnerability and
heterogeneity in trade exposure by industry matters in determining house-
hold overall vulnerability. They also show that the ex-ante permanent risk is
significantly correlated with both the non-stochastic, via the precautionary
saving channel, and the risk components of vulnerability and that this corre-
lation actually increases for the upper percentiles of vulnerability distribution
(with the most vulnerable households being the most severely affected). This
work is relevant to policymaking since it is, to the best of my knowledge, the
first empirical evidence of the direct influence of the trade-related risks on
household vulnerability in a panel setting.
Keywords: trade openness, vulnerability, poverty, risk, consumption be-
haviour, Vietnam.
JEL: F14, O12, D12, C31
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4.1 Introduction
Various attempts have been made to empirically investigate the link be-
tween trade liberalisation and household welfare in Vietnam under Doi Moi,
focusing mainly on the impact of liberalisation on poverty indicators (Justino
et al., 2008; Jenkins, 2004; Nadvi et al., 2004; van de Walle and Cratty,
2004; Jensen and Tarp, 2005; Nguyen and Ezaki, 2005; Fujii and Roland-
Holst, 2007; Niimi et al., 2007; Abbott et al., 2009 ; Heo and Doanh, 2009;
Coello et al., 2010). Few attempts have been made to date to further inves-
tigate the impact of the Vietnamese opening process on ex-ante measures of
vulnerability to poverty and the consequent role played by the permanent
components of risk associated with trade liberalisation. This can be consid-
ered a remarkably weakness since trade can alter a household’s risk exposure
and its vulnerability. As shown in Essay 2, risk-averse people react to risk by
modifying their optimal behaviour, thus encouraging additional/extra saving
and reducing current consumption. Although consumption fluctuations are
seen as optimal responses to risk, they imply a smoothless path of consump-
tion which in turn implies permanent negative effects on welfare. This is
especially true for people characterised by a poor ability to take advantage
of the positive opportunities linked to trade reforms and weak mitigating
strategies. In the midst of trade reform they carry out extra-saving and fol-
low conservative choices shying away from profitable but risky investments
(Winters et al., 2004).
To deal with this issue, here we propose a novel empirical approach to
isolating the trade-induced component of vulnerability, taking into account
the different role played by the ex-ante effects of risk and the ex-post effects of
shocks. More specifically, we present: i) an extended version of the Ligon and
Schechter’s (2003) measure of Vulnerability as low Expected Utility (VEU)
able to isolate the component of risk-exposure associated with trade openness
(i.e., risks that are not fully shared across trade-related industries) as well
as the ex-ante effects of risk from the ex-post effects of shocks; and ii) an
empirical application of the proposed extended measure by exploiting the
panel data available in Vietnam for the period 2002-06.1
Our results show that i) trade exposure and its related risks matter in
determining household overall vulnerability; ii) the ex-ante permanent risk
is significantly correlated with both the “random” and “non-random” com-
ponents of vulnerability: iii) the relative impact of the ex-ante permanent
1The VHLSS collected information from a sample of 29,530 households in 2002 of which
4,476 were re-interviewed in 2004 and 2006, out of samples of 9,188 in total in 2004 and
9,189 in 2006. A new wave was also collected in 2008 but, unfortunately, it does not
include panel data with the previous rounds.
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risk actually increases for the upper percentiles of vulnerability distribution
(with the most vulnerable households being the most severely affected).
This empirical evidence has strong policy implications. Although it does
not represent, by any means, an argument against free trade, it is a quest
to deepen our knowledge on the stabilisation needs of trade reforms, e. g.,
the promotion of credible stabilisation policies (e.g., reducing price fluctu-
ations) and/or the design of new insurance schemes that target vulnerable
households (e.g., raise the creditworthiness of small farmers’ participation in
export cropping).
The paper is organised as follows: Section II reviews the literature and
presents the conceptual framework on trade and vulnerability to poverty;
Section III provides the details on the adopted vulnerability measure; Section
IV presents the empirical model and the data; Section V the empirical results
and Section VI concludes.
4.2 Trade and vulnerability to poverty: the
conceptual framework
Trade theory is mainly focused on the first moment of the relationship
between trade openness and welfare which is incomplete when people are risk
averse. Empirical evidence is mixed, scattered in separate fields of analysis
and does not reach a common stance. As a result, current literature fails to
make a full assessment of the net welfare impact of the opening-up process
(see Essay 1).
In principle, trade openness could alter households’ optimal portfolios, so
that their current ones become sub-optimal ex-ante.2 This is because trade
openness can alter risk, impact on households’ optimal portfolios, and lead
to net welfare effects that are less positive than expected in the long run
(Winters, 2002; Winters and al., 2004; Calvo and Dercon, 2007a).
As a result, households in the midst of trade reforms may decide to employ
strategies to mitigate risks and reduce welfare variability.3 These actions can
2Of course, ex-post, a household may lose out because of unlucky realisations. Hence,
increases in observed poverty can be consistent with ex-ante improvements in welfare if
households trade higher mean incomes for higher variances (Winters et al., 2004).
3Both management and coping strategies can operate through i) an informal chan-
nel, which includes personal, family and community arrangements; ii) a market-based
channel, based on the opportunity provided by institutions such as banks, insurance or
microfinance corporations; or iii) a public channel, which implies a series of welfare state
interventions aimed at protecting specific subsets of the population, e.g. measures to deal
with unemployment, old-age, work injury, disability, widowhood and sickness.
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imply conservative choices, especially for the poor, that lower the expected
value of income (and consumption) in exchange for lower variability.4 While
consumption fluctuations are seen as optimal responses to risk, they imply
a smoothless path of consumption. Hence, these strategies can be costly
in the short run because they encourage additional/extra saving and reduce
current consumption (Kimball, 1990; Caballero, 1990; Deaton, 1992; Caroll,
2001; Caroll & Kimball, 2008) with permanent negative effects on welfare
(Ravallion 1988; Morduch 1994; Dercon, 2005).
Consequently, any measure of vulnerability which is not able to ade-
quately take into account trade exposure and the effect of the ex-ante change
in behaviour induced by trade liberalisation is lacking an important compo-
nent of welfare analysis.
To undertake the issue operationally, here we propose a workable measure
of vulnerability that is able to isolate the net welfare cost of trade exposure
and the relative effect of the ex-ante changing behaviour under trade risks.
We then apply this measure to the VHLSS panel data for the available pe-
riod 2002-06 to test the presence of heterogeneity in households’ vulnerability
associated with their degree of trade exposure. More specifically, our hypoth-
esis is that the presence of heterogeneity in vulnerability scores is associated
with heterogeneity in risk exposure and/or in the adopted mitigating strate-
gies between households involved in “traded” and “non-traded” sectors. This
is because while households engaged in non-traded sectors are mainly affected
by domestic risks (e.g., bad weather, crops failure, livestock diseases, etc.),
households engaged in import- and export-related sectors are also affected by
foreign markets’ risks (e. g, international price fluctuations, exchange rate
fluctuations, etc.). This heterogeneity in risk exposure leads, ceteris paribus,
to heterogeneity in risk management strategies including changes in their
ex-ante consumption behaviour.
Note that the focus here is on behavioural heterogeneity. We do not
make any additional assumption regarding the typology and sign of possible
correlations between domestic and foreign risks (an issue on which empirical
evidence has been somewhat inconclusive, see McCulloch et al., 2001) since
this it is neither necessary nor particularly informative for our empirical anal-
ysis. Furthermore, we acknowledge that the presence of significant differences
in vulnerability across households employed in different trade-related sectors
4The literature on income smoothing mainly focuses its interest on aspects related
to farm production such as the intensity of input adoption (Morduch, 1990; Dercon and
Christiaensen, 2011), diversification of activities (Morduch, 1990, Townsend, 1995, Dercon,
1996), occupational choices (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Kochar, 1999; Rose, 1995) and
their net impact on the expected profit of the household (Rosenzweig and Binswanger,
1993).
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of specialisation does not provide information on the nature of the foreign
risks and/or their channels of transmission to changes in household welfare.
However, it is undeniable that the presence of heterogeneity in vulnerability
scores across households classified by trade exposure strongly suggests the
need for further, more detailed, analyses of the links between trade and vul-
nerability which is an issue that has so far been ignored in the specialised
literature, both theoretical and applied.
4.3 Vulnerability as Expected Utility for trade
analysis
In order to isolate the trade risk component of vulnerability, in this Essay
we propose an extended version of Ligon and Schechter’s (2003) measure of
Vulnerability as low Expected Utility (VEU). By using a utilitarian approach,
VEU assesses vulnerability as the difference between the utility derived from
some level of certainty-equivalent consumption (based on and analogous to
the choice of a poverty line in the literature of poverty measurement, z) above
which the household would not be considered vulnerable, and the expected
utility of consumption [EUi(ci)], as follows:
Vi = Ui(z)− EUi(ci) (1)
where Ui is a weakly concave, strictly increasing function.
5 Taking expec-
tations of the increasing, concave function of consumption expenditures has
the effect of making vulnerability depend not only on mean consumption,
but also on its variation over time (Ligon and Schechter, 2003). To this end,
VEU disentangles ”poverty-induced” vulnerability - as a low expected mean
of consumption - from ”risk-induced” vulnerability, linked to consumption
fluctuations, as follows:
Vi = [Ui(z)− Ui(E(cit))] + [Ui(E(cit))− EUi(cit)] (2)
where E(cit) indicates the non-random expected level of consumption
(i.e., the certainty equivalent consumption). While the first bracketed term
of Eq.2 involves no random variables, the second one measures the “risk
premium”, i.e., the amount of utility the household would be prepared to
give up rather than face a risky prospect. This is the “natural” counterpart,
5This method applies to the class of von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility func-
tions.
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denominated in utils, of the risk premium the household would be willing to
forego in order to eliminate risk.6
The VEU method overcomes the weak theoretical background of the most
popular vulnerability measures based on expected values of the common
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of decomposable poverty measures.7
Furthermore, it is micro founded, empirically based, and presents some clear
advantages over other groups of micro-founded vulnerability measures, e.g.,
the class of vulnerability measures looking at the threat of poverty (VTP)
(Calvo and Dercon, 2013; Povel, 2015, Chaudhuri et al., 2002; Kamanou &
Morduch, 2004; Pritchett, Suryahadi, & Sumarto, 2000; Dutta et al., 2011;
Gunther & Maier, 2008).8 First, unlike the VTP class of measures, VEU
addresses vulnerability to risk only after aggregation across states has been
performed (Calvo, 2008). It implicitly assumes that it measures vulnerability
net of the adoption of all the feasible precautionary saving and/or other in-
surance mechanisms whereby households can smooth away, even if not fully,
variations in outcomes over states of the world. Second, VEU empirical ap-
plications overcome the need to approximate all possible states of the world,
a somewhat heroic assumption of the VTP class of measures using the short
panel data currently available in developing countries.
Notwithstanding its virtues, the VEU measure presents drawbacks too.
First, it treats mean consumption as being independent of risk, implying
that risks affect only the volatility of consumption around its mean, but not
the mean itself, thus underestimating the overall effect of risk (Elbers and
Gunning, 2003). Second, it does not distinguish between whether vulnera-
bility is generated by exposure to shocks, i.e., the lack of coping mechanisms
(ex-post effects), or risk-induced change in behaviour, i.e., the long-term cost
of undertaking ex-ante mitigating strategies (ex-ante effects). The latter
issue is prominent since, as underlined in the previous sections, this distinc-
tion should be considered as an unavoidable element in the design of policy
interventions.
To overcome the above caveats, we provide an extended version of the
VEU measure for trade and vulnerability analysis in three steps.
6The concavity of the utility function implies that the so-called “Jensen’s inequality”
holds, i.e., the difference between the utility of consuming the expected consumption with
certainty and the expected utility from consuming ci is positive, on average.
7For a survey of the main methods applied in vulnerability analysis, please refer to the
Appendix 1.A in Essay 1.
8VTP measures compute vulnerability as the ex-ante probability weighted average[s]
of state-specific indices of deprivation. The main advantage of this group of measures is
that vulnerability is associated with the extent that poverty cannot be safely ruled out in
any of the possible future scenarios (Calvo, 2008).
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First, following on from Ligon and Schecher (2003) and Ligon (2006),
we further decompose the risk component of the VEU measure filtering out
“aggregate risk”, “meso (trade-related) risk” and “measurement error and
idiosyncratic risk” respectively, as follows:
Vi = [Ui(z)− Ui(Ecit)]+ (Poverty)
[Ui(Ecit)− EUi(E(Cit|µk))]+ (trade-related risk)
[EUi(E(Cit|µk))− EUi(E(Cit|µk, µt))]+ (Aggregate risk)
[EUi(E(Cit|µk, µt))− EUi(cit)]+ (Measurement error and idyosincratic risk)
(3)
where µt is an aggregate risk term, common to all households, which may
vary over dates and (aggregate) states; µk represents a risk term which varies
across k clusters of households that are supposed to be characterised by het-
erogeneity in their exposure to foreign risks.9 The rationale of this further
decomposition is the following: with complete markets, household i’s con-
sumption is supposed to vary over time only in response to aggregate shocks
(i.e., common to all households). However, if we assume heterogeneity in risk
exposure between households involved in traded and non-traded sectors, we
should verify that risks are not fully shared across them (because they are
different in nature and/or because the lack of appropriate risk-sharing mech-
anisms) and that aggregate risks do not affect households homogeneously.
To take this into account in our vulnerability measure, we filter out a further
“meso component” able to capture any systematic variation in the expected
level of log consumption across households classified by trade clusters. A
simple joint significance test of the latent terms will provide an appropriate
empirical test for this intuition (see section IV). To this end, it seems more
natural to look at the aggregate/covariate risk as a residual sub-component
of the VEU overall risk component after controlling for trade groups’ de-
viations from risk sharing. If, on the other hand, we filter out the trade
groups’ deviations from the overall component of aggregate risk, this will
imply that deviations from risk sharing by trade categories are considered as
the residual subcomponent of the VEU overall risk component. Since trade
cannot be considered orthogonal to time risks (i.e., they are correlated), both
strategies are legitimate. Of course, the first component always captures all
the common elements and, for this reason, we adopt the first strategy as the
preferred one: it gives more emphasis to the trade-related risk component
(Figs.1 and 2 show the comparison of the decomposition of overall risk using
9A similar procedure has been followed by Ligon (2006) for a different purpose.
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the two different strategies highlighting this difference). It is worth noting
that in all cases, we are simply attempting to provide alternative possible
distributions of the VEU overall risk component - which remains invariant -
into trade-related and non-trade-related sources. The added value is to ex-
clude possible extreme interpretations that Vietnamese households are facing
alternatively only trade-related risks or only non-trade-related risks.10 The
final sub-component in Eq. 3 contains the remaining idiosyncratic risk, i.e.,
any systematic deviation by households from the predictions of complete
markets, other than trade risk heterogeneity, and likely measurement errors.
Second, as suggested by several authors (Elbers and Gunning 2003, El-
bers et al. 2007, Elbers et al. 2009, Carter and Ikegami, 2009), we assume
that households correctly perceive the distribution of risk they face even when
they do not actually experience any shock. Hence. we further decompose the
final sub-component of Eq. 3 by filtering out two additional sub-components
of vulnerability: the ex-ante permanent component of risk and the ex-post
component of shocks. This further decomposition presents some clear advan-
tages over the standard VEU measure. First, it provides a distinct evaluation
of the costs of mitigation strategies compared with the coping ones. Second,
the permanent component of ex-ante risk also captures the impact of risk
on mean consumption, via the standard precautionary savings channel, over-
coming the main weakness of Ligon & Schechter’s (2003) version of VEU.
Our extended VEU measure becomes thus fully consistent with the theoret-
ical and empirical prediction that a rational consumer can safeguard against
future bad shocks by reducing current consumption and over accumulating
saving in safe (unproductive) assets (see Essay 2 and also Caballero 1990,
Deaton 1992, Caroll 2001). Unfortunately, we cannot decompose the impact
of the ex-ante permanent risk on the non-random level of consumption from
its impact on risk premium. However, we can test the significance of the two
channels by presenting the correlates between our measure of permanent risk
and the various components of our vulnerability measure (see section V).
Once we have filtered out both the ex-ante and the ex-post idiosyncratic
components of risk, we leave only the unexplained risk and/or measurement
error in the residuals, as follows:
10For an extensive discussion on how to work out with the original VEU measure after
removing the hypothesis of complete markets, please refer to Ligon (2006).
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Vi = [Ui(z)− Ui(Ecit)]+ (Poverty)
[Ui(Ecit)− EUi(E(cit|µk))]+ (trade-related risk)
[EUi(E(cit|µk))− EUi(E(cit|µk, µt))]+ (Aggregate risk)
[EUi(E(cit|µk, µt))− EUi(E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit))]+ (Ex-ante idiosyncratic risk)
[EUi(E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit))− EUi(E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit, xit))]+ (Ex-post idiosyncratic risk)
[EUi(E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit, xit))− EUi(cit)]+ (Unexplained risk and measurement error)
(4)
where s2ηit is a latent idiosyncratic term for the ex-ante component of risk
and xit is a bundle of time variant idiosyncratic households characteristics.
Thus, E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit) is the expected value of household consumption condi-
tional on knowledge of ex-ante idiosyncratic risk whereas E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit, xit)
is the expected value of household consumption conditional on knowledge of
ex-ante risk and a vector of idiosyncratic household characteristics able to
capture the heterogeneity in households’ exposure and their ability to cope
with it. As in Ligon and Schechter (2003), this controls for the idiosyn-
cratic risk component of the vulnerability measure that can be attributed to
variation in m observed time-varying household characteristics by filtering
it out from the risk component which cannot be explained by these charac-
teristics and from the aggregate and meso variables as well as from all the
other components (i.e., the unexplained variance and measurement error in
consumption).
Third, we average the VEU outcomes and the value of its risk premia
sub-components across the household cohorts belonging to the groups of
industries grouped according to their degree of trade exposure and investigate
them comparatively.
4.4 Model specification and Data
Model specification
To compute household vulnerability by using our extended VEU measure,
we follow a three-step procedure.
First, we choose the utility function and its degree of concavity (i. e., the
risk aversion parameter). As for the utility function, in line with Ligon and
Schechter (2003), we adopt the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
utility function which takes the form:
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U(c) =
{
log(c) if γ = 1,
c1−γ
1−γ otherwise.
(5)
where γ measures household relative risk aversion (Arrow, 1965; Pratt,
1964). Concerning the risk aversion parameter, estimates of risk aversion
in the empirical literature range from 1 (i.e., log utility) to no more than 4
(Lucas, 2003).11 Thus, we carry out our empirical analysis within this range
(specifically, from 1 to 3).12 We also normalise consumption for the poverty
lines available for each period, so that for poor household consumption is
below 1.
Second, we estimate the unconditional and the conditional expectations
of household i consumption included in our vulnerability measure. In the
first case, we assume a stationary environment - which is indeed reasonable
in our case considering the very short panel - and compute the unconditional
expectation of consumption as follows: Ecit =
1
T
∑T
t=1 cit. For the condi-
tional expectations, we assume that the expected consumption expenditure
of household i in industrial trade cluster k at time t can be estimated using
a linear equation of the conditional log consumption expenditure as follows:
E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit, xit) = αi + µk + µt + ωs2ηit + βxit + υit (6)
where α, µk, µt, ω, β are unknown parameters to be estimated: α captures
the influence of the fixed household characteristics on predicted consumption;
µk captures the influence of the (meso) trade-related fixed effects; µt captures
the remaining effect of common changes in aggregates which are not captured
by the meso component (it follows:
∑
µk = 0); ω is the parameter attached
to permanent ex-ante risk; and β is a vector of parameters attached to the
matrix of household characteristics.13 Note that if the latent variables µk are
11The common critique to these values is the Mehra and Prescott (1985) “equity pre-
mium puzzle”. It shows that if we want to use a stochastic growth model with CRRA
preferences to account for the entire return differential between stocks and bonds - histori-
cally about 6 percent - as a premium for risk, the parameter γ must be enormous, perhaps
50 or 100 (Lucas, 2003).
12According to Ligon and Schechter (2003), we do not expect our results to be very
sensitive to the actual choice of γ since we are more interested in investigating the relative
importance of the various vulnerability components than its overall magnitude. While in
fact the estimates of total vulnerability, poverty and risk are all sensitive to the choice of
γ (i.e., to the shape of the utility function), the relative magnitudes of the different com-
ponents are less sensitive since greater concavity reflects greater welfare losses associated
with all the components. We will see that our expectations are confirmed in the empirical
analysis.
13In order to catch the individual contribution of the m sources of idiosyncratic risks,
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jointly significant, then we can reject the null hypothesis of complete aggre-
gate risk sharing across households clustered by trade-related industries.14
The intuition behind is that this component of risk captures the presence of
risk heterogeneity across industries clustered by trade exposure and repre-
sents a measure of the different nature of trade risks, and/or the correlated
mitigating strategies, relative to the domestic ones. Similarly, if some risk is
shared at the aggregate level, then estimates of µt will be significant too. The
use of a panel fixed effects econometric procedure wipes out further sources
of bias due to unobservable household heterogeneity in consumption.
Third, to derive parsimonious information on ex-ante risk from our data,
we exploit the longitudinal dimension of the panel and derive the variance of
innovations in income. The estimated equation, similarly to what has done
in many of the previous empirical works (Carroll and Samwick 1997, 1998;
Hubbard et al, 1994; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002; Jalan and Ravallion,
2001; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004; Storesletten et al., 2004) is the following:
yit = δi + γk + θt + τzit + uit (8)
To filter out the permanent component of ex-ante risk, as in Carroll and
Samwick (1997) and Krebs et al. (2010), we assume that the stochastic term
(i.e., the unpredictable component) of our income equation (uit ) is the sum of
two unobserved components, a permanent (ηit) and a transitory one (it) that
are both white noise and uncorrelated with each other at all leads and lags.
We then rely on the intuition that the random walk component in income
of each household i implies a linearly increasing income dispersion over time
as follows (for additional details on this decomposition, see Appendix 2B in
Essay 2):
E[var[∆dyit]] = 2σ
2
 + dσ
2
η (9)
we orthogonalise the m variables xit by using a Gram-Schmidt procedure and then rewrite
the fourth line of equation 4 as follows:
[EUi(E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit))− EUi(E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit, xit))] =
[EUi(E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit))− EUi(E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit, x1t))]+
[EUi(E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit)), x1t)− EUi(E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit, x2t))]+
...
[EUi(E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit)), x(m−1)it)− EUi(E(cit|µk, µt, s2ηit, x1t...xmit))].
(7)
14We are of course here excluding any shift in the degree of trade exposure across groups
of sectors during the time span of the analysis, which is consistent with the short period
of our panel data.
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where var[∆dyit] is the variance of log difference of income of length d for
each household in the sample. By using two var[∆dyit] of different lengths we
can estimate the permanent component of the variance of income innovation
at the household level as follows:
s2ηi = υ
2
yid − υ2yid−1 (10)
where E(s2ηi) = σ
2
η and υ
2
yid = var[∆dyit]. The latter relies on the as-
sumption of no individual specific growth rates for income (other than those
predictable by occupation, education, industry and other personal character-
istics).15
We have already highlighted in section 3 that filtering out the permanent
component of ex-ante risk lets us also capture the impact of risk on mean
consumption via the standard precautionary savings channel, overcoming
the main weakness of the Ligon & Schechter’s (2003) version of VEU. A
second motivation is that according to our econometric specification of the
income process, filtering out the permanent component from the stochastic
component of consumption leads to unbiased estimates of the ex-ante risk
(since the transitory component also absorbs measurement errors). A third
motivation is that the more persistent the effect of the stochastic component
of income is, the larger its impacts are assumed to be (for a thorough analysis
of this issue, see Reis, 2009).
Finally, in line with adoption of the CRRA utility function, we assume
that poorer households are more responsive to changes in risk. To this end, we
again scale up the permanent component of income ex-ante risk by the ratio
between current household’s income and expected lifetime wealth. Our final
proxy for ex-ante permanent risk for each household i is thus the following:
s2ηit = piits
2
ηi
(11)
where piit = (yit/ŵit)
n and ŵit is our measure of the expected wealth.
16
15As a robustness check, we run our income equation by also controlling for an addi-
tional time trend component in order to capture additional predictable linear unobservable
components in the model (which may not be captured by the other predictable compo-
nents). Unfortunately, we cannot control for this time trend at the household level since
T = 3 and
∑
(û1 + û2 + û3) = 0. Hence, we assume that the unobservable components
captured by the time trend are homogeneous within each trade category (and additional to
those already captured by the trade categories fixed effects). The outcomes of the income
equation that includes the linear trend by trade categories as well as the parameters for
the fresh consumption equation are reported in Appendix 4B.
16Due to difficulties in extracting reliable information on the expected wealth from the
available observations, we follow Banks et al. (2001) and Giles and Yoo (2007) by replacing
expected wealth with an observed level of per capita consumption.
144
4.4 Model specification and Data
Again as a robustness check, we carry out our empirical analysis for different
values of the exponent of the scaling factor (for n = 1; 2; 3, consistently with
the various estimates of risk aversion parameter).17 As well as its theoretical
foundation, the scaling term has the additional advantage of transforming our
“risk term” into a time variant idiosyncratic component as well as introducing
explicit heterogeneity to the households’ responses to permanent risk and,
hence, heterogeneity in expected mean consumption.
Data
We used panel data for the period 2002-2004-2006 taken from the Viet-
nam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS). These are nationally rep-
resentative surveys based on the Population and Housing Census 1999 and
developed by the Vietnam General Statistics Office (GSO), jointly with the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Swedish Interna-
tional Development Agency (SIDA) with technical assistance from the World
Bank. In each wave, two questionnaires were filled in, a household question-
naire and a community questionnaire. The first one contained detailed in-
formation on household demographic characteristics, education, health and
healthcare, income, expenditures, assets and durable goods and accommo-
dation as well as participation in poverty reduction programmes. The com-
munity questionnaire gathered information on the demography, health, edu-
cation and infrastructure of all the rural communities. The VHLSS collected
information from a sample of 29,530 households in 2002 of which 4,476 were
re-interviewed in 2004 and 2006, out of samples of 9,188 in total in 2004
and 9,189 in 2006. The number of surveyed communes was 2,091 in 2002,
3,063 in 2004 and 3,065 in 2006. Taking into account some inconsistency
in the GSO original panel, here we used the Brandt et al. (2009) revised
version of VHLSS panel data.18 Moreover, the following sample restriction
was introduced to reduce the influence of unobservables and measurement
errors. First of all, we dropped all the households that match the following
criteria: i) head of household changed during the panel period and ii) head
of household not in the labour force during the entire period. Second, we
dropped all the households for which we do not have information on income,
17According to Skinner (1988) and Guiso et al (1992), the exponent of the scaling
factor measures the sensitivity to the level of expected wealth exhibited by the reaction to
uncertainty. If the exponent is more than zero, the effect of risk on consumption declines
with the household’s resources and the decline is faster the higher the value.
18As highlighted by Brandt et al. (2009), the GSO original panel data 2002-06 are
incorrect: of the 4,476 households interviewed in 2004 that should have a matching house-
hold in 2002, 429 have proven to be mismatched (9.6%) and these matching errors in the
2002-2004 VHLSS panel contribute to mismatches in the entire 02-06 VHLSS panel.
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consumption and/or assets. Third, to reduce the influence of outliers, we
dropped households with per capita income or consumption lower than the
first percentile or higher than the last one. Finally, we kept only the house-
holds that have observations for the entire panel period as well as real per
capita income, consumption and assets other from zero. As a result of these
restrictions, the sample decreased to a panel of 988 households.
The variable used for consumption was real per capita food and non-food
expenditure in the past 12 months re-adjusted by price indexes of regions
and months. Food expenditure included information on both market pur-
chases and consumption from home production of 58 items whereas the non-
food expenditure collected information on 32 items such as fabric, clothing,
blankets, pillow, tailoring or laundry service, shoes, nylon sheeting, electrical
equipment, etc. Poverty lines were expressed in Vietnamese dongs as follows:
1,915,000 for 2002; 2,070,000 for 2004; 2,559,000 for 2006.
Lastly, we converted all nominal variables into nationally representative
January 2006 prices using three different set of deflators, as suggested by
Brandt et al. (2009). Considering that households within each survey are in-
terviewed during different months, the first set were monthly deflators which
are needed to convert the income and consumption values to January prices
in the respective year. Second, in order to take into account the differences
in the cost of living across regions, we used regional deflators.19 Third, to
link January prices of 2002 and 2004 to January 2006, we used the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) indicators provided by the GSO, which are 1.279 for 2002
and 1.193 for 2004.
For household per capita income, since the VHLSS do not provide a syn-
thetic measure, we did as follows (for additional information, see also Brandt
et al., 2009). We aggregated income into six major categories: income from
crops, income from agricultural sidelines, household business income, wage
income, gifts and remittances, and other residual sources of income. Income
from crops is net income (gross revenue minus current expenditures) from
rice; other cereals, vegetables, and annual crops; industrial crops; fruit crops;
and crop by-products such as straw, leaves, etc. Agricultural sidelines include
livestock and other animal products, agricultural services, forestry services,
hunting, trapping, and domesticating wild animals, and aquaculture. House-
hold business income is net income from non-agriculture, non-forestry, and
non-aquaculture businesses run by the household and includes the process-
ing of agricultural, forestry and aquaculture products. Wage income includes
19For the regional deflators, we use the indices provided by the GSO in the VHLSS. We
also replicate the same exercise using the different set of regional deflators kindly provided
(upon request) by Brian McCaig and the results do not change significantly.
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salary or wage payments plus additional payments such as holiday contribu-
tions, social insurance payments, etc. for all jobs held by individuals during
the past 12 months. Gifts and remittances include payments from both
domestic and overseas sources. Finally, “other” residual sources of income
include items such as government transfers and earned interest as well as
rental income from land and housing.
The set of covariates used in our empirical exercise includes household
characteristics (such as characteristics of the head of household head, i.e., lin-
ear and quadratic age, marital status, sex; linear and quadratic terms of fam-
ily size and number of children); education achievements (primary, secondary,
upper secondary, technical/vocational, university) as well as village-level in-
frastructure characteristics (such as the presence of roads, water pipelines,
public transports, urban/rural environment). We also include province dum-
mies to control for spatial heterogeneity. As in Essay 3, the classification of
industries by trade exposure has been taken from Coello et al. (2010). This
is reported in Table 3A-3 in the Appendix in Essay 3. Coello et al. (2010)
manually matched the ISIC code of any sector with the SITC classification
used in Comtrade and GSO statistics and classified industries as net exporter
or net importer according to their trade performance. Non-traded industries
are those that cannot be matched with trade data. Crops are classified as
export-oriented, import-competing and subsistence crops (non-traded). The
main export crops are those that represent the bulk of Vietnam’s agricultural
exports, whereas rice is classified as a special category since it is both an ex-
port crop and the most important item for self-consumption. The full list of
the variables used in the empirical analysis as well as the main descriptive
statistics are reported in Tables 4A-1 and 4A-2.
4.5 Empirical results
In this section, we follow the pattern depicted in the previous sections
first by predicting expected consumption using eq. 6 and then by estimating
the different conditional expectations shown in eq. 4. We thus derive our
vulnerability measure and its sub-components. Finally, we present the em-
pirical correlation between our measure of ex-ante permanent risk and each
vulnerability sub-component.
Since the presence of observed consumption in the scaling term makes
it likely that errors in the measurement of this term will be correlated with
errors in the measurement of the dependent variable, as in Essay 3, we apply
alternative strategies to deal with this issue. As a first strategy , we use one
lag of the observed consumption. Table 1 reports the estimated coefficients
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of eq. 6. using this strategy.20 Two different specifications are presented
and replicated for different values (from one to three) of the exponents of the
scaling factor: the first column presents the outcomes with only household
and time fixed effects specification21; the second column adds the trade-
related fixed effects.
It should be noted first that, in both specifications, the covariates are
statistically significant and show the expected signs. The signs of age of the
head of household and its square coefficients confirm the well-known concave
age-consumption profile. Not surprisingly, having children reduces house-
hold consumption. The education variables also behave as expected: i.e.,
higher levels of education actually correspond to higher levels of consump-
tion (although the estimated coefficients are only significant for university
education). Urban households, as expected, consume more than rural ones
whereas the characteristics of the head of household do not seem to be sig-
nificant.
Second, the joint significance of the trade-related fixed effects (i.e., groups
of households belonging to clusters of industries that are supposed to be
characterised by a similar degree of trade exposure), confirms the intuition of
the presence of a significant systematic variation in household consumption
patterns by trade-related clusters of industries.22 The significance of the
aggregate year fixed effects shows that some time variant shocks are shared
at the macro level too. Note that the estimated coefficients attached to these
fixed effects should be read relative to the benchmark category (non-traded
non-food activities and year 2002, respectively, for trade-related and year
fixed effects) and, as expected, they are positive by year and negative (with
different magnitudes) by trade-related clusters. Due to the joint significance
of the trade-related fixed effects, we can argue that the model specification
presented in the first columns is mis-specified due to omitted variable bias.
We should take into account that the identification of trade fixed effects
in the triple fixed effect specification (i.e., including time, household and
trade cluster) applied in the model shown in the second columns is driven
by those households that move across trade-related groups. This is because
20It is worth recalling that because of the use of lagged consumption in the scaling
factor, the panel is reduced to 1976 observations (i.e., T=2)
21We assume that the random effects estimators are inconsistent since we cannot rule
out the possibility that the heterogeneity terms are correlated with the observables. This
implies the inability to identify separately the parameters associated with the set of house-
hold observed characteristics which are time-invariant.
22To preserve these moving patterns across the trade-related industry clusters in the em-
pirical analysis, we do not control for time variant trade-related fixed effects which would
be able, in principle, to capture further time variant factors which are contemporaneous
to the moving of households across trade-related sectors.
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Table 1: Panel regression on household consumption in Vietnam (2002-06)
dep.var.: log of real pc consumption 1 (with pi) 2 (with pi2) 3 (with pi3)
Ex-ante components
permanent risk
(expected wealth in scaling factor=
L. real pc cons.) 0.00000813 -0.0000743 -5.75e-08** -6.97e-08*** -1.05e-11*** -1.18e-11***
(0.000214) (0.000234) (2.30e-08) (2.46e-08) (2.70e-12) (3.06e-12)
transitory risk 0.0000120 0.000131 -1.36e-09 5.57e-09 2.06e-12 2.78e-12+
(0.000167) (0.000170) (1.35e-08) (1.44e-08) (1.69e-12) (1.89e-12)
Ex-post components
Age hh head 0.0417** 0.0424*** 0.0423** 0.0434*** 0.0424** 0.0435***
(0.0165) (0.0159) (0.0165) (0.0159) (0.0165) (0.0159)
Age sq. hh head -0.000394** -0.000398*** -0.000400*** -0.000408*** -0.000401*** -0.000410***
(0.000153) (0.000148) (0.000153) (0.000148) (0.000153) (0.000149)
hh size -0.158*** -0.158*** -0.160*** -0.161*** -0.159*** -0.160***
(0.0300) (0.0298) (0.0297) (0.0294) (0.0295) (0.0292)
hh size sq 0.00613*** 0.00612*** 0.00620*** 0.00627*** 0.00616*** 0.00623***
(0.00226) (0.00223) (0.00225) (0.00222) (0.00224) (0.00221)
No of children -0.0527** -0.0516** -0.0526** -0.0519** -0.0532** -0.0525**
(0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0231) (0.0233)
Married hh head (yes=1) 0.0344 0.0346 0.0316 0.0314 0.0326 0.0321
(0.0865) (0.0837) (0.0865) (0.0838) (0.0865) (0.0839)
hh head sex (male=1) -0.0222 -0.0320 -0.0191 -0.0273 -0.0207 -0.0277
(0.0915) (0.0895) (0.0915) (0.0894) (0.0915) (0.0895)
Prim educ (yes=1) 0.0401 0.0394 0.0405 0.0397 0.0401 0.0391
(0.0461) (0.0464) (0.0465) (0.0468) (0.0464) (0.0467)
Low secondary educ (yes=1) 0.0830 0.0815 0.0838 0.0814 0.0832 0.0805
(0.0582) (0.0584) (0.0584) (0.0586) (0.0583) (0.0584)
Upper secondary educ (yes=1) 0.0132 0.00630 0.0144 0.00735 0.0138 0.00624
(0.0819) (0.0812) (0.0822) (0.0813) (0.0820) (0.0812)
Tech/voc edu (yes=1) 0.0698 0.0696 0.0735 0.0729 0.0720 0.0707
(0.0665) (0.0669) (0.0666) (0.0670) (0.0665) (0.0669)
Univers. Edu (yes=1) 0.235* 0.226+ 0.238* 0.227+ 0.237* 0.226+
(0.138) (0.139) (0.138) (0.140) (0.138) (0.140)
Geographical loc (urban=1) 0.172** 0.157* 0.171** 0.154* 0.173** 0.155*
(0.0708) (0.0853) (0.0707) (0.0853) (0.0706) (0.0851)
pos. Income shocks 2.356*** 2.379*** 2.550*** 2.681*** 2.502*** 2.636***
(0.569) (0.569) (0.536) (0.532) (0.535) (0.531)
neg. Income shocks 2.298*** 2.128*** 2.296*** 2.194*** 2.265*** 2.175***
(0.538) (0.539) (0.507) (0.507) (0.505) (0.504)
cons 8.240*** 8.217*** 8.237*** 8.219*** 8.223*** 8.204***
(0.546) (0.539) (0.540) (0.534) (0.543) (0.538)
Fixed effects:
trade-related:
Exporting industries -0.0943* -0.0919* -0.0914*
(0.0508) (0.0502) (0.0502)
Import-competing industries -0.0623+ -0.0558 -0.0506
(0.0411) (0.0408) (0.0409)
Rice -0.0401+ -0.0417+ -0.0411+
(0.0271) (0.0269) (0.0269)
Main export crops -0.172*** -0.171*** -0.172***
(0.0526) (0.0522) (0.0523)
Other export crops -0.0810+ -0.0809+ -0.0813+
(0.0552) (0.0556) (0.0554)
import-competing crops -0.144*** -0.123*** -0.115***
(0.0537) (0.0447) (0.0435)
Non-traded food -0.0485 -0.0486 -0.0527
(0.0995) (0.0976) (0.0976)
household yes yes yes yes yes yes
years yes yes yes yes yes yes
No Obs. 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976
Adj R-sq 0.823 0.824 0.824 0.825 0.825 0.826
Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p ≤ 0.15 ∗ p ≤ 0.10; ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01
In the fixed effects specification the category ”non-traded activities” and year 2002 act, respectively, as the benchmark
from trade-related and year fixed effects.
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the k trade cluster fixed effects turn out to be zero for any household that
does not change trade group over the period under observation (for more
details, see Andrews et al., 2006). This identification strategy looks rea-
sonable since the kernel densities of log consumption of both moving and
non-moving households look quite similar (see Fig. 4A-1 in the Appendix),
whereas the lack of a significant correlation across households between the
permanent component of ex-ante risk (filtered out from the residuals of the
income regression as shown in Eq. 10) and the trade-related fixed effects on
consumption supports the assumption of exogeneity of the moving decision
with regard to risk (see Table 4A-6 in the Appendix). Hence, our identifica-
tion strategy based on moving households does not seem to be affected by
any significant bias. For a closer look into how many households move from
one trade group to another over the course of the panel and what the origin
and destination trade groups are, see Tables 4A-3 and 4A-4 in Appendix 4A.
Specifically, Tab. 4A-3 derives the number of moving households by trade
categories by decomposing the between and within variation of the panel.
The between variation looks at the variation across households whereas the
within variation indicates the percentage of households that are always in the
reference trade category. In practice, when looking at a specific trade cate-
gory, the between variation tells us how many households have been in that
trade category at least once, whereas the within variation tells us how many
of these households have always been in that trade category (the latter is a
measure of stability of the trade-related status). For example, focusing on
“exporting industries”, the table shows that 78 households have ever been in
that category over the course of the panel (7.89% of the 988 total households
in the panel). This figure includes 47 households that have always been in
that category (i.e., 60.26% of the 78 households that have ever been in this
specific trade category). This means that 31 households out of 78 (3.14% of
the total households in the sample) have not always been in the same trade
category over the course of the panel. Looking at all trade categories, the
table confirms that, notwithstanding some heterogeneity across groups, 496
households in the panel actually move across trade-related categories over
the course of the panel (i.e., 50.2% of the 988 total households in the panel).
Another way to look at the issue is to compute the between total percentage
for the entire panel time frame (i.e., the fraction of total households that have
ever been in one of the possible trade categories: [1484/988]∗100 = 150.2%).
This confirms that 50.2% of the households have been counted more than once
because they actually moved across groups. Tab. 4A-4 shows the details of
the transition matrices by trade group of origin and trade group of desti-
nation (i.e., the frequencies and associated percentages of households that
moved across trade categories over the periods 2002-2004 and 2004-2006).
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Specifically, the frequencies (and associated percentages) of the households
that changed trade categories from one survey to another for both periods
are those that lie off the diagonal of the respective transition matrix.
Third, as expected, the ex-ante permanent component of risk is signif-
icantly and negatively correlated with household consumption. This also
shows the consistency of our empirical exercise with the theoretical predic-
tion of precautionary saving behaviour under risk. In other words, our con-
sumption estimates confirm that Vietnamese households register, generally
speaking, a lower path of consumption because of ex-ante risk (as a function
of mitigating strategies) even when they do not experience any shock. In line
with the outcomes in Essay 2, the overall loss due to permanent risk is tiny
but statistically significant (about 0.03% of annual real per capita consump-
tion for the average consumer characterised by a concave utility function).
To be consistent with the outcomes in Essay 3, even if in this case the
adopted panel fixed effect specification softens the risk of residual endogene-
ity, we report in Table 2 the outcomes of the same estimates where in the
scaling factor we proxy household wealth with the same index of house char-
acteristics and land physical availability applied in Essay 3. It is useful to
recall that this is derived by applying principal component analysis to avail-
able VHLSS data and is not influenced by monetary terms. Table 2 shows
that the permanent risk coefficients in this case decline both in magnitude
and significance. However, it is apparent that the negative relation is still
significant when we assume that the poorer households are characterised by
a higher degree of concavity of the utility function (i.e., when we adopt the
square of the scaling factor in the estimates). It is worth noting that, also in
this case, we face a slight reduction in the number of observations because
of the availability of data for the variables included in the index (see Ta-
bles 4A-1 and 4A-2 in Appendix 4A). As largely expected, the magnitude
of the phenomenon actually decreases along with the number of additional
controls to soften endogeneity in the estimates. Since we are working with
a very short panel a prudent interpretation is to see the difference between
the coefficients in Table 1 and Table 2 as upper bounds and lower bounds,
respectively, of the true parameters.
As a further robustness check, we also run another income equation by
controlling for an additional time trend component by trade categories in
order to capture additional predictable linear unobservable components in
the model (which may not be captured by the existing ones). The outcomes
of the income equation that includes the linear trend by trade categories as
well as the parameters for the fresh consumption equation are reported in
Appendix 4B. As can be seen from Table 4B-2, whereas the outcomes are
of course different in detail, the parameters for the consumption equation
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Table 2: Panel regression on household consumption in Vietnam (2002-06):
permanent risk with an index of house characteristics and land physical availability as a
measure for wealth in the scaling factor
dep.var.: log of real pc consumption 1 (with pi) 2 (with pi2) 3 (with pi3)
Ex-ante components
permanent risk
(expected wealth in scaling factor=
Index of house charact. & land ) -0.000000155 -0.000000106 -1.69e-13*** -1.78e-13*** -5.77e-21 -5.90e-21
(0.000000276) (0.000000290) (4.12e-14) (4.23e-14) (8.98e-21) (9.24e-21)
transitory risk 6.59e-08 4.09e-08 7.95e-14*** 8.37e-14*** 2.72e-21 2.78e-21
(0.000000131) (0.000000138) (1.94e-14) (1.99e-14) (4.27e-21) (4.39e-21)
Ex-post components
Age hh head 0.0309*** 0.0321*** 0.0308*** 0.0322*** 0.0309*** 0.0321***
(0.00913) (0.00902) (0.00910) (0.00899) (0.00912) (0.00901)
Age sq. hh head -0.000301*** -0.000310*** -0.000300*** -0.000311*** -0.000300*** -0.000311***
(0.0000842) (0.0000833) (0.0000839) (0.0000830) (0.0000841) (0.0000832)
hh size -0.148*** -0.149*** -0.147*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.149***
(0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0265)
hh size sq 0.00607*** 0.00619*** 0.00601*** 0.00613*** 0.00608*** 0.00620***
(0.00224) (0.00223) (0.00223) (0.00223) (0.00224) (0.00223)
No of children -0.0417*** -0.0414*** -0.0423*** -0.0418*** -0.0417*** -0.0413***
(0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0149)
Married hh head (yes=1) -0.0309 -0.0348 -0.0312 -0.0343 -0.0310 -0.0346
(0.0569) (0.0559) (0.0569) (0.0558) (0.0569) (0.0559)
hh head sex (male=1) -0.0275 -0.0230 -0.0272 -0.0238 -0.0274 -0.0231
(0.0654) (0.0646) (0.0655) (0.0645) (0.0654) (0.0646)
Prim educ (yes=1) 0.0319 0.0305 0.0324 0.0307 0.0321 0.0305
(0.0369) (0.0363) (0.0369) (0.0363) (0.0369) (0.0363)
Low secondary educ (yes=1) 0.0672+ 0.0666+ 0.0660+ 0.0651+ 0.0676+ 0.0671+
(0.0450) (0.0448) (0.0449) (0.0447) (0.0450) (0.0448)
Upper secondary educ (yes=1) 0.0316 0.0286 0.0281 0.0248 0.0316 0.0285
(0.0656) (0.0654) (0.0656) (0.0654) (0.0656) (0.0654)
Tech/voc edu (yes=1) 0.0771 0.0775 0.0710 0.0713 0.0763 0.0767
(0.0555) (0.0556) (0.0556) (0.0556) (0.0556) (0.0557)
Univers. Edu (yes=1) 0.0980 0.0921 0.0947 0.0889 0.0978 0.0919
(0.107) (0.109) (0.107) (0.108) (0.107) (0.109)
Geographical loc (urban=1) 0.0187 0.0156 0.0194 0.0172 0.0188 0.0158
(0.0753) (0.0760) (0.0753) (0.0760) (0.0753) (0.0760)
pos. Income shocks 2.864*** 2.946*** 2.895*** 2.988*** 2.869*** 2.952***
(0.421) (0.423) (0.422) (0.424) (0.422) (0.423)
neg. Income shocks 2.356*** 2.267*** 2.332*** 2.229*** 2.353*** 2.261***
(0.438) (0.441) (0.438) (0.441) (0.438) (0.441)
cons 8.119*** 8.084*** 8.117*** 8.076*** 8.120*** 8.083***
(0.357) (0.358) (0.357) (0.358) (0.357) (0.358)
Fixed effects:
trade-related:
Exporting industries -0.00318 -0.00458 -0.00351
(0.0552) (0.0552) (0.0552)
Import-competing industries -0.00860 -0.0180 -0.0106
(0.0392) (0.0391) (0.0392)
Rice -0.0312 -0.0330 -0.0316
(0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250)
Main export crops -0.105** -0.106** -0.105**
(0.0512) (0.0513) (0.0512)
Other export crops -0.0460 -0.0461 -0.0461
(0.0433) (0.0431) (0.0432)
import-competing crops -0.0866* -0.0948** -0.0884*
(0.0460) (0.0457) (0.0456)
Non-traded food -0.0156 -0.0176 -0.0160
(0.0767) (0.0765) (0.0767)
household yes yes yes yes yes yes
years yes yes yes yes yes yes
No Obs. 2341 2341 2341 2341 2341 2341
Adj R-sq 0.832 0.832 0.833 0.833 0.832 0.832
Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p ≤ 0.15 ∗ p ≤ 0.10; ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01
In the fixed effects specification the category ”non-traded activities” and year 2002 act, respectively, as the benchmark
from trade-related and year fixed effects.
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are consistent with those in Tables 1 and 2. The relationship between ex-
pected consumption and the permanent risk components (computed using
the new set of income residuals) is still negative and statistically significant
(even if smaller in magnitude). It is worth noting that the presence of the
additional time trend component actually reduces both the magnitude and
significance of the coefficients associated with the observed characteristics in
the income equation (see Table 4B-1), highlighting that our preferred speci-
fication (without time trend) does not leave out relevant non-random trends
in income that inflate our permanent proxy for income risk.
Table 3 reports the outcomes of the various components of our vulner-
ability measure (Eq.4) by column both for the overall sample and for the
subsample of households classified as vulnerable (about 20% of the sample).
The first three columns in Table 3 show overall vulnerability, in utils, as well
as the relative weights of its poverty and risk components. Of course, if we
look at the entire sample, the average level of vulnerability is negative and
so is its poverty-induced component, whe all the components are positive if
we select only the sub-sample of households classified as vulnerable. Note
that the risk-induced vulnerability sub-components (trade-related included,
see section 3) are, on average, positive for all sampled households. It also
demonstrates that the households not classified as vulnerable show, on aver-
age, positive risk-induced vulnerability.
Again for sensitivity purposes, we present the vulnerability outcomes for
different values of the CRRA utility derived for different levels of the risk
aversion parameter (γ = 1; 2; 3). Total vulnerability is the sum of risk-
induced and poverty components. As expected, if we increase our risk aver-
sion parameter, the vulnerability estimates also increase in magnitude, but
the relative pattern across its components does not change much. For in-
stance, “risk-induced” vulnerability (reported in the “overall risk” column in
Table 2) actually doubles for the entire sample (from 3% to 6% of overall
vulnerability) and becomes more than five times larger for vulnerable house-
holds (from 3% to 16%), but its relative contribution on overall vulnerability
does not change. Acknowledging that the overall risk-induced component in-
cludes both unexplained risk and measurement error, the columns from four
to eight report the further decomposition of overall risk proposed in Eq.4.
The fourth column shows the meso (trade-related) component of overall risk-
induced vulnerability, cleaned by unobservables and measurement errors. It
turns out to be the main component of risk-induced vulnerability, on av-
erage, for all sampled households ranging from 4% to 12% (and from 6%
to 49% for vulnerable households). This confirms our intuition that trade-
related risks (i.e., risks that are not fully shared across households clustered
by trade-related industries) matter in determining household risk-induced
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vulnerability. The fifth column filters out the component of truly covariate
shocks. The sixth column isolates the component of vulnerability due to the
ex-ante permanent risk. It shows once again that the relative weight of the
ex-ante risk component is low compared with the others (even if we are here
assuming this to be a lower bound of the possible true influence of this com-
ponent in vulnerability analysis). The seventh column refers to the ex-post
idiosyncratic components of risk. The last one is the residual unexplained
sub-component. All these sub-components sum together to form the overall
risk component.
Fig.1 provides a breakdown of the sub-components of the VEU overall
risk component for the sub-sample of households classified as vulnerable (for
the sake of brevity, only when γ = 2). It is clear from Fig.1 that the risk-
sharing deviations by categories of households classified by trade exposure are
significant and, in some cases (e.g., exporting industries, rice, other export
crops, and import competing crops), represent the most significant compo-
nent. Fig.2 reports the same statistics, but is computed by reversing the or-
der of the decomposition of the VEU overall risk between aggregate/covariate
risk and risk by trade groups (i.e., assuming deviations from risk sharing by
trade categories to be a residual subcomponent of the VEU overall risk com-
ponent). Table 4A-7 in Appendix 4A shows the full statistics. As largely
expected, in the latter case, the relative weight of the risk-sharing deviations
by trade categories is greatly reduced and is no longer the most significant
component. However, also in this case, the sub-component of risk-sharing
deviations by trade categories is different from zero, in line with the statis-
tical significance of the fixed effects by trade categories in Tables 1 and 2.
This exercise highlights the need to include a trade meso component of risk
in VEU.
Unfortunately, we cannot assess the separate impacts of the ex-ante per-
manent risk on the poverty and the risk components of vulnerability. We
can only test for the presence of possible correlations between the ex-ante
permanent risk and the various components of VEU. To test this we also
relax the assumption of homogeneity across the conditional distribution of
vulnerability by applying a quantile regression framework.23 Fig. 3 plots
the values of the quantile estimated coefficients of the relationship between
the ex-ante permanent risk and the various components of our extended vul-
nerability measure for each 5% of vulnerability distribution (reported on the
23The quantile approach assumes that the conditional distribution of the dependent
variable is not homogeneous across households. It applies a linear programming approach
to obtaining the coefficient estimates which does not involve simply running a set of sep-
arate OLS regressions. It is worth noting that the precision of the estimates is dependent
on the density of the points in each quantile.
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Table 3: Vulnerability decomposition in utils (all sample and vulnerable
households) in Vietnam in the period 2002-06
Overall Vulnerability (V) Poverty induced (P) Overall Risk (V-P) Risk by trade ctgs Aggr. risk Ex.ante iid risk Ex-post iid risk unexpl. risk
all sample
γ = 1
Exporting industries -0.485 -0.524 0.039 0.042 -0.010 -0.00000781 -0.003 0.009
Import-competing industries -0.642 -0.667 0.025 0.022 -0.015 0.00000003 0.000 0.017
Non-traded industries -0.704 -0.735 0.032 0.025 -0.008 0.00000031 -0.002 0.017
Rice -0.242 -0.274 0.033 0.027 0.008 0.00001460 0.024 -0.026
Main export crops -0.423 -0.473 0.050 0.008 0.006 0.00000473 0.018 0.019
Other export crops -0.328 -0.354 0.026 0.025 0.007 0.00000535 0.022 -0.029
import-competing crops -0.273 -0.308 0.036 0.025 0.009 0.00000154 0.009 -0.007
non-traded crops -0.673 -0.706 0.033 0.024 -0.001 0.00000734 0.009 0.001
All -0.415 -0.449 0.034 0.025 0.002 0.00000730 0.014 -0.007
γ = 2
Exporting industries -0.300 -0.350 0.050 0.045 -0.007 0.00000065 0.016 -0.004
Import-competing industries -0.419 -0.447 0.028 0.016 -0.009 0.00000202 0.007 0.012
Non-traded industries -0.435 -0.467 0.033 0.021 -0.005 0.00000288 0.003 0.013
Rice -0.113 -0.164 0.052 0.067 0.009 0.00003850 -0.017 -0.006
Main export crops -0.229 -0.303 0.074 0.023 0.005 0.00001080 0.041 0.005
Other export crops -0.163 -0.201 0.038 0.076 0.009 0.00002550 0.028 -0.075
import-competing crops -0.128 -0.180 0.052 0.066 0.009 0.00002010 -0.004 -0.020
non-traded crops -0.441 -0.471 0.030 0.025 0.000 0.00000731 0.018 -0.013
All -0.235 -0.281 0.046 0.048 0.003 0.00002190 -0.002 -0.003
γ = 3
Exporting industries -0.192 -0.250 0.058 0.055 -0.007 0.00001120 0.087 -0.079
Import-competing industries -0.295 -0.324 0.029 0.015 -0.006 0.00000330 0.017 0.002
Non-traded industries -0.297 -0.328 0.031 0.022 -0.003 0.00000639 0.008 0.004
Rice 0.003 -0.076 0.080 0.194 0.012 0.00017210 2.506 -2.657
Main export crops -0.095 -0.201 0.106 0.051 0.006 0.00002780 0.098 -0.049
Other export crops -0.030 -0.086 0.057 0.222 0.013 0.00012950 0.286 -0.466
import-competing crops -0.011 -0.085 0.074 0.187 0.012 0.00011180 0.302 -0.429
non-traded crops -0.315 -0.342 0.026 0.029 0.000 0.00001020 0.047 -0.049
All -0.111 -0.175 0.064 0.123 0.006 0.00009630 1.204 -1.287
Overall Vulnerability (V) Poverty induced (P) Overall Risk (V-P) Risk by trade ctgs Aggr. risk Ex.ante iid risk Ex-post iid risk unexpl. risk
only vulnerable
γ = 1
Exporting industries 0.177 0.138 0.039 0.108 -0.021 -0.00001520 -0.043 -0.005
Import-competing industries 0.237 0.192 0.045 -0.041 -0.015 0.00000030 0.088 0.013
Non-traded industries 0.135 0.105 0.031 0.040 -0.009 0.00001240 0.033 -0.033
Rice 0.275 0.241 0.034 0.065 0.015 0.00003400 0.049 -0.095
Main export crops 0.284 0.229 0.055 0.017 0.011 0.00001440 0.014 0.014
Other export crops 0.342 0.311 0.031 0.073 0.018 0.00000592 -0.005 -0.055
import-competing crops 0.282 0.249 0.033 0.054 0.015 -0.00000003 0.006 -0.042
non-traded crops 0.269 0.214 0.054 0.383 -0.005 0.00011960 0.466 -0.790
All 0.266 0.230 0.036 0.060 0.011 0.00002470 0.037 -0.073
γ = 2
Exporting industries 0.238 0.158 0.080 0.164 -0.024 0.00000699 0.075 -0.135
Import-competing industries 0.320 0.220 0.100 -0.010 -0.019 0.00000102 0.185 -0.056
Non-traded industries 0.162 0.101 0.061 0.092 -0.010 0.00003140 0.045 -0.066
Rice 0.358 0.275 0.083 0.180 0.020 0.00010780 -0.106 -0.010
Main export crops 0.355 0.208 0.147 0.075 0.014 0.00003770 0.103 -0.046
Other export crops 0.471 0.402 0.069 0.243 0.028 0.00008010 0.026 -0.229
import-competing crops 0.382 0.307 0.074 0.180 0.021 0.00005600 -0.065 -0.062
non-traded crops 0.368 0.239 0.130 0.576 -0.006 0.00021620 1.073 -1.513
All 0.346 0.261 0.085 0.167 0.016 0.00008670 -0.058 -0.039
γ = 3
Exporting industries 0.249 0.128 0.121 0.209 -0.024 0.00004770 0.439 -0.503
Import-competing industries 0.445 0.256 0.189 0.041 -0.023 0.00001510 0.391 -0.222
Non-traded industries 0.189 0.083 0.106 0.142 -0.011 0.00005930 0.077 -0.103
Rice 0.534 0.365 0.169 0.569 0.031 0.00052040 7.712 -8.249
Main export crops 0.495 0.213 0.282 0.181 0.017 0.00010060 0.312 -0.228
Other export crops 0.664 0.524 0.140 0.752 0.043 0.00044680 0.962 -1.617
import-competing crops 0.537 0.388 0.150 0.557 0.032 0.00034240 0.891 -1.330
non-traded crops 0.525 0.267 0.258 0.876 -0.007 0.00039110 2.516 -3.127
All 0.495 0.327 0.168 0.489 0.024 0.00040410 5.222 -5.614
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Figure 1: Comparison between the sub-components of the VEU overall risk
by clusters of households computed as in Eq.3 (vulnerable households)
horizontal axis) across all the sampled households (for the sake of brevity,
also in this case, only the estimates for γ = 2 have been shown in the figure.
The outcomes of the regressions for the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of
vulnerability distribution for different values of the γ parameters are reported
in Tabs. 4A-8, 4A-9 and 4A-10 in the Appendix).
The OLS (mean) regression coefficients are also reported in the graphs
(represented by the dashed line) as well as the confidence intervals both for
the quantile regressions (represented by the grey areas) and the OLS ones
(represented by the lighter dotted lines). Even if based on different scales,
the graphs clearly show that the ex-ante permanent risk correlates with vul-
nerability both via its poverty-induced and its risk-induced components (see
the first three graphs reported in the first row of Fig. 3). Within the risk
components (see the graphs in the second row), there is, on average, a nega-
tive correlation with aggregate vulnerability (the mean regression coefficient
is negative) and a positive correlation with trade-related vulnerability and
idiosyncratic vulnerability. The main feature of Fig. 3 is, however, that the
relative impact of the ex-ante permanent risk actually increases moving up
across different quantiles of vulnerability distribution (with the most vulner-
able households being the most severely affected). This pattern is confirmed,
with some degree of heterogeneity, for all the sub-components in our extended
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Figure 2: Comparison between the sub-components of the VEU overall risk
by clusters of households computed reversing the order in Eq.3 (vulnerable
households)
vulnerability measure. Note that in this case, running a simple OLS, which
assumes homogeneity in the conditional distribution of vulnerability, would
underestimate the relationship between ex-ante risk and the aggregate com-
ponent of vulnerability and overestimate the relation with the trade-related
and idiosyncratic components, respectively.
4.6 Conclusions
This paper addresses the timely issue of trade-induced vulnerability using
the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) panel data for the
period 2002-2004-2006. The added value of this exercise stands in propos-
ing an extended version of the VEU measure of vulnerability that is able to
address the presence of trade-related heterogeneity in households’ exposure
to risk more appropriately and overcome the most common weaknesses of
current available measures of vulnerability. More specifically, we present a
method of decomposing the impact on vulnerability of the ex-ante risk and
its correlated risk-mitigating strategies from the ex-post ones and looking
separately at the relationship between ex-ante risk, risk premium and mean
consumption. Our empirical results reveal a number of useful insights for
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Figure 3: Permanent risk correlates with VEU components by quantiles of
the households’ vulnerability distribution
Legend:
v=vulnerability; p=poverty induced; r=risk induced;
a= aggregate risk; tr=trade-related risk; id=idiosyncratic risk
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policymaking: first, the risk-induced component of vulnerability consistently
matters in determining households’ overall vulnerability and second, the pres-
ence of a relative inability, on average, to share risks across households in-
volved in different trade-related clusters. This confirms our intuition that
trade-related risks (i.e., risks that are not fully shared across trade-related
industries) matter in determining household overall vulnerability. Third, we
show that the ex-ante permanent risk is significantly correlated with both
poverty, via the precautionary saving channel, and all the subcomponents
of the risk components of vulnerability (trade-related included). Fourth, we
show that the relative impact of the ex-ante permanent risk actually increases
along with the increase in the upper percentiles of vulnerability distribution
(with the most vulnerable households being the most severely affected).
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Appendix 4A - Tables & Figures
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Figure 4A-1: Kernel density of log-consumption between moving and not-
moving households
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4.6 Conclusions
Table 4A-5: Panel regression on household income in Vietnam (2002-06)
dep.var.: log real pc income Coeff. Std. Err.
Age hh head 0.00912 0.0167
Age sq. hh head -0.000105 0.000161
hh size -0.164*** 0.0280
hh size sq 0.00719*** 0.00215
No of children -0.0490*** 0.0173
Married hh head (yes=1) 0.0259 0.0781
hh head sex (male=1) -0.0939 0.0948
Prim educ (yes=1) 0.0266 0.0384
Low secondary educ (yes=1) 0.0341 0.0500
Upper secondary educ (yes=1) 0.0106 0.0769
Tech/voc edu (yes=1) 0.117* 0.0686
Univers. Edu (yes=1) -0.0366 0.124
Geographical loc (urban=1) -0.338*** 0.111
Cons 9.706*** 0.695
Fixed effects:
household yes
year yes
trade categories yes
No Obs. 2964
Adj R-sq 0.725
Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p ≤ 0.15 ∗ p ≤ 0.10; ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01
In the fixed effects specification the category ”non-traded activities” and year 2002 act, respectively, as the benchmark
from trade-related and year fixed effects.
Table 4A-6: Correlation matrix across aggregate and trade ex-ante perma-
nent risk
Risk by trade categories Aggregate Risk
Exporting industries 0.0343
Import-competing industries -0.0919
Non-traded industries 0.1312
Rice 0.266
Main export crops 0.189
Other export crops -0.1587
import-competing crops -0.9389
Non traded crops 0.1732
166
4.6 Conclusions
Table 4A-7: Vulnerability decomposition in utils (all sample and vulnerable
households) in Vietnam in the period 2002-06 computed reversing the order
in Eq.3
Overall Vulnerability (V) Poverty induced (P) Overall Risk (V-P) Aggr. risk Risk by trade ctgs Ex.ante iid risk Ex-post iid risk unexpl. risk
all sample
γ = 1
Exporting industries -0.485 -0.524 0.039 0.011 0.022 0.010 -0.002 -0.002
Import-competing industries -0.642 -0.667 0.025 0.007 -0.003 0.018 -0.001 0.002
Non-traded industries -0.704 -0.735 0.032 0.007 0.010 0.008 -0.002 0.009
Rice -0.242 -0.274 0.033 0.019 0.016 -0.009 0.024 -0.017
Main export crops -0.423 -0.473 0.050 0.013 0.001 -0.006 0.018 0.025
Other export crops -0.328 -0.354 0.025 0.019 0.014 -0.009 0.022 -0.020
import-competing crops -0.273 -0.308 0.035 0.018 0.013 -0.007 0.008 0.003
non-traded crops -0.673 -0.706 0.033 0.007 0.017 0.001 0.009 0.000
All -0.415 -0.449 0.033 0.014 0.012 -0.002 0.013 -0.005
γ = 2
Exporting industries -0.300 -0.350 0.050 0.020 0.017 0.009 0.022 -0.018
Import-competing industries -0.419 -0.447 0.028 0.011 -0.006 0.011 0.007 0.003
Non-traded industries -0.435 -0.467 0.032 0.012 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.008
Rice -0.113 -0.164 0.052 0.056 0.019 -0.013 -0.178 0.169
Main export crops -0.229 -0.303 0.074 0.028 0.000 -0.006 0.040 0.012
Other export crops -0.163 -0.201 0.038 0.056 0.030 -0.017 0.023 -0.055
import-competing crops -0.128 -0.179 0.052 0.051 0.020 -0.010 -0.009 -0.001
non-traded crops -0.441 -0.471 0.030 0.009 0.016 0.001 0.019 -0.014
All -0.235 -0.281 0.046 0.038 0.013 -0.006 -0.076 0.078
γ = 3
Exporting industries -0.192 -0.250 0.058 0.032 0.016 0.010 0.126 -0.127
Import-competing industries -0.295 -0.324 0.029 0.016 -0.008 0.009 0.020 -0.009
Non-traded industries -0.297 -0.328 0.031 0.016 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.000
Rice 0.003 -0.076 0.079 0.183 0.021 -0.036 28.423 -28.785
Main export crops -0.095 -0.201 0.106 0.056 0.001 -0.009 0.091 -0.034
Other export crops -0.030 -0.086 0.057 0.159 0.080 -0.047 0.173 -0.312
import-competing crops -0.011 -0.085 0.074 0.138 0.050 -0.025 0.219 -0.311
non-traded crops -0.315 -0.342 0.026 0.011 0.018 0.001 0.049 -0.052
All -0.111 -0.175 0.063 0.110 0.018 -0.019 13.193 -13.441
Overall Vulnerability (V) Poverty induced (P) Overall Risk (V-P) Aggr. risk Risk by trade ctgs Ex.ante iid risk Ex-post iid risk unexpl. risk
only vulnerable
γ = 1 0.177 0.139 0.039 0.030 0.058 0.023 -0.040 -0.032
Exporting industries 0.237 0.192 0.045 0.033 -0.093 0.020 0.095 -0.011
Import-competing industries 0.135 0.105 0.030 0.028 0.004 0.008 0.033 -0.043
Non-traded industries 0.275 0.241 0.034 0.043 0.037 -0.017 0.048 -0.077
Rice 0.284 0.229 0.055 0.037 -0.009 -0.012 0.013 0.027
Main export crops 0.342 0.311 0.031 0.048 0.045 -0.024 -0.004 -0.034
Other export crops 0.282 0.249 0.033 0.042 0.023 -0.013 0.005 -0.024
import-competing crops 0.269 0.214 0.054 0.034 0.345 0.007 0.477 -0.808
non-traded crops 0.266 0.230 0.035 0.041 0.030 -0.013 0.036 -0.059
All
γ = 2
Exporting industries 0.24 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.11 -0.21
Import-competing industries 0.32 0.22 0.10 0.09 -0.12 0.03 0.22 -0.12
Non-traded industries 0.16 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.08
Rice 0.36 0.28 0.08 0.15 0.05 -0.03 -0.62 0.54
Main export crops 0.36 0.21 0.15 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 0.10 -0.02
Other export crops 0.47 0.40 0.07 0.18 0.10 -0.05 0.01 -0.16
import-competing crops 0.38 0.31 0.07 0.14 0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01
non-traded crops 0.37 0.24 0.13 0.09 0.48 0.01 1.11 -1.57
All 0.35 0.26 0.08 0.14 0.05 -0.03 -0.40 0.33
γ = 3
Exporting industries 0.249 0.128 0.121 0.130 0.056 0.038 0.647 -0.750
Import-competing industries 0.445 0.256 0.188 0.189 -0.176 0.046 0.514 -0.384
Non-traded industries 0.189 0.083 0.106 0.116 0.016 0.008 0.080 -0.115
Rice 0.534 0.365 0.169 0.537 0.058 -0.107 88.162 -89.699
Main export crops 0.495 0.213 0.282 0.197 0.002 -0.029 0.286 -0.173
Other export crops 0.664 0.524 0.140 0.543 0.273 -0.161 0.559 -1.074
import-competing crops 0.537 0.388 0.149 0.413 0.148 -0.072 0.626 -0.965
non-traded crops 0.525 0.267 0.257 0.180 0.690 0.022 2.646 -3.280
All 0.495 0.327 0.168 0.443 0.066 -0.083 57.869 -58.648
167
4.6 Conclusions
T
ab
le
4A
-8
:
P
er
m
an
en
t
ri
sk
an
d
ot
h
er
co
va
ri
at
es
co
rr
el
at
es
w
it
h
th
e
va
ri
ou
s
co
m
p
on
en
ts
of
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
(fi
rs
t
q
u
ar
ti
le
:
25
th
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
)
rh
o1
rh
o2
rh
o3
O
ve
ra
ll
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
(V
)
P
ov
er
ty
in
d
u
ce
d
(P
)
O
ve
ra
ll
R
is
k
(V
-P
)
T
ra
d
e-
re
la
te
d
ri
sk
A
gg
r.
ri
sk
ex
-p
o
st
id
.
ri
sk
O
ve
ra
ll
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
(V
)
P
ov
er
ty
in
d
u
ce
d
(P
)
O
ve
ra
ll
R
is
k
(V
-P
)
T
ra
d
e-
re
la
te
d
ri
sk
A
gg
r.
ri
sk
ex
-p
o
st
id
.
ri
sk
O
v
er
a
ll
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
(V
)
P
ov
er
ty
in
d
u
ce
d
(P
)
O
ve
ra
ll
R
is
k
(V
-P
)
T
ra
d
e-
re
la
te
d
ri
sk
A
g
gr
.
ri
sk
ex
-p
os
t
id
.
ri
sk
q
2
5
v
p
r
tr
a
id
to
t
v
p
r
tr
a
id
to
t
v
p
r
tr
a
id
to
t
E
x-
a
n
te
co
m
po
n
en
ts
p
er
m
ri
sk
0
.6
46
**
0.
59
6*
0.
04
8
5*
-0
.0
07
41
-0
.5
45
**
*
-0
.0
0
35
1
0.
70
6
**
*
0
.5
45
*
*
0.
06
88
**
*
-0
.0
0
12
6
-0
.3
13
**
*
-0
.0
03
92
0
.7
88
*
**
0.
54
5*
**
0.
0
82
8*
*
*
0.
02
8
2
-0
.1
09
**
*
-0
.0
10
1
(2
.8
4
)
(2
.4
3)
(2
.0
8)
(-
1.
51
)
(-
21
.2
5)
(-
0.
4
4)
(3
.3
4
)
(3
.0
8
)
(3
.7
5
)
(-
0.
1
5)
(-
10
.1
2)
(-
0.
30
)
(3
.9
5)
(3
.6
8)
(4
.1
7)
(1
.8
9)
(-
5.
34
)
(-
0.
55
)
tr
an
s
ri
sk
0.
73
9
**
0.
63
9*
0.
04
21
-0
.0
06
50
-0
.5
87
**
*
-0
.0
0
83
8
0
.9
0
5*
**
0
.6
7
3*
**
0
.0
61
9
**
0
.0
0
85
6
-0
.3
42
*
**
-0
.0
2
18
0.
97
4*
**
0.
66
5*
*
*
0
.0
79
8
**
*
0.
04
61
**
-0
.1
14
**
*
-0
.0
38
9
(2
.9
7
)
(2
.2
7)
(1
.6
8)
(-
1.
19
)
(-
20
.2
8)
(-
0.
9
7)
(4
.1
1
)
(3
.8
2
)
(2
.8
7
)
(0
.9
4
)
(-
10
.0
8)
(-
1.
45
)
(4
.4
9
)
(3
.9
6)
(4
.0
1)
(2
.7
7)
(-
5.
22
)
(-
1.
92
)
E
x-
po
st
co
m
po
n
en
ts
A
ge
h
h
h
ea
d
0.
0
02
02
-0
.0
00
98
8
-0
.0
00
31
0
-0
.0
00
12
4
0.
0
00
36
2
-0
.0
0
00
3
48
-0
.0
0
57
9
-0
.0
06
84
-0
.0
00
5
88
-0
.0
0
01
66
0.
00
0
11
9
0
.0
0
00
09
4
7
-0
.0
03
27
-0
.0
02
9
1
-0
.0
00
70
2
-0
.0
00
03
12
0.
00
00
5
93
0.
00
00
67
9
(0
.2
4
)
(-
0.
1
0)
(-
0
.7
5)
(-
0
.8
8
)
(1
.5
0)
(-
0
.1
4
)
(-
1.
36
)
(-
1
.7
4)
(-
1
.1
3)
(-
0
.6
3
)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.0
3
)
(-
1.
10
)
(-
0.
97
)
(-
1.
59
)
(-
0.
1
1)
(0
.4
2)
(0
.1
1)
A
ge
sq
.
h
h
h
ea
d
-0
.0
0
00
5
20
-0
.0
00
01
90
0.
00
00
0
41
1
0.
00
00
00
91
1
-0
.0
0
00
03
12
-0
.0
00
00
0
10
3
0.
0
00
04
4
6
0.
0
00
05
7
0
0.
00
00
06
1
5
0.
00
0
00
08
9
5
-0
.0
00
00
1
22
-0
.0
00
0
00
15
3
0.
00
00
2
14
0.
00
0
02
27
0.
00
00
06
8
6
-0
.0
00
00
0
47
3
-0
.0
00
0
00
65
1
-0
.0
00
00
08
33
(-
0
.5
7)
(-
0.
17
)
(0
.9
3
)
(0
.6
3)
(-
1.
31
)
(-
0.
0
4)
(1
.0
3
)
(1
.4
7
)
(1
.1
5
)
(0
.3
3)
(-
0.
51
)
(-
0.
05
)
(0
.6
9
)
(0
.7
3)
(1
.5
4)
(-
0
.1
6)
(-
0.
46
)
(-
0.
14
)
h
h
si
ze
0
.0
3
69
0.
04
28
0.
00
03
83
-0
.0
00
78
8
-0
.0
00
35
6
0.
00
1
28
-0
.0
0
29
7
-0
.0
06
98
-0
.0
00
08
2
8
-0
.0
0
19
7
-0
.0
00
6
29
0.
00
39
9
-0
.0
21
5
-0
.0
22
2
-0
.0
0
13
6
-0
.0
0
27
7
-0
.0
01
10
0.
00
58
1
(1
.5
4
)
(1
.9
4)
(0
.3
3)
(-
1.
22
)
(-
0.
33
)
(1
.2
8
)
(-
0.
24
)
(-
0.
51
)
(-
0.
04
)
(-
1.
3
7)
(-
0
.4
9)
(1
.2
6
)
(-
1.
4
2)
(-
1.
57
)
(-
0.
73
)
(-
1.
23
)
(-
1.
11
)
(1
.0
3)
h
h
si
ze
sq
-0
.0
0
16
3
-0
.0
01
8
4
-0
.0
00
00
1
14
0.
00
01
10
0.
00
00
91
1
-0
.0
0
01
23
0.
00
1
50
0.
00
1
73
0
.0
00
05
5
1
0
.0
00
2
58
0.
0
00
12
8
-0
.0
0
03
8
9
0.
00
31
4
0.
0
02
81
0.
00
02
06
0
.0
00
3
21
0.
00
01
56
-0
.0
00
54
8
(-
0
.7
4)
(-
0.
93
)
(-
0.
01
)
(1
.6
2
)
(0
.8
1)
(-
1.
1
8)
(1
.2
7
)
(1
.4
7
)
(0
.2
9
)
(1
.6
0)
(0
.8
9
)
(-
1.
08
)
(1
.9
2
)
(1
.8
6)
(1
.1
9)
(1
.2
6)
(1
.3
6
)
(-
0.
81
)
N
o
of
ch
il
d
re
n
0.
03
58
**
0.
0
36
3*
*
-0
.0
0
08
15
0
.0
0
11
8*
**
0
.0
00
37
7
-0
.0
01
97
**
*
0
.0
3
97
**
*
0
.0
4
00
**
*
-0
.0
0
07
4
8
0.
00
2
15
**
*
0.
0
00
58
2
-0
.0
0
45
6*
*
*
0
.0
23
2
**
*
0.
02
39
**
*
0.
00
02
3
9
0.
00
2
62
**
*
0.
00
04
1
6
-0
.0
07
37
**
*
(2
.6
9
)
(3
.0
2)
(-
1.
35
)
(5
.8
4)
(0
.7
5)
(-
3
.8
4
)
(5
.1
6)
(5
.3
3)
(-
0
.9
9
)
(4
.4
1
)
(1
.2
4)
(-
4
.3
7)
(4
.1
0)
(4
.2
8
)
(0
.2
8)
(4
.0
1)
(1
.4
8)
(-
3.
93
)
M
ar
ri
ed
h
h
h
ea
d
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.0
11
3
-0
.0
08
80
-0
.0
0
03
24
0
.0
00
15
1
0
.0
01
01
0.
00
00
9
96
-0
.0
1
33
0.
01
77
-0
.0
01
7
5
-0
.0
00
2
39
0.
00
07
5
6
-0
.0
0
14
0
-0
.0
10
4
0.
00
8
12
-0
.0
02
59
-0
.0
00
0
04
58
0.
00
07
3
6
-0
.0
02
26
(-
0
.2
4)
(-
0.
17
)
(-
0.
16
)
(0
.2
3
)
(0
.8
0)
(0
.1
2)
(-
0.
53
)
(0
.7
7
)
(-
0.
84
)
(-
0
.2
0
)
(0
.7
5)
(-
0.
7
8)
(-
0.
7
6)
(0
.5
1
)
(-
1.
30
)
(-
0.
0
0)
(1
.3
0)
(-
0.
97
)
h
h
h
ea
d
se
x
(m
al
e=
1)
0.
04
07
0.
0
41
5
-0
.0
0
00
71
8
0.
00
04
42
-0
.0
00
14
1
-0
.0
0
02
7
1
0.
01
7
6
0.
01
0
2
0
.0
00
88
6
0.
00
0
80
7
0.
0
00
07
3
2
0.
00
0
42
3
0.
01
70
0.
00
80
0
0.
00
12
9
0.
00
12
7
-0
.0
00
14
1
0.
00
00
07
77
(1
.2
6
)
(1
.0
4)
(-
0.
06
)
(0
.9
9)
(-
0.
19
)
(-
0.
4
3)
(1
.3
7
)
(0
.7
2
)
(0
.8
4
)
(1
.0
9
)
(0
.1
2
)
(0
.4
0)
(1
.5
7)
(0
.6
5
)
(1
.2
2)
(1
.4
4)
(-
0.
3
5)
(0
.0
1)
P
ri
m
ed
u
c
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.0
76
5
**
-0
.0
72
5
**
-0
.0
01
6
7
-0
.0
01
19
*
-0
.0
01
1
1
0.
00
09
47
-0
.0
6
01
*
**
-0
.0
54
6
**
-0
.0
03
95
*
-0
.0
02
57
*
-0
.0
01
6
4
0.
0
04
02
*
-0
.0
4
70
**
-0
.0
32
9*
*
-0
.0
04
41
*
-0
.0
03
65
**
-0
.0
00
76
2
0.
00
54
3
(-
2
.6
6)
(-
3.
03
)
(-
1.
22
)
(-
2.
20
)
(-
0
.8
2
)
(0
.8
9)
(-
3.
5
0)
(-
2
.8
6
)
(-
1
.9
9
)
(-
2.
33
)
(-
1.
35
)
(1
.9
9)
(-
3.
21
)
(-
2.
74
)
(-
2
.3
1)
(-
3.
08
)
(-
1.
0
8)
(1
.6
4)
L
ow
se
co
n
d
a
ry
ed
u
c
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.0
68
7*
*
-0
.0
7
04
*
-0
.0
01
14
-0
.0
01
13
*
-0
.0
00
96
2
0.
0
01
6
0
-0
.0
44
8*
*
-0
.0
43
9*
-0
.0
0
28
0
-0
.0
02
4
8*
-0
.0
0
18
3
0.
00
5
32
**
-0
.0
37
2
**
-0
.0
27
2
*
-0
.0
03
2
6
-0
.0
03
22
**
-0
.0
0
11
0
0.
00
67
9*
(-
2
.6
3)
(-
2.
48
)
(-
0.
87
)
(-
2.
11
)
(-
0
.8
2
)
(1
.4
9)
(-
2.
6
7)
(-
2
.1
6
)
(-
1
.5
9
)
(-
2.
44
)
(-
1.
56
)
(2
.7
5)
(-
2.
81
)
(-
2.
32
)
(-
1
.8
6)
(-
2.
83
)
(-
1.
5
7)
(2
.3
1)
U
p
p
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y
ed
u
c
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.1
36
**
-0
.1
34
*
*
0
.0
0
12
8
-0
.0
01
59
**
-0
.0
04
14
*
0.
00
15
3
-0
.0
75
9*
*
*
-0
.0
6
70
**
-0
.0
02
29
-0
.0
0
33
3*
-0
.0
03
93
**
0
.0
06
5
9*
*
-0
.0
48
8*
*
-0
.0
26
6
-0
.0
03
80
-0
.0
03
5
6*
-0
.0
0
17
2*
0.
00
87
4*
*
(-
2
.9
7)
(-
2.
82
)
(0
.5
3
)
(-
2.
7
2)
(-
2.
0
8)
(1
.3
3
)
(-
3.
31
)
(-
3
.1
1)
(-
0
.8
4)
(-
2
.2
6
)
(-
2.
72
)
(3
.0
7)
(-
3.
18
)
(-
1.
61
)
(-
1.
6
6)
(-
2
.1
6)
(-
1.
97
)
(2
.6
7)
T
ec
h
/v
o
c
ed
u
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.1
82
**
*
-0
.1
86
**
*
-0
.0
00
43
0
-0
.0
02
0
4*
**
-0
.0
03
62
*
0.
00
0
63
0
-0
.0
8
36
*
**
-0
.0
77
2*
*
*
-0
.0
0
31
4
-0
.0
03
12
**
-0
.0
0
42
6*
*
*
0
.0
0
34
3
-0
.0
50
1
**
*
-0
.0
3
98
**
*
-0
.0
01
95
-0
.0
0
36
0*
*
*
-0
.0
01
85
*
0.
00
45
5
(-
4
.7
6)
(-
4.
74
)
(-
0.
15
)
(-
3.
55
)
(-
2
.5
7
)
(0
.7
4)
(-
4.
6
4)
(-
3
.9
6
)
(-
1
.3
2
)
(-
3.
22
)
(-
4.
17
)
(1
.8
2)
(-
3.
84
)
(-
3.
67
)
(-
0
.7
7)
(-
3.
64
)
(-
2.
2
9)
(1
.6
6)
U
n
iv
er
s.
E
d
u
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.2
9
1*
**
-0
.2
7
8*
**
-0
.0
04
53
-0
.0
01
08
-0
.0
0
43
3
**
*
0
.0
0
0
00
43
3
-0
.0
7
51
**
-0
.0
63
7*
*
-0
.0
02
94
-0
.0
0
09
80
-0
.0
05
02
**
*
-0
.0
0
00
3
22
-0
.0
21
9
-0
.0
11
4
-0
.0
01
06
-0
.0
00
84
3
-0
.0
01
97
*
-0
.0
00
61
9
(-
6
.2
9)
(-
5.
32
)
(-
1.
72
)
(-
1.
73
)
(-
3
.3
2
)
(0
.0
0)
(-
2.
8
3)
(-
2
.8
9
)
(-
1
.0
9
)
(-
0.
76
)
(-
3.
79
)
(-
0.
02
)
(-
1.
41
)
(-
0
.8
9)
(-
0.
43
)
(-
0.
58
)
(-
2.
35
)
(-
0.
20
)
G
eo
gr
ap
h
ic
al
lo
c
(u
rb
an
=
1)
-0
.2
75
**
*
-0
.2
87
**
*
-0
.0
00
1
95
-0
.0
02
36
*
**
-0
.0
06
6
1*
*
*
0
.0
00
77
2
-0
.1
11
**
*
-0
.1
0
6*
**
-0
.0
0
11
6
-0
.0
0
39
5*
*
*
-0
.0
06
3
7*
**
0.
00
0
96
4
-0
.0
48
6*
**
-0
.0
45
9
**
*
-0
.0
01
64
-0
.0
03
85
**
*
-0
.0
03
18
*
**
0.
00
03
46
(-
12
.1
9
)
(-
10
.2
0)
(-
0.
17
)
(-
7.
79
)
(-
8
.4
3
)
(1
.8
0)
(-
9
.7
9
)
(-
1
0.
0
6)
(-
0.
95
)
(-
6.
19
)
(-
8.
7
1)
(1
.0
5
)
(-
6.
39
)
(-
6
.7
1)
(-
1.
47
)
(-
5.
1
2)
(-
6
.0
8)
(0
.3
0)
lp
p
c
in
co
m
n
-0
.7
05
**
*
-0
.7
06
*
**
-0
.0
03
29
**
*
-0
.0
08
0
7*
*
*
0.
00
0
62
2
0.
00
4
04
**
*
-0
.3
85
**
*
-0
.3
7
1*
**
-0
.0
0
83
3
**
*
-0
.0
14
1*
**
0.
00
15
5
*
0
.0
0
86
2*
*
*
-0
.2
44
**
*
-0
.2
07
**
*
-0
.0
13
6
**
*
-0
.0
16
9
**
*
0
.0
00
6
55
0.
01
24
**
*
(-
29
.8
0)
(-
30
.9
8)
(-
3
.7
8
)
(-
1
3.
0
1)
(1
.1
0)
(5
.8
7)
(-
26
.9
0
)
(-
2
4.
63
)
(-
7
.6
2
)
(-
1
0.
89
)
(2
.3
2)
(7
.3
9)
(-
15
.7
7)
(-
17
.8
7)
(-
11
.2
2)
(-
8.
2
5)
(1
.1
2)
(5
.8
6)
co
n
s
5.
27
3*
**
5
.3
0
4*
**
0.
03
55
**
*
0.
08
24
**
*
0.
08
15
*
**
-0
.0
3
81
**
*
2.
92
6*
*
*
2.
8
15
**
*
0
.0
88
6*
*
*
0
.1
38
*
**
0.
04
4
1*
**
-0
.0
8
75
**
*
1.
77
2*
*
*
1.
44
5
**
*
0.
13
7
**
*
0.
15
4*
*
*
0.
01
6
0*
-0
.1
24
**
*
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
b
el
ow
th
e
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
co
effi
ci
en
ts
.
∗p
≤
0
.1
0
;
∗
∗
p
≤
0
.0
5
;
∗
∗
∗p
≤
0
.0
1
168
4.6 Conclusions
T
ab
le
4A
-9
:
P
er
m
an
en
t
ri
sk
an
d
ot
h
er
co
va
ri
at
es
co
rr
el
at
es
w
it
h
th
e
va
ri
ou
s
co
m
p
on
en
ts
of
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
(S
ec
on
d
q
u
ar
ti
le
:
50
th
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
)
rh
o1
rh
o
2
rh
o3
O
ve
ra
ll
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
(V
)
P
ov
er
ty
in
d
u
ce
d
(P
)
O
ve
ra
ll
R
is
k
(V
-P
)
T
ra
d
e-
re
la
te
d
ri
sk
A
g
gr
.
ri
sk
ex
-p
os
t
id
.
ri
sk
O
ve
ra
ll
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
(V
)
P
ov
er
ty
in
d
u
ce
d
(P
)
O
ve
ra
ll
R
is
k
(V
-P
)
T
ra
d
e-
re
la
te
d
ri
sk
A
gg
r.
ri
sk
ex
-p
o
st
id
.
ri
sk
O
v
er
a
ll
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
(V
)
P
ov
er
ty
in
d
u
ce
d
(P
)
O
ve
ra
ll
R
is
k
(V
-P
)
T
ra
d
e-
re
la
te
d
ri
sk
A
gg
r.
ri
sk
ex
-p
os
t
id
.
ri
sk
q
5
0
(2
0.
60
)
(2
0.
38
)
(4
.0
7)
(1
0.
3
3)
(8
.4
4
)
(-
3
.7
5
)
(1
9
.3
2)
(1
5
.8
6
)
(5
.8
4)
(9
.2
3)
(4
.5
0
)
(-
5.
68
)
(1
1
.5
5
)
(1
0
.7
0)
(8
.2
1)
(7
.5
8)
(2
.3
9)
(-
4.
60
)
E
x-
a
n
te
co
m
po
n
en
ts
p
er
m
ri
sk
0.
8
94
*
0.
67
0
0.
08
00
*
-0
.0
00
75
0
-0
.3
9
7*
**
0.
0
09
3
7
1
.6
9
0*
**
1
.4
3
2
0.
12
3*
*
0
.0
52
4
**
-0
.1
68
*
**
0.
0
19
2
1.
48
8*
*
*
1.
20
9*
*
*
0.
14
7*
*
*
0.
11
4*
**
-0
.0
4
11
**
*
0.
01
83
*
(2
.5
6)
(1
.9
0)
(2
.1
1)
(-
0.
09
)
(-
12
.5
4)
(1
.2
4)
(5
.0
5
)
(1
.2
2)
(3
.1
3)
(2
.6
9)
(-
7.
1
4)
(1
.7
3
)
(5
.8
7)
(6
.7
6)
(3
.5
3)
(3
.6
2)
(-
3.
43
)
(2
.0
3)
tr
an
s
ri
sk
1.
01
2*
*
0
.6
9
2
0.
08
67
*
0.
00
68
9
-0
.4
52
**
*
0.
00
12
8
2
.0
4
8*
**
1
.7
7
3
0
.1
44
*
**
0.
07
6
7*
**
-0
.1
95
*
**
0
.0
13
8
1.
79
7
**
*
1.
46
9
**
*
0.
20
4*
**
0
.1
64
*
**
-0
.0
42
3*
*
0.
01
52
(2
.6
5)
(1
.7
7)
(2
.2
5)
(0
.7
0)
(-
1
3.
7
1)
(0
.1
9)
(5
.8
0
)
(1
.7
6)
(3
.4
1)
(3
.5
1
)
(-
7.
38
)
(1
.4
9)
(6
.6
3
)
(7
.7
8)
(4
.8
6)
(5
.2
2)
(-
3.
23
)
(1
.7
3)
E
x-
po
st
co
m
po
n
en
ts
A
ge
h
h
h
ea
d
-0
.0
07
04
-0
.0
0
94
9
-0
.0
00
22
1
-0
.0
00
24
9
0.
0
00
27
8
-0
.0
00
07
20
-0
.0
0
86
9
-0
.0
0
42
3
-0
.0
00
7
37
-0
.0
00
7
20
0.
00
02
4
5
0
.0
00
1
86
-0
.0
06
79
-0
.0
07
1
0
-0
.0
00
47
1
-0
.0
00
93
5
0
.0
00
0
86
2
0.
00
00
78
1
(-
1.
28
)
(-
1.
47
)
(-
0.
35
)
(-
1
.0
5)
(1
.1
0)
(-
0.
3
1)
(-
1.
85
)
(-
0.
1
9)
(-
0
.8
4)
(-
1
.2
1)
(1
.2
0)
(0
.6
5
)
(-
1.
59
)
(-
1.
82
)
(-
0.
59
)
(-
0.
92
)
(0
.5
3)
(0
.4
1)
A
ge
sq
.
h
h
h
ea
d
0.
00
0
05
3
0
0.
00
00
76
7
0.
00
0
00
43
4
0.
00
00
02
16
-0
.0
00
00
23
1
0.
00
00
00
99
1
0
.0
0
00
76
7
0
.0
0
00
30
7
0.
0
00
00
93
7
0.
00
00
0
58
9
-0
.0
0
00
0
21
8
-0
.0
00
0
01
91
0
.0
00
0
61
6
0.
00
00
6
40
0
.0
00
0
04
63
0.
0
00
00
6
79
-0
.0
00
00
0
90
2
-0
.0
00
00
07
80
(0
.9
2)
(1
.1
3)
(0
.6
6)
(0
.9
5)
(-
0.
89
)
(0
.4
1)
(1
.6
2
)
(0
.1
3)
(1
.0
3)
(0
.9
8
)
(-
1.
06
)
(-
0.
67
)
(1
.3
7)
(1
.6
6)
(0
.6
0)
(0
.6
6)
(-
0.
56
)
(-
0.
41
)
h
h
si
ze
0.
02
7
0
0.
03
37
0
.0
0
05
46
-0
.0
01
66
*
0.
0
00
63
3
-0
.0
0
26
7
-0
.0
11
5
-0
.0
1
23
0.
00
25
8
-0
.0
10
3*
*
-0
.0
01
19
-0
.0
01
68
-0
.0
2
64
-0
.0
28
7
*
-0
.0
01
1
6
-0
.0
23
4
*
-0
.0
03
22
**
*
-0
.0
01
16
(0
.9
4)
(1
.5
0)
(0
.2
7)
(-
2.
57
)
(0
.6
3)
(-
0
.9
9)
(-
0
.6
0)
(-
0
.5
3
)
(0
.6
7)
(-
2.
73
)
(-
1
.3
7
)
(-
0
.6
1)
(-
1.
83
)
(-
2.
3
2)
(-
0
.2
3)
(-
2.
22
)
(-
3.
3
4)
(-
0.
48
)
h
h
si
ze
sq
-0
.0
00
3
43
-0
.0
00
93
8
-0
.0
00
03
43
0.
0
00
21
3*
*
-0
.0
00
00
76
2
0.
00
02
86
0
.0
0
19
8
0
.0
0
20
8
-0
.0
0
01
51
0.
00
1
19
**
0.
00
01
6
1
0
.0
00
1
90
0
.0
03
3
1*
0.
0
03
59
*
*
0.
00
0
20
4
0.
00
27
0
*
0
.0
00
3
60
**
0.
00
01
43
(-
0.
14
)
(-
0.
50
)
(-
0.
19
)
(3
.0
4)
(-
0
.0
7)
(0
.9
9)
(1
.0
1)
(1
.0
2)
(-
0
.4
1
)
(2
.8
3
)
(1
.8
7)
(0
.6
2)
(2
.2
3)
(3
.0
1)
(0
.3
9
)
(2
.2
2)
(3
.2
8)
(0
.5
3)
N
o
of
ch
il
d
re
n
0.
02
65
*
0
.0
2
74
**
-0
.0
01
21
0
.0
02
03
**
*
0.
00
15
6*
*
*
-0
.0
01
5
6*
*
0.
0
37
5*
*
*
0
.0
43
9
**
-0
.0
00
28
7
0
.0
04
7
9*
**
0.
00
19
0
**
*
-0
.0
01
62
**
0
.0
39
5
**
*
0.
03
44
*
**
0
.0
01
8
0
0
.0
07
0
2*
**
0.
00
14
2*
*
*
-0
.0
01
34
**
(2
.5
5)
(2
.7
7)
(-
0.
94
)
(5
.9
0)
(3
.4
1)
(-
3.
2
1)
(4
.4
1
)
(3
.2
5)
(-
0.
1
8)
(4
.8
7)
(4
.2
0
)
(-
3.
01
)
(6
.1
6)
(4
.3
3)
(0
.9
6)
(3
.8
2)
(3
.9
9
)
(-
3.
29
)
M
a
rr
ie
d
h
h
h
ea
d
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.0
37
0
-0
.0
2
43
-0
.0
0
23
0
0.
00
0
36
7
-0
.0
00
43
6
-0
.0
00
4
25
0
.0
1
86
0
.0
1
50
-0
.0
0
26
3
0.
00
09
1
3
0
.0
0
07
02
-0
.0
00
40
2
-0
.0
0
58
2
0.
01
03
-0
.0
02
73
0
.0
05
5
8
0.
00
10
0
-0
.0
00
73
1
(-
0.
79
)
(-
0.
65
)
(-
0.
61
)
(0
.4
4)
(-
0
.3
5)
(-
0.
3
3)
(0
.8
2
)
(0
.7
8
)
(-
0.
69
)
(0
.4
3
)
(0
.6
9)
(-
0
.2
9
)
(-
0
.3
7)
(0
.6
7)
(-
0.
7
4)
(1
.2
9)
(1
.3
5)
(-
0.
66
)
h
h
h
ea
d
se
x
(m
al
e=
1)
0.
0
52
8
0
.0
4
90
0.
0
04
28
0.
00
05
08
0.
0
00
6
60
-0
.0
00
44
6
0.
01
47
0
.0
1
38
0
.0
04
21
0
.0
0
14
7
0.
0
00
44
9
-0
.0
0
06
0
2
0.
01
0
6
0.
0
06
58
0.
0
02
39
0.
00
01
3
2
0.
00
01
94
-0
.0
00
08
74
(1
.6
4)
(1
.9
5)
(1
.5
4)
(0
.8
7)
(0
.9
0)
(-
0
.7
7)
(0
.8
3
)
(0
.3
7)
(1
.5
5)
(0
.9
3
)
(0
.6
8)
(-
0.
95
)
(0
.7
9)
(0
.5
6)
(0
.9
7)
(0
.0
6)
(0
.4
0)
(-
0.
14
)
P
ri
m
ed
u
c
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.0
87
6*
*
-0
.0
76
3
**
*
-0
.0
00
99
9
-0
.0
03
47
**
*
-0
.0
03
61
*
*
0.
00
0
34
8
-0
.1
0
8*
**
-0
.0
8
14
-0
.0
07
73
-0
.0
08
79
*
**
-0
.0
03
31
**
*
-0
.0
00
79
1
-0
.0
71
4*
**
-0
.0
57
3
**
*
-0
.0
1
17
**
-0
.0
1
47
**
-0
.0
0
28
9*
*
-0
.0
00
63
4
(-
3.
23
)
(-
3.
63
)
(-
0.
37
)
(-
3
.6
3)
(-
2.
65
)
(0
.3
5
)
(-
5.
21
)
(-
1.
2
4)
(-
1
.7
1)
(-
3
.5
8)
(-
3
.4
4
)
(-
0
.7
8)
(-
4.
09
)
(-
3.
4
0)
(-
2
.6
4)
(-
3.
06
)
(-
3.
14
)
(-
0.
67
)
L
ow
se
co
n
d
ar
y
ed
u
c
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.1
0
3*
**
-0
.0
86
8*
*
*
-0
.0
02
66
-0
.0
03
59
**
*
-0
.0
04
95
**
*
0.
00
0
60
0
-0
.1
0
6*
*
*
-0
.0
8
23
-0
.0
08
27
*
-0
.0
07
5
9*
**
-0
.0
03
90
*
**
-0
.0
00
07
59
-0
.0
66
0*
**
-0
.0
56
5*
*
*
-0
.0
09
7
1*
-0
.0
13
1
**
*
-0
.0
02
94
**
*
-0
.0
00
06
62
(-
4.
32
)
(-
4.
11
)
(-
1.
15
)
(-
4
.2
1)
(-
4.
66
)
(0
.6
1
)
(-
6.
37
)
(-
1.
9
5)
(-
2
.1
6)
(-
3
.5
0)
(-
4
.2
4
)
(-
0
.0
6)
(-
4.
13
)
(-
4.
0
5)
(-
2
.3
6)
(-
3.
41
)
(-
3.
71
)
(-
0.
08
)
U
p
p
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y
ed
u
c
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.1
46
**
*
-0
.1
39
**
*
-0
.0
01
26
-0
.0
04
3
1*
**
-0
.0
0
55
0*
**
0
.0
00
12
9
-0
.1
38
**
*
-0
.1
0
4
-0
.0
0
75
7
-0
.0
0
83
6
**
*
-0
.0
0
50
9*
*
*
-0
.0
0
06
0
9
-0
.0
78
2*
**
-0
.0
6
39
**
*
-0
.0
1
10
*
-0
.0
13
9*
*
-0
.0
0
30
3*
*
*
0.
00
01
93
(-
4.
00
)
(-
4.
13
)
(-
0.
43
)
(-
4
.6
9)
(-
3.
46
)
(0
.1
2
)
(-
6.
36
)
(-
1.
2
5)
(-
1
.3
9)
(-
3
.7
5)
(-
3
.8
7
)
(-
0
.5
2)
(-
4.
20
)
(-
3.
9
6)
(-
2
.4
7)
(-
2.
80
)
(-
3.
55
)
(0
.2
1)
T
ec
h
/v
o
c
ed
u
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.2
1
2*
**
-0
.2
02
**
*
0.
00
2
73
-0
.0
04
13
**
*
-0
.0
06
59
**
*
0.
00
0
14
7
-0
.1
4
6*
*
*
-0
.1
27
-0
.0
03
8
9
-0
.0
0
69
7
**
-0
.0
05
8
3*
**
-0
.0
0
06
69
-0
.0
58
0*
**
-0
.0
61
3*
*
-0
.0
07
71
-0
.0
07
5
6
-0
.0
03
5
2*
**
-0
.0
00
32
5
(-
5.
88
)
(-
5.
13
)
(0
.6
3)
(-
3
.6
7
)
(-
5
.1
8)
(0
.1
4)
(-
6
.8
8
)
(-
0.
83
)
(-
0.
84
)
(-
2.
9
1)
(-
4
.7
1)
(-
0.
6
0)
(-
3.
31
)
(-
3.
06
)
(-
1.
6
2)
(-
1
.5
8)
(-
3.
79
)
(-
0.
44
)
U
n
iv
er
s.
E
d
u
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.3
53
**
*
-0
.3
22
**
*
-0
.0
0
32
5
-0
.0
02
00
-0
.0
06
44
**
*
-0
.0
00
0
24
8
-0
.1
1
4*
**
-0
.0
89
9
-0
.0
05
00
-0
.0
00
44
2
-0
.0
05
24
**
*
-0
.0
00
87
5
-0
.0
00
48
7
-0
.0
05
47
-0
.0
06
87
0.
00
63
3
-0
.0
02
59
*
-0
.0
00
20
1
(-
6.
89
)
(-
6.
82
)
(-
0.
62
)
(-
1
.7
0)
(-
4.
43
)
(-
0
.0
2
)
(-
3.
71
)
(-
0
.7
3)
(-
0
.9
7)
(-
0
.1
5
)
(-
3
.7
7)
(-
0.
8
5)
(-
0
.0
2)
(-
0.
21
)
(-
1.
4
9)
(1
.3
2)
(-
2
.3
6)
(-
0.
26
)
G
eo
gr
ap
h
ic
al
lo
c
(u
rb
an
=
1
)
-0
.2
8
0*
**
-0
.2
8
6*
**
-0
.0
02
05
-0
.0
02
44
**
*
-0
.0
08
44
**
*
-0
.0
0
04
70
-0
.0
9
95
**
*
-0
.1
02
**
*
-0
.0
05
15
*
-0
.0
0
39
0*
*
-0
.0
05
56
*
**
-0
.0
00
3
36
-0
.0
38
4*
*
-0
.0
3
57
**
*
-0
.0
03
30
-0
.0
02
88
-0
.0
0
26
4*
*
*
-0
.0
00
03
14
(-
1
3.
1
7)
(-
13
.5
1
)
(-
0.
9
3)
(-
4.
81
)
(-
12
.1
1)
(-
0
.9
1
)
(-
5
.9
6)
(-
8.
63
)
(-
2.
27
)
(-
2.
9
6)
(-
8.
58
)
(-
0.
62
)
(-
2.
96
)
(-
3.
56
)
(-
1.
76
)
(-
1.
23
)
(-
5.
68
)
(-
0.
09
)
lp
p
c
in
co
m
n
-0
.6
9
1*
*
*
-0
.6
91
**
*
-0
.0
01
35
-0
.0
1
16
**
*
-0
.0
03
3
2*
**
-0
.0
00
23
6
-0
.4
5
0*
**
-0
.4
2
7*
**
-0
.0
14
2
**
*
-0
.0
25
4
**
*
-0
.0
04
72
**
*
-0
.0
00
25
2
-0
.3
29
*
**
-0
.2
82
*
**
-0
.0
27
0*
**
-0
.0
41
4*
*
*
-0
.0
05
02
**
*
-0
.0
00
55
0
(-
3
3.
77
)
(-
39
.5
4)
(-
0.
65
)
(-
16
.0
6)
(-
4.
6
3)
(-
0.
38
)
(-
30
.7
6)
(-
2
9.
71
)
(-
7
.4
5
)
(-
1
2.
19
)
(-
5
.8
0
)
(-
0
.3
8)
(-
21
.9
3)
(-
18
.7
8)
(-
8.
9
2)
(-
9
.1
6)
(-
6.
33
)
(-
1.
02
)
co
n
s
5.
49
7*
**
5.
53
6*
*
*
0.
0
18
0
0.
12
0*
**
0.
10
2*
**
0.
0
11
3
3
.4
8
6*
**
3
.1
8
3*
**
0
.1
36
*
**
0.
2
63
**
*
0
.0
76
7
**
*
0
.0
0
21
7
2
.5
2
0
*
*
*
2
.1
3
4
*
*
*
0
.2
4
5
*
*
*
0
.4
2
2
*
*
*
0
.0
6
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
7
9
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
b
el
ow
th
e
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
co
effi
ci
en
ts
.
∗p
≤
0
.1
0
;
∗
∗
p
≤
0
.0
5
;
∗
∗
∗p
≤
0
.0
1
169
4.6 Conclusions
T
ab
le
4A
-1
0:
P
er
m
an
en
t
ri
sk
an
d
ot
h
er
co
va
ri
at
es
co
rr
el
at
es
w
it
h
th
e
va
ri
ou
s
co
m
p
on
en
ts
of
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
(U
p
p
er
q
u
ar
ti
le
:
75
th
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
)
rh
o
1
rh
o
2
rh
o3
O
ve
ra
ll
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
(V
)
P
ov
er
ty
in
d
u
ce
d
(P
)
O
ve
ra
ll
R
is
k
(V
-P
)
T
ra
d
e-
re
la
te
d
ri
sk
A
gg
r.
ri
sk
ex
-p
o
st
id
.
ri
sk
O
ve
ra
ll
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
(V
)
P
ov
er
ty
in
d
u
ce
d
(P
)
O
ve
ra
ll
R
is
k
(V
-P
)
T
ra
d
e-
re
la
te
d
ri
sk
A
gg
r.
ri
sk
ex
-p
o
st
id
.
ri
sk
O
v
er
a
ll
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
(V
)
P
ov
er
ty
in
d
u
ce
d
(P
)
O
ve
ra
ll
R
is
k
(V
-P
)
T
ra
d
e-
re
la
te
d
ri
sk
A
gg
r.
ri
sk
ex
-p
os
t
id
.
ri
sk
q
7
5
(2
7.
7
6)
(2
9.
18
)
(0
.7
8)
(1
3.
19
)
(9
.0
3
)
(1
.1
3
)
(2
0
.0
1
)
(1
0
.3
0
)
(4
.9
6
)
(9
.7
3
)
(7
.4
5
)
(0
.1
8
)
(1
4.
55
)
(1
4.
4
0)
(7
.5
8)
(8
.2
2)
(8
.4
2)
(0
.6
4)
E
x-
a
n
te
co
m
po
n
en
ts
p
er
m
ri
sk
1.
6
99
*
1.
58
3*
0.
1
5
8*
0.
01
42
-0
.2
47
**
*
0
.0
43
5
2.
87
5*
*
*
2.
36
1*
*
*
0
.2
13
*
0.
07
12
*
-0
.0
97
2*
*
*
0.
10
6*
*
2.
2
50
**
*
1.
64
1*
**
0.
41
5*
**
0.
20
8*
*
-0
.0
07
83
0.
17
1*
*
(2
.5
8
)
(2
.0
7)
(2
.1
1
)
(0
.9
6)
(-
8.
14
)
(1
.7
8)
(6
.1
7)
(6
.4
3)
(2
.4
6)
(2
.5
2)
(-
5
.0
3)
(2
.6
2
)
(7
.6
6)
(7
.1
5)
(3
.8
0
)
(3
.2
8)
(-
0.
45
)
(2
.8
8)
tr
an
s
ri
sk
2.
31
6*
*
2.
2
44
*
*
0.
19
6*
0
.0
28
3
-0
.2
94
**
*
0.
03
9
5
3.
45
2
**
*
2.
96
3
**
*
0.
28
3
**
0
.1
1
3*
**
-0
.1
1
9*
**
0
.1
18
*
*
2.
68
4*
**
2
.0
57
*
**
0.
53
1
**
*
0.
31
8*
*
*
-0
.0
05
59
0.
20
8*
*
(3
.0
8
)
(2
.7
3)
(2
.5
5
)
(1
.8
0)
(-
8.
95
)
(1
.4
5)
(7
.1
1)
(7
.4
1)
(3
.0
8)
(3
.3
9)
(-
5
.3
0)
(2
.7
6
)
(7
.9
6)
(8
.0
9)
(4
.4
5
)
(4
.2
7)
(-
0.
29
)
(2
.6
8)
E
x-
po
st
co
m
po
n
en
ts
A
ge
h
h
h
ea
d
-0
.0
05
1
0
-0
.0
02
3
3
-0
.0
00
70
3
-0
.0
00
3
64
0.
0
00
1
95
0.
00
0
34
3
-0
.0
0
68
7
-0
.0
05
85
0
.0
00
6
97
-0
.0
00
9
00
0.
00
02
7
6
0
.0
00
6
13
-0
.0
0
90
1
-0
.0
06
6
2
0.
00
1
91
-0
.0
01
8
9
0.
00
03
13
0.
00
06
51
(-
0.
91
)
(-
0.
35
)
(-
0
.5
2
)
(-
1.
12
)
(1
.0
8)
(0
.8
1)
(-
1.
29
)
(-
1.
14
)
(0
.3
6
)
(-
0.
8
0)
(1
.3
1)
(0
.7
3)
(-
1.
50
)
(-
1.
27
)
(0
.9
4)
(-
0.
75
)
(0
.8
5)
(0
.3
6)
A
ge
sq
.
h
h
h
ea
d
0
.0
00
04
42
0.
00
00
0
93
0
0
.0
00
01
14
0.
0
00
0
03
52
-0
.0
00
0
01
54
-0
.0
0
00
0
25
5
0
.0
0
00
72
1
0.
00
00
5
43
-0
.0
00
0
07
54
0.
0
00
00
8
73
-0
.0
00
00
2
23
-0
.0
0
00
0
53
7
0
.0
00
0
98
1
0.
00
00
6
67
-0
.0
00
01
7
9
0.
00
0
02
04
-0
.0
00
00
26
9
-0
.0
00
00
57
8
(0
.7
5
)
(0
.1
4)
(0
.7
4
)
(1
.1
0)
(-
0.
85
)
(-
0.
5
5)
(1
.3
2)
(1
.0
1)
(-
0.
38
)
(0
.7
8)
(-
1.
05
)
(-
0
.6
0
)
(1
.5
8)
(1
.2
8)
(-
0.
8
5)
(0
.7
8)
(-
0.
7
4)
(-
0.
27
)
h
h
si
ze
0.
0
21
1
0.
03
18
-0
.0
01
00
-0
.0
03
78
-0
.0
0
08
44
-0
.0
2
67
**
-0
.0
41
1
-0
.0
24
0
-0
.0
10
3
-0
.0
16
7*
-0
.0
0
33
6
-0
.0
3
85
-0
.0
94
9
*
-0
.0
67
1*
-0
.0
1
05
-0
.0
4
16
**
*
-0
.0
05
11
-0
.0
55
9
(1
.0
5
)
(1
.6
9)
(-
0
.2
1
)
(-
1.
85
)
(-
0
.9
0)
(-
2.
9
5)
(-
1.
2
6)
(-
0
.8
0)
(-
1
.1
4)
(-
2
.3
9
)
(-
1
.5
2)
(-
0.
8
6)
(-
2.
4
1)
(-
2.
05
)
(-
0.
82
)
(-
3.
4
3)
(-
1
.9
6)
(-
0.
16
)
h
h
si
ze
sq
0.
00
00
48
0
-0
.0
00
93
7
0.
00
0
17
8
0
.0
00
45
1
0.
00
01
50
0.
00
3
03
**
0.
0
05
01
0.
00
36
4
0.
00
1
14
0
.0
0
20
0*
0
.0
00
3
80
0.
0
04
43
0.
01
06
*
0.
00
79
2
*
0.
00
09
8
4
0
.0
04
9
8*
*
0.
00
05
74
0.
00
65
0
(0
.0
3
)
(-
0.
57
)
(0
.3
8)
(1
.9
1)
(1
.4
8)
(2
.9
7
)
(1
.4
4)
(1
.1
5)
(1
.2
3)
(2
.3
0)
(1
.5
1)
(0
.8
4
)
(2
.3
1)
(2
.1
5)
(0
.6
9)
(3
.1
3)
(1
.7
9)
(0
.1
7)
N
o
of
ch
il
d
re
n
0.
0
34
2*
*
0
.0
2
96
*
*
-0
.0
02
7
1
0.
00
3
29
*
**
0.
00
1
54
*
**
-0
.0
01
42
0
.0
56
8
**
*
0
.0
51
4
**
*
-0
.0
0
02
63
0.
01
0
7*
**
0.
0
03
58
*
**
-0
.0
0
09
8
2
0.
07
08
*
**
0.
0
61
7*
*
*
0
.0
08
0
4*
0.
02
2
4*
**
0.
00
45
9*
*
*
-0
.0
00
52
8
(3
.1
6
)
(2
.6
5)
(-
0
.9
5
)
(5
.0
8)
(3
.3
1)
(-
1.
8
0)
(4
.9
4)
(4
.5
8)
(-
0.
09
)
(5
.3
4)
(6
.2
9)
(-
0.
8
0)
(6
.1
5)
(5
.8
3
)
(2
.3
0
)
(4
.7
1)
(5
.1
0
)
(-
0.
25
)
M
ar
ri
ed
h
h
h
ea
d
(y
es
=
1)
0.
00
16
2
0
.0
04
78
-0
.0
02
58
-0
.0
00
10
0
-0
.0
01
78
*
0
.0
0
20
4
-0
.0
05
48
0.
0
04
20
0.
00
1
31
0.
00
2
56
-0
.0
0
01
6
6
0.
0
01
45
0.
0
32
5
0
.0
08
4
7
-0
.0
01
67
0.
0
08
85
-0
.0
0
00
72
8
-0
.0
02
08
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.1
4)
(-
0
.2
8
)
(-
0.
08
)
(-
1
.9
7)
(0
.7
7)
(-
0.
20
)
(0
.1
6)
(0
.1
5)
(0
.6
0
)
(-
0.
13
)
(0
.2
5)
(1
.2
3)
(0
.3
9)
(-
0
.1
6)
(0
.8
3)
(-
0
.0
4)
(-
0.
08
)
h
h
h
ea
d
se
x
(m
al
e=
1)
0.
01
02
0
.0
13
0
0.
0
00
0
24
2
0
.0
0
13
8
0
.0
0
22
4*
**
-0
.0
00
50
1
0.
0
21
0
0
.0
2
67
0
.0
00
3
32
0
.0
0
11
0
0.
0
00
52
0
-0
.0
01
80
-0
.0
14
1
0.
0
00
97
9
0
.0
01
6
5
0.
00
0
39
9
0.
00
12
0
-0
.0
01
08
(0
.3
7
)
(0
.4
1)
(0
.0
0
)
(1
.2
7)
(3
.3
4)
(-
0
.4
1
)
(0
.9
7)
(1
.3
3)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.3
8)
(0
.5
1)
(-
0
.8
2)
(-
0
.5
8)
(0
.0
6
)
(0
.2
9)
(0
.0
7)
(1
.1
4)
(-
0.
36
)
P
ri
m
ed
u
c
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.0
73
3*
*
-0
.0
93
7*
*
*
-0
.0
10
4
-0
.0
04
51
**
-0
.0
02
7
2*
*
-0
.0
06
08
*
-0
.0
69
4*
*
-0
.0
80
6*
**
-0
.0
1
36
-0
.0
17
5*
**
-0
.0
04
43
*
**
-0
.0
0
77
0
-0
.1
08
**
*
-0
.0
8
98
**
*
-0
.0
27
3*
-0
.0
3
95
**
*
-0
.0
06
29
*
**
-0
.0
10
1
(-
3.
26
)
(-
3.
92
)
(-
1
.6
7
)
(-
3.
04
)
(-
3
.2
7)
(-
2.
4
0)
(-
2.
94
)
(-
4
.1
2
)
(-
1
.3
9
)
(-
3.
61
)
(-
3
.4
3
)
(-
1
.7
9)
(-
3
.3
3)
(-
3.
7
6)
(-
2
.1
0)
(-
3.
37
)
(-
3.
78
)
(-
1.
17
)
L
ow
se
co
n
d
ar
y
ed
u
c
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.1
2
0*
*
*
-0
.1
2
3*
*
*
-0
.0
13
2*
-0
.0
0
59
2*
**
-0
.0
04
04
*
**
-0
.0
0
42
4
-0
.1
00
**
*
-0
.1
06
*
**
-0
.0
16
9
*
-0
.0
1
89
*
**
-0
.0
04
8
8*
**
-0
.0
0
70
4
-0
.1
25
*
**
-0
.1
07
**
*
-0
.0
31
8
*
-0
.0
40
6*
**
-0
.0
06
7
4*
**
-0
.0
10
7
(-
5.
39
)
(-
5.
71
)
(-
2
.0
0
)
(-
4.
89
)
(-
5
.0
9)
(-
1.
7
7)
(-
5.
49
)
(-
6
.2
6
)
(-
2
.0
0
)
(-
4.
25
)
(-
4
.4
3
)
(-
1
.6
2)
(-
4
.1
2)
(-
5.
2
7)
(-
2
.5
0)
(-
3.
93
)
(-
4.
38
)
(-
1.
30
)
U
p
p
er
se
co
n
d
ar
y
ed
u
c
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.1
52
**
-0
.1
67
**
*
-0
.0
1
47
*
-0
.0
06
7
1*
*
*
-0
.0
05
12
**
*
-0
.0
04
0
1
-0
.1
2
3*
**
-0
.1
3
2*
**
-0
.0
2
69
*
-0
.0
19
3*
**
-0
.0
0
68
8*
*
*
-0
.0
04
35
-0
.1
4
3*
**
-0
.1
16
*
**
-0
.0
36
8
**
-0
.0
36
9
**
-0
.0
07
56
**
*
-0
.0
07
41
(-
3.
27
)
(-
4.
64
)
(-
2
.0
3
)
(-
4.
53
)
(-
4
.0
0)
(-
1.
1
9)
(-
4.
03
)
(-
5
.7
7
)
(-
2
.5
3
)
(-
3.
96
)
(-
4
.7
2
)
(-
0
.9
0)
(-
4
.4
9)
(-
4.
6
0)
(-
3
.2
0)
(-
3.
19
)
(-
4.
98
)
(-
0.
91
)
T
ec
h
/v
o
c
ed
u
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.1
63
**
*
-0
.2
11
**
*
-0
.0
12
3
-0
.0
04
8
2*
*
-0
.0
06
45
*
**
-0
.0
0
41
5
-0
.0
51
7
-0
.0
81
5*
*
*
-0
.0
1
88
*
-0
.0
11
7*
-0
.0
0
52
2
**
*
-0
.0
03
74
-0
.0
57
1
-0
.0
66
3*
-0
.0
23
0
-0
.0
24
6*
-0
.0
0
46
3*
*
-0
.0
02
44
(-
3.
70
)
(-
4.
36
)
(-
1
.6
9
)
(-
2.
98
)
(-
5
.0
4)
(-
1.
4
4)
(-
1.
55
)
(-
3
.5
0
)
(-
2
.2
5
)
(-
2.
24
)
(-
3
.8
7
)
(-
0
.7
9)
(-
1
.3
3)
(-
2.
3
5)
(-
1
.7
9)
(-
2.
07
)
(-
2.
66
)
(-
0.
25
)
U
n
iv
er
s.
E
d
u
(y
es
=
1)
-0
.3
75
*
**
-0
.3
78
*
**
-0
.0
16
3
-0
.0
00
58
6
-0
.0
04
95
**
*
-0
.0
04
12
-0
.0
2
92
-0
.0
3
04
-0
.0
22
2
*
0.
00
0
73
1
-0
.0
02
1
3
-0
.0
03
39
0.
05
84
0.
03
9
3
-0
.0
06
95
0.
00
09
59
-0
.0
0
04
56
-0
.0
00
88
3
(-
9.
44
)
(-
7.
52
)
(-
1
.7
5
)
(-
0.
29
)
(-
3
.9
5)
(-
1.
6
2)
(-
0.
50
)
(-
0
.7
6
)
(-
2
.3
8
)
(0
.1
1)
(-
1
.1
5
)
(-
0
.7
8)
(0
.9
3)
(0
.8
3
)
(-
0.
52
)
(0
.0
7)
(-
0.
24
)
(-
0.
09
)
G
eo
gr
ap
h
ic
a
l
lo
c
(u
rb
an
=
1)
-0
.2
5
6*
*
*
-0
.2
4
1*
*
*
-0
.0
03
29
-0
.0
01
89
*
-0
.0
07
50
*
**
-0
.0
0
24
8*
*
-0
.0
9
75
**
*
-0
.0
93
2*
**
-0
.0
06
5
5
-0
.0
01
9
7
-0
.0
05
8
9*
**
-0
.0
0
37
0*
-0
.0
16
1
-0
.0
0
95
9
-0
.0
0
19
9
0.
0
04
97
-0
.0
0
25
9*
*
-0
.0
00
05
74
(-
9.
79
)
(-
7.
11
)
(-
0
.7
2
)
(-
2.
40
)
(-
7
.4
0)
(-
2.
7
5)
(-
5.
07
)
(-
7
.4
0
)
(-
1
.4
0
)
(-
0.
77
)
(-
6
.5
4
)
(-
2
.3
8)
(-
0
.8
2)
(-
0.
7
5)
(-
0
.3
7)
(0
.8
8)
(-
2
.6
2)
(-
0.
02
)
lp
p
c
in
co
m
n
-0
.6
68
**
*
-0
.6
7
1*
*
*
0
.0
04
72
-0
.0
14
8*
**
-0
.0
0
56
9
**
*
-0
.0
04
44
*
**
-0
.5
1
1*
*
*
-0
.4
6
8*
*
*
-0
.0
24
0*
*
*
-0
.0
3
7
2*
**
-0
.0
0
99
2*
*
*
-0
.0
10
4
**
*
-0
.4
20
*
**
-0
.3
48
**
*
-0
.0
58
0*
**
-0
.0
72
3*
**
-0
.0
12
3*
**
-0
.0
19
8*
**
(-
39
.7
3)
(-
37
.1
3)
(1
.2
0
)
(-
17
.4
2)
(-
10
.0
6)
(-
4.
68
)
(-
29
.5
6
)
(-
3
0.
80
)
(-
6
.1
3
)
(-
1
2.
97
)
(-
1
1.
0
4)
(-
4
.4
4
)
(-
2
2.
23
)
(-
21
.3
9
)
(-
9
.0
0)
(-
10
.2
9)
(-
10
.3
9
)
(-
3.
66
)
co
n
s
5.
18
1*
**
5.
13
0*
**
-0
.0
05
72
0.
15
5
**
*
0.
10
5*
**
0.
0
89
1*
*
*
3.
8
45
**
*
3
.4
6
9*
**
0.
2
33
**
*
0.
38
9*
*
*
0
.1
1
8*
**
0.
15
1
3.
41
2*
**
2.
75
0
**
*
0.
46
2
**
*
0.
74
5*
*
*
0.
12
1*
**
0.
25
7
(2
5.
94
)
(2
3.
21
)
(-
0
.1
3)
(1
1.
2
0)
(1
4.
15
)
(4
.3
7
)
(2
0.
5
7)
(1
9
.0
1)
(3
.7
1)
(8
.2
5
)
(1
1.
4
5)
(1
.6
8)
(1
4.
31
)
(1
5.
4
4)
(6
.6
3
)
(6
.9
7)
(1
0.
23
)
(0
.3
7)
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
b
el
ow
th
e
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
co
effi
ci
en
ts
.
∗p
≤
0
.1
0
;
∗
∗
p
≤
0
.0
5
;
∗
∗
∗p
≤
0
.0
1
170
4.6 Conclusions
Appendix 4B - Additional income and con-
sumption estimates (robustness checks)
Table 4B-1: Panel regression on household income in Vietnam (2002-06) with
time trends
dep.var.: log of real pc income Coeff. Std. Err.
Age hh head 0.012 0.0166
Age sq. hh head -0.000*** 0.000160
hh size -0.162*** 0.0278
hh size sq 0.008*** 0.00215
No of children -0.042** 0.0170
Married hh head (yes=1) 0.0162 0.0759
hh head sex (male=1) -0.056 0.0921
Prim educ (yes=1) 0.025 0.0387
Low secondary educ (yes=1) 0.027 0.0497
Upper secondary educ (yes=1) -0.005 0.0769
Tech/voc edu (yes=1) 0.110+ 0.0686
Univers. Edu (yes=1) -0.046 0.123
Geographical loc (urban=1) -0.319*** 0.108
time trend 0.215*** 0.0180
Cons 8.973*** 0.681
Fixed effects:
household yes
year yes
trade categories yes
No Obs. 2964
R-sq 0.824
Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p ≤ 0.15 ∗ p ≤ 0.10; ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01
In the fixed effects specification the category ”non-traded activities” and year 2002 act, respectively, as the benchmark
from trade-related and year fixed effects.
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Table 4B-2: Panel regression on household consumption in Vietnam (2002-06) with
income residuals controlling for trade categories time trend
dep.var.: log of real pc consumption 1 (with pi) 2 (with pi2) 3 (with pi3)
Ex-ante components
permanent risk
(expected wealth in scaling factor=
L. real pc cons.) -0.0000234 -0.000108 -6.46e-08** -7.74e-08*** -1.18e-11*** -1.32e-11***
(0.000224) (0.000248) (2.58e-08) (2.75e-08) (3.08e-12) (3.37e-12)
transitory risk -0.00000809 0.000114 -5.45e-09 4.27e-10 1.36e-12 1.95e-12
(0.000169) (0.000175) (1.40e-08) (1.46e-08) (1.52e-12) (1.62e-12)
Ex-post components
Age hh head 0.0418** 0.0424*** 0.0421** 0.0433*** 0.0423** 0.0434***
(0.0165) (0.0159) (0.0164) (0.0159) (0.0165) (0.0159)
Age sq. hh head -0.000395** -0.000399*** -0.000399*** -0.000408*** -0.000400*** -0.000410***
(0.000153) (0.000148) (0.000153) (0.000148) (0.000153) (0.000148)
hh size -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.159*** -0.161*** -0.159*** -0.160***
(0.0300) (0.0298) (0.0297) (0.0294) (0.0295) (0.0292)
hh size sq 0.00616*** 0.00613*** 0.00619*** 0.00625*** 0.00616*** 0.00622***
(0.00226) (0.00223) (0.00225) (0.00222) (0.00224) (0.00221)
No of children -0.0527** -0.0517** -0.0528** -0.0522** -0.0535** -0.0529**
(0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0230) (0.0233)
Married hh head (yes=1) 0.0339 0.0341 0.0317 0.0309 0.0327 0.0319
(0.0865) (0.0836) (0.0866) (0.0837) (0.0865) (0.0838)
hh head sex (male=1) -0.0215 -0.0316 -0.0191 -0.0268 -0.0207 -0.0275
(0.0916) (0.0895) (0.0916) (0.0894) (0.0915) (0.0895)
Prim educ (yes=1) 0.0404 0.0394 0.0405 0.0397 0.0402 0.0393
(0.0462) (0.0465) (0.0466) (0.0468) (0.0464) (0.0466)
Low secondary educ (yes=1) 0.0832 0.0817 0.0837 0.0814 0.0834 0.0806
(0.0582) (0.0584) (0.0584) (0.0586) (0.0583) (0.0584)
Upper secondary educ (yes=1) 0.0136 0.00632 0.0146 0.00722 0.0141 0.00640
(0.0819) (0.0812) (0.0822) (0.0813) (0.0820) (0.0812)
Tech/voc edu (yes=1) 0.0706 0.0701 0.0736 0.0730 0.0724 0.0711
(0.0665) (0.0668) (0.0667) (0.0670) (0.0665) (0.0668)
Univers. Edu (yes=1) 0.236* 0.226+ 0.238* 0.227+ 0.237* 0.226+
(0.138) (0.139) (0.138) (0.140) (0.138) (0.140)
Geographical loc (urban=1) 0.171** 0.157* 0.170** 0.154* 0.172** 0.155*
(0.0711) (0.0852) (0.0707) (0.0850) (0.0705) (0.0849)
cons 8.245*** 8.220*** 8.243*** 8.222*** 8.225*** 8.205***
(0.546) (0.538) (0.540) (0.533) (0.543) (0.538)
pos. Income shocks 2.400*** 2.404*** 2.559*** 2.689*** 2.515*** 2.650***
(0.570) (0.565) (0.535) (0.530) (0.533) (0.530)
neg. Income shocks 2.313*** 2.126*** 2.283*** 2.180*** 2.247*** 2.156***
(0.531) (0.535) (0.505) (0.505) (0.504) (0.503)
Fixed effects:
trade-related:
Exporting industries -0.0953* -0.0925* -0.0915*
(0.0507) (0.0502) (0.0502)
Import-competing industries -0.0637+ -0.0560 -0.0503
(0.0415) (0.0407) (0.0409)
Rice -0.0403+ -0.0415+ -0.0411+
(0.0270) (0.0269) (0.0269)
Main export crops -0.170*** -0.169*** -0.171***
(0.0536) (0.0521) (0.0522)
Other export crops -0.0880+ -0.0855+ -0.0830+
(0.0567) (0.0556) (0.0554)
import-competing crops -0.146*** -0.123*** -0.115***
(0.0537) (0.0447) (0.0435)
Non-traded food -0.0658 -0.0579 -0.0542
(0.0989) (0.0978) (0.0978)
household yes yes yes yes yes yes
years yes yes yes yes yes yes
No Obs. 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976
Adj R-sq 0.823 0.824 0.824 0.825 0.825 0.826
Robust standard errors in parentheses. +p ≤ 0.15; ∗p ≤ 0.10; ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01
In the fixed effects specification the category ”non-traded activities” and year 2002 act, respectively, as the benchmark
from trade-related and year fixed effects.
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Although each essay focuses on a specific issue, by putting them together,
this thesis provides a thorough understanding of trade-induced vulnerability,
both conceptually and empirically. Moreover, in all the reported empirical
analyses - except those with cross-sectional data (Essay 3) - we are able to
isolate a clean measure of the ex-ante permanent risk, by filtering out possi-
ble measurement errors using Carroll and Samwick’s (1997) decomposition,
as well as to control for possible additional endogeneity in the model by using
panel fixed effects (Essay 4) and system-GMM estimation techniques (Essay
2). In this respect, Essay 3 is an exception. It is a first effort to present
a comprehensive analysis of vulnerability under Doi Moi by exploiting the
full set of available rounds of household surveys currently available. While
the lack of panel data makes it impossible to rule out the influence of un-
observables, this effort represents, in my opinion, a fruitful way to address
the issue, conceptually. Since we are facing a chronic lack of panel data
in developing contexts and market failures hamper the actual predictability
of simulation exercises, I believe that deriving insights from available cross-
sectional data, taking explicitly into account the problems of observability
without the availability of panels, actually represents an opportunity that
should not be missed. It would be at least as fruitful as investing in the
creation of additional panel data at the household level.
The review of the literature in Essay 1 clearly shows that trade openness
could in principle magnify risk, impact on households’ optimal portfolios, and
lead to net welfare effects that are less positive than expected in the long run.
As a result, households in the midst of trade reforms may employ strategies
to mitigate risks and reduce welfare variability. For instance, households
may try to reduce the variability of their welfare by relying on income di-
versification (i.e., combining activities with low positive covariance), income
skewing (i.e., allocating resources to low-risk and low-return activities), as-
set smoothing, strategic migration, etc. (Dercon, 2005). These actions can
result in deviations from a smoothing path of consumption (and saving) be-
haviour and/or imply, especially for the poor, conservative choices that lower
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the expected value of income (and consumption) in exchange for lower vari-
ability. Hence, these strategies can be costly in the short run (Coate and
Ravallion, 1993; Udry, 1994; Townsend, 1994, 1995; Besley, 1995; Morduch,
2002; Elbers and Gunning, 2007; Giles and Yoo, 2007; Jalan and Ravail-
lon, 2001) with negative permanent effects also in the long-run (Ravallion
1988; Morduch 1994; Dercon, 2005). Consequentely, any measure of trade-
induced vulnerability which is not able to take adequately into account the
risk-induced component of “ex-ante” changes in behaviour is biased down-
wards. For example, households in the midst of a trade reform may deviate
from consumption smoothing to safeguard against unexpected future bad
shocks by carrying out “extra saving” (shying away from profitable but risky
investments) and/or by self-imposed reluctance to borrow (Caroll, 2001, Ca-
ballero, 1990, Deaton, 1992) with permanent effects on their welfare. This
is the innermost source of vulnerability since it is neither directly observable
nor linked to an actual manifestation of shocks.
Essay 2 builds on this intuition using a long cross-country panel data set.
It highlights a significant cross-country association, on average and ceteris
paribus, between ex-ante permanent risk and deviations from consumption
smoothing, resulting in a significant amount of extra-saving and lower con-
sumption prospects. It shows that this is particularly evident in the most
recent decades and holds across the entire income distribution. The conclu-
sion argues that standard certainty equivalent analyses that do not control
for the precautionary saving component can be affected by omitted variable
bias and underestimate risk. On the other hand, it also shows that these
empirical results ultimately confirm the Lucas’s (1987) intuition regarding
the low value of stabilisation policies.
Consistent empirical evidence is derived in Essay 3 by relaxing the repre-
sentative agent assumption and taking advantage of the availability of sev-
eral rounds of household living standard survey data (VLSS and VHLSS,
covering a period between 1992 and 2008). Even if, as already stated, this
empirical exercise cannot be considered a proper test of the precautionary
saving theory because of its static nature, these results are consistent with
the provisions made by theory, i.e., that ex-ante risk implies a lower level
of current consumption. The inconsistency of alternative interpretations of
these results is apparent: why should both the unobservable heterogeneity
and measurement error change according to household trade exposure across
sectors? And why are households working in the more exposed trading sector
more, and increasingly, severely affected by unobservables and measurement
errors than households working in the less trade-exposed sector? And, even
more so, why should the impact of unobservables and measurement errors on
consumption behaviour be negative? To provide explanations, we need to as-
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sume that the households that self-select to participate in the more exposed
trade sectors present a set of common characteristics, unobserved to the re-
searcher, or alternatively a common path in their relative measurement error,
that have a negative impact on their consumption behaviour. Even if these
assumptions are correct, the empirical result would still be a very relevant
issue for policymaking and would imply a partial revision of the assumed
trade benefits for the welfare of Vietnamese households working in the most
exposed trading sector. As a matter of fact, the nature of the heterogeneity
of the ex-ante income innovation on trade-related sectors as well as the role
of risk management strategies actually engaged in by Vietnamese households
need more careful investigation.
Essay 4 applies the same empirical exercise to the available set of panel
data (at the expense of reducing the time span of the analysis) and presents
an extended version of Ligon and Schechter’s (2003) measure of vulnerabil-
ity as low expected utility in order to isolate the trade component of vul-
nerability. This shows more robust empirical outcomes: first, risk-induced
vulnerability consistently matters in determining the overall vulnerability of
households and second, the relative inability, on average, to share risks across
households involved in different trade-related clusters. This confirms the in-
tuition that trade-related risks (i.e., risks that are not fully shared across
trade-related industries) matter in determining household overall vulnerabil-
ity. Third, it shows that ex-ante permanent risk is significantly correlated
with both poverty, via the precautionary saving channel, and all the sub-
elements of the risk components of vulnerability (trade-related included).
Fourth, it shows that the relative impact of ex-ante permanent risk actually
increases as vulnerability distribution increases (with the most vulnerable
households being the most severely affected).
The main contribution of this work has been to provide a set of useful in-
sights to reconcile, conceptually and empirically, the theory of precautionary
saving with an empirical analysis of vulnerability, that have been considered
to date as two separate issues (current vulnerability measures continue to
use average consumption as the risk-free counterfactual). Second, it demon-
strates, empirically, that household consumption behaviour is sensitive to
permanent risk and that this empirical evidence holds both in a long-term
(pre-crisis) cross-country (see Essay 2) scenario and in a within-country con-
text (see Essays 3 and 4). Third, it shows different workable methods of
complementing current standard vulnerability measures with an analysis of
trade-related risks (taking advantage of empirical evidence of the absence of
full risk sharing across households clustered in different trading industries).
Finally, it detects empirically significant differences in household vulnerabil-
ity showing that the relative impact of the ex-ante permanent risk (included
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its trade-related component) actually increases as vulnerability distribution
increases (with the most vulnerable households being the most severely af-
fected).
This research has strong policy implications. First of all, by demonstrat-
ing that the characteristics of the vulnerable differ significantly from those of
the poor, it shows that targeting only the latter means that we exclude a sig-
nificant group of households that are at risk of a decline in living standards.
Moreover, it challenges the widespread idea that the poor will be among
the most vulnerable people (World Bank, 2000; Calvo & Dercon, 2007a).
Empirical analyses show that: i) shocks occur everywhere across the income
distribution and affect the poor and non-poor alike (Tesliuc and Lindert,
2004); ii) the poor can show a higher degree of resilience even if they rely
on coping strategies that could damage their growth prospects (Jalan & Ra-
vaillon, 1999, Zimmerman & Carter, 2003; Carter & Barrett, 2006; Carter &
al., 2007). This illustrates a key difference between resilience and responsive-
ness that is also worth bearing in mind when drawing policy implications.
Second, it demonstrates that output volatility does not translate one for one
to consumption volatility and that ex-ante permanent risk is significantly
correlated with both poverty, via the precautionary saving channel, and all
the subcomponents of the risk components of vulnerability. Finally, it shows
that risk-induced vulnerability consistently matters in determining house-
holds’ overall vulnerability and, specifically, that trade-related risks (i.e.,
risks that are not fully shared across trade-related industries) also matter in
determining household overall vulnerability.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first conceptualisation, supported
by thorough empirical assessments, of the influence of trade-related risks on
household vulnerability. Although it does not represent, by any means, an
argument against free trade, it is a necessary quest to deepen our knowledge
of the stabilisation needs linked to trade reforms ranging from the promotion
of credible stabilisation policies (e.g., reducing price fluctuations) to the de-
sign of new insurance schemes that target vulnerable households (e.g., raise
the creditworthiness of small farmers’ participation in export cropping). As
a result, this work clearly improves our capacity to assess the “vulnerability
hazard” of trade reforms, at different levels of analysis. While an evalua-
tion of the impact of covariate risks induced by trade openness is of major
interest to international economic policy, an assessment of trade-related id-
iosyncratic risks will help national policymakers to set priorities and cali-
brate domestic mitigation strategies and safety nets. The empirical evidence
of the persistence of a significant presence of risk-induced vulnerable house-
holds in Vietnam during Doi Moi, combined with the inability to share risks
by households clustered in different trade-related groups of activities, should
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inform national policy in terms of safety nets. In this respect, it has to be
stressed once more that trade-induced vulnerability is not directly observable
or linked to the actual manifestation of shocks.
While informative and comprehensive, this piece of work prepares the
ground for a number of additional research questions. First, Essays 1, 3 and
4 highlight the significance and relevance of the “meso” dimension of vul-
nerability. At present, this appears to be one of the most promising paths
towards empirical evidence of trade-induced vulnerability at the household
level thanks to the robust empirical evidence of heterogeneity in risk exposure
by trading industries. What actually drives this heterogeneity (heterogene-
ity in risk-mitigating strategies and/or in the inherent exposure to different
kinds of foreign risks) is something that needs additional careful investiga-
tion. Second, Essay 4 presents a first attempt to provide an extended version
of VEU. The primary scope of this piece of work was to amend it to filter
out a “meso trade-related” component of permanent risk. It incidentally also
dealt with the main weakness of the VEU measure related to the inability
to take full account of precautionary saving behaviour. While this essay
presents a first insight into this issue by filtering out the ex-ante risk from
ex-post shock within the VEU measure, additional efforts should be made to
provide a causal analysis of their relative influence on the separate poverty
and risk-induced VEU components.
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